COMPETING AGAINST ADAPTIVE AGENTS BY MINIMIZING COUNTERFACTUAL NOTIONS OF REGRET by Marinov, Teodor Vanislavov
COMPETING AGAINST ADAPTIVE AGENTS BY MINIMIZING
COUNTERFACTUAL NOTIONS OF REGRET
by
Teodor Vanislavov Marinov
A dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University in conformity
with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Baltimore, Maryland
June, 2021
© 2021 Teodor V. Marinov
All rights reserved
Abstract
Online learning or sequential decision making is formally defined as a repeated game
between an adversary and a player. At every round of the game the player chooses
an action from a fixed action set and the adversary reveals a reward/loss for the
action played. The goal of the player is to maximize the cumulative reward of her
actions. The rewards/losses could be sampled from an unknown distribution or other
less restrictive assumptions can be made. The standard measure of performance is the
cumulative regret, that is the difference between the cumulative reward of the player
and the best achievable reward by a fixed action, or more generally a fixed policy,
on the observed reward sequence. For adversaries which are oblivious to the player’s
strategy, regret is a meaningful measure. However, the adversary is usually adaptive,
e.g., in healthcare a patient will respond to given treatments, and for self-driving cars
other traffic will react to the behavior of the autonomous agent. In such settings the
notion of regret is hard to interpret as the best action in hindsight might not be the
best action overall, given the behavior of the adversary. To resolve this problem a new
notion called policy regret is introduced. Policy regret is fundamentally different
from other forms of regret as it is counterfactual in nature, i.e., the player competes
against all other policies whose reward is calculated by taking into account how the
adversary would have behaved had the player chosen another policy. This thesis
studies policy regret in a partial (bandit) feedback environment, beyond the worst
case setting, by leveraging additional structure such as stochasticity/stability of the
adversary or additional feedback.
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Machine learning has exploded as a field in the past decade. Complex systems have
been applied in impactful areas like healthcare, economically important tasks like
market predictions, futuristic tasks like building self-driving cars and more mundane
tasks like car navigation and ad placement/recommendations. While the practical
success of such systems is undeniable, theoretical understanding of this success has
been somewhat lacking. Indeed, classical theory of statistical learning, while well
suited to problems in which there is an abundance of data all sampled from the same
population, has struggled to explain the behavior of systems applied to any of the
tasks above, in which data is plagued by adversarial corruptions, hidden confounding
and its distribution may shift over time and adapt to the system’s outputs. Moreover,
in the above examples, successful systems are constantly evolving and learning is
perpetual. The paradigm of online learning is arguably better suited to explain the
performance of such systems.
1.1 Summary of contributions of this work
This thesis consists of four seemingly different problems spanning the topics of game
theory, online learning and reinforcement learning. All the works, however, share a
common theme, which is to study the online learning game in an adaptive setting.
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Formally, we study policy regret minimization and its benefits in novel settings,
beyond the worst case, provide meaningful regret guarantees for these settings and
study how close to optimal these guarantees are.
We begin the study of policy regret in Chapter 2 by showing that it is indeed
possible to improve on the bandit regret bound, if the player receives additional
feedback about rewards of other actions together with the the reward of the played
action. The feedback is modeled by a graph, where each vertex represents an action
and playing an action also reveals the reward of all of its neighbors. While standard
guarantees scale with the number of actions (K or |A|), the novel bound only depends
on the amount of information actions reveal about each other. In particular, if a few
actions reveal information about all other actions, then the bound is constant in the
number of actions. Formally the bound scales with the domination number of
the feedback graph. While bounds scaling with domination number are known in the
stochastic setting (Buccapatnam et al., 2014b), that is the losses are sampled from
an unknown distribution, this is not the case in the adversarial setting. Most other
work in the adversarial online learning with graph feedback literature scale with the
independence number of the feedback graph (Mannor and Shamir, 2011; Alon
et al., 2013; Kocák et al., 2014; Alon et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2016; Valko, 2016;
Lykouris et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020b), which is always greater than the domination
number. The upper bounds are supplemented by min-max lower bounds, showing that
it is impossible to go beyond the T 2/3 regret bounds, unless all actions are observable
at the same time. Further, we show a problem instance on which it is impossible
to do better than the proposed regret upper bounds, including the dependence on
domination number.
In many real world problems there is no single adversary but rather multiple
self-interested agents competing in an environment, each with their own set of rewards.
Our goal is to select the agent yielding the highest total reward. As a motivating
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example consider the online contractual display ads allocation problem: when users
visit a website, say some page of the online site of a national newspaper, an ads
allocation algorithm (the player) chooses an ad to display at each specific slot with the
goal of achieving the largest value. To do so, the ads allocation algorithm chooses one
out of a large set of advertisers (self-interested agents). Each advertiser has their own
marketing strategy, usually following their own no-regret algorithm. The number of
ads or arms can be very large. The number of advertisers can also be large in practice,
depending on the domain. The number of times the ads allocation is run is in the
order of millions or even billions per day, depending on the category of items. In the
above example, at every round, the player will only be able to provide feedback to the
agent whose ad was displayed. This in turn implies that only that agent will be able
to update its internal state. Because the rewards we observe are dependent on the
displayed ads and therefore dependent on the internal state of each agent, solving this
corralling problem, requires counterfactual reasoning. Thus our goal is to minimize
policy regret, which would guarantee that we would not discard the best agent should
she perform poorly in initial rounds. The study of corralling adversarial bandit
algorithms was initiated in Agarwal et al. (2016), who give sublinear regret guarantees.
In Chapter 3, we extend their work by proposing a corralling strategy which also
works for stochastic bandit algorithms and enjoys gap-dependent regret bounds, under
the assumption that there is a positive gap between the reward of the best arm of the
best base algorithm and the rewards of any other algorithm. These regret bounds are
syntactically similar to instance dependent bounds discussed in Section 1.2.2.2. The
algorithm is a version of FTRL with 1/2-Tsallis entropy regularization and a special
step-size schedule inspired by Agarwal et al. (2016). As such it is able to corral bandit
algorithms both when rewards are stochastic or adversarial. Finally, we supplement
our theoretical results with experiments on a synthetic dataset, showing that our
approach outperforms prior work.
3
In Chapter 4 we investigate policy regret in a game-theoretic setting. In this
setting there is no central algorithm as in the corralling setting. Rather, each player’s
rewards are both a function of the environment and of other players actions. The
goal of each player is again to maximise their own cumulative reward. Each player
observes the reward of her actions at every round, unlike in the corralling setting. Two
examples of games are network package routing and vehicle traffic routing. In both
cases players are competing for shared resources and the utility of each player decreases
as function of the number of other players using the same resource. Classical game
theory studies how players can converge to equilibrium states in such games and what
the social welfare is in such states. It is well known that if all parties play according
to a no-regret rule, that is the regret of every player with respect to the observed
rewards is o(T ), then their play would converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium
(CCE) (see for example Nisan et al. (2007)). In general, different types of no-regret
play have been shown to converge to different types of equilibria (Hazan and Kale,
2008). Further the social welfare of such equilibria has been investigated for certain
classes of games (Roughgarden, 2015), which contain the above examples, showing
that it is no worse than twice the best possible. Policy regret intuitively seems like
a stronger notion than regret, so it is natural to ask what would happen in a game
if players were to play strategies minimizing policy regret rather than simple regret.
In (Arora et al., 2018), we show that in 2-player games, the players will converge to a
new type of equilibrium called Policy Equillibrium (PE). Surprisingly, we also show
that the class of PE contains the class of CCE as a strict subset and that policy regret
is in fact not comparable to external regret. Finally, we show that as long as both
agents play natural no-regret algorithms they will also achieve sublinear policy regret.
This is in contrast with the adversarial setting, where different algorithms are needed
for achieving strong policy regret guarantees.
In Chapter 5, we study the Reinforcement learning (RL) problem. The reinforce-
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ment learning problem is often modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The
standard comparator in RL is the difference between the total reward of the player’s
policy and the best overall policy for the given MDP making policy regret the defacto
measurement of success. There is a vast variety of settings under which RL problems
are studied. Our work focuses on the episodic tabular setting, in which the interactions
with the environment proceed in K episodes, each of length H. The MDP is assumed
to have finite number of states and actions, however, no additional assumptions
are made. Most prior work has focused on deriving regret bounds sub-linear in the
number of interactions T = HK. Notable exceptions are the works of (Simchowitz and
Jamieson, 2019; Lykouris et al., 2019; Jin and Luo, 2020), who all derive optimistic
bounds, based on a definition of gap which captures the difference between total
reward of the best policy and sub-optimal policies at every state-action pair. We
investigate the smallest achievable optimistic regret by deriving information theoretic
lower bounds for two classes of MDPs – MDPs with deterministic transitions and
MDPs in which every state is visited by an optimal policy with non-zero probability.
To derive such lower bounds we also need to assume that the value function of optimal
policies and all reward functions are uniformly bounded by one. With the insight from
these lower bounds we show that the regret of optimistic algorithms can be much
smaller, depending on the structure of the MDP, than what was previously showed.
1.2 The online learning game
Online learning is concerned with studying the sequential decision making problem
which is often modelled as a repeated game between an adversary or an unknown
environment and a player, usually represented by an algorithm. While there are many
ways to model this repeated game, we are going to focus on the following finite horizon
scenario.
5
• The game will have T ∈ N rounds.
• During every round, t ∈ [T ]1, of the game the player must take an action at
from a fixed action set A.
• Further the adversary prepares a hidden loss ℓt (or reward rt)2 function which
maps actions to real numbers.
• The player then observes the loss of her actions and possibly the loss over some
or all remaining actions.
In general we will assume that the loss is bounded in [0, 1], or if it is random, then has
bounded sub-Gaussian norm. The goal of the player is to minimise her cumulative
loss over the span of the game. The above game is very flexible and can represent
multiple problems in Machine Learning, Statistics, Optimization and Game Theory.
We now give two examples.
The experts problem: In the experts problem (Freund and Schapire, 1997)
the set of actions, A = {1, 2, . . . , K}, consists of different expert advisors. At every
round of the game, the player selects an expert it ∈ A and follows their advise. After
selecting the expert, the player gets to observe the loss for the advise given by all the
experts. The experts could be financial advisors managing the player’s portfolio or in
a gambling scenario could be the player’s friends who bet on outcomes of sport games.
Convex Optimization: One could view the problem of optimizing a convex
function, f : A → R, through first order oracle queries as a version of the above
game. At every round the player selects an iterate at as a guess about the optimum
of the convex function and the adversary presents to the player the gradient (or
more generally an element of the sub-differential) at at, given by ∇f(at). It is not
1[T ] denotes the set {1, . . . , T}.
2Because our work deals with both stochastic and adversarial online learning we will use losses or
rewards depending on what is more convenient for the discussion.
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immediately clear why we are interested in minimizing the cumulative loss, however,
using convexity it is possible to convert a regret bound on the sequence (∇f(at))Tt=1
to a guarantee about approximately minimizing f . This is done using the so called
online to batch conversion which uses ˆ︁a = 1
T
∑︁T
t=1 at as an approximate minimizer.
While in the convex optimization example above the set A consists of infinitely
many actions, in our work we are primarily interested in sets of finite size |A| = K.
1.2.1 Regret minimization
As already mentioned, the goal of the player is to minimize her cumulative loss.
However, this is not sufficient to determine how well the player is doing after the T
rounds have expired. For example, it is unreasonable to expect that the player will
incur the smallest possible loss on every round of the game. Thus we would like to
choose a suitable comparator against which the player’s loss will be measured. In
the experts problem described above one possible benchmark is to compare with the
smallest cumulative loss obtained by an expert. In general we can compete with the
smallest cumulative loss of any fixed action. The difference between the player’s loss
and the smallest cumulative loss is known as (external) regret (Foster and Vohra,










In general, one is interested in algorithms which enjoy sublinear regret guarantees
over all problem instances, that is for all adversaries the regret of the player’s strategy
is bounded by o(T ) with high probability.
There are several related quantities to 1.1. First, we can define the regret of the









Most algorithms in this work will have expected regret bounds of the form E[Ra(T )] ≤
o(T ),∀a ∈ A. Here the expectation is taken with respect to the possible randomization
in the algorithm and any randomness coming from the strategy of the adversary. Note
that the strategy of the adversary might depend on the player’s strategy as well, which
introduces additional randomness in the losses. One might be tempted to reason that
if E[Ra(T )] ≤ o(T ) for all actions then the expected regret, E[R(T )], is also bounded.
Unfortunately this is not always true, exactly because of the fact that the adversary
might be adaptive, that is they tailor their strategy based on what the player has
done so far. Another quantity of interest which arises from bounds on E[Ra(T )] is
the pseudo regret3:











As already discussed, pseudo regret is a weaker notion than the expected regret and a
simple application of Jensen’s inequality shows that E[R(T )] ≤ E[R(T )]. In the case
when the adversary is oblivious, i.e., they have prepared the loss sequence (ℓt)Tt=1
before the start of the game then it holds that E[R(T )] = E[R(T )]. One instance of
oblivious adversaries is when each of the losses, ℓt(a), is sampled according to some
unknown distribution.
1.2.1.1 Other notions of regret
External regret was introduced by comparing the cumulative loss of the player to the
cumulative loss of the best fixed action in hindsight. Changing the comparator class
gives rise to other different notions of regret. For example, one can compare against
the best fixed function τ : A → A. The resulting regret is known as swap regret
(Blum and Mansour, 2007). It turns out that one can build algorithms with at most
o(T ) swap regret from algorithms with o(T ) external regret by an elegant reduction
3Most of this work focuses on bounding pseudo regret and hence we will refer to pseudo-regret
simply as regret.
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provided by Blum and Mansour (2007). One can take this notion of regret further by
using functions as the comparator which might depend on the history of the player’s
actions (Lehrer, 2003). Mohri and Yang (2014) design efficient algorithms for the
setting when τ : As → A is a function defined for fixed s (independent of the time
horizon T ) and at time t exchanges the past s actions of the player for the comparator
action τ(at−s+1, . . . , at). The regret in this setting is called conditional swap regret.
Further, Mohri and Yang (2017) extend the comparator class to weighted finite-state
automata and show how to minimize the respective transductive regret.
If one takes s = t at round t, that is to consider an unrestricted comparator
function, they will arrive at what is known as dynamic regret (Zinkevich, 2003).
Unsurprisingly, in the worst case it is impossible to design algorithms with o(T )
dynamic regret. However, it is possible to design strategies with dynamic regret
bounded by meaningful quantities depending on how rapidly losses change, which in
the worst case are linear in T .
1.2.2 Full information and Bandit games
In our description of the online learning game we did not specify exactly what feedback
the player receives from the adversary. Intuitively, games in which the player only
observes the loss of the action she played at round t should be harder than games in
which she observes the loss of all possible actions in A. Indeed, the player receives
|A| times less information in the former scenario. We call feedback in which only
the loss of the played action is revealed bandit feedback. Feedback in which the
player observes the full loss vector at every round is referred to as full information
feedback.
The experts and convex optimization problems which we discussed above are
both problems with full information feedback. The following simplified version of the
experts problem is first studied by Littlestone (1988): at every step all the experts
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make a binary prediction. The observed loss is just the zero-one loss. Further, it is
assumed that there exists at least one expert which is correct at every round of the
game, that is they always have zero loss on their prediction. A halving algorithm,
which maintains a set of active experts (which have not made a mistake so far) is
proposed. At every round of the game the algorithm selects the prediction with
majority vote. If the prediction is correct the game continues, otherwise the algorithm
updates the set of active experts by removing all experts who have made a mistake.
The regret of this algorithm is O(log (|A|)).
While the halving algorithm is natural, we can not expect that there is always an
expert (or action) which has zero loss. Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) propose the
Randomized Weighted Majority algorithm. The idea behind the weighted majority
algorithm is to keep a set of weights wt,i, one per each expert and at every round
update the weights as wt+1,i = (1 − ηℓt(i))wt,i, where η is some fixed parameter. The
expert which is chosen at time t is sampled with probability proportional to their
weight. The regret of this strategy is bounded by O(
√︂
log (|A|)T ) for appropriately
set η. Freund and Schapire (1997) later proposed the Hedge algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Hedge can be seen as a version of the weighted majority algorithm, however, instead
of updating the weights through a linear function of the losses, one updates them
with an exponential function. Hedge has similar regret guarantees to the weighted
Algorithm 1: Hedge
Input: Step size η, time horizon T
Output: Sequence of sampled experts i1, . . . , iT
1: Initialize w1 = 1, p1 = Unif(A)
2: for t=1,. . . ,T do
3: Sample it ∼ pt and observe loss vector ℓt




majority algorithm and again enjoys a O(
√︂
log (|A|)T ) regret bound for appropriately
set η. The Hedge algorithm has become a staple in Online Learning literature and
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many algorithms have used it as a building block, including some of the approaches
presented in the current thesis. This algorithm is, in fact, part of a larger family of
algorithms known as Online Mirror Descent which we discuss next.
1.2.2.1 Online Mirror Descent and Follow the Regularized Leader
Mirror descent (Nemirovskij and Yudin, 1983) is a generalization of the gradient
descent algorithm to Banach spaces (normed vector spaces). We have already seen
in our convex optimization example that we can indeed treat convex optimization
as an instance of the online learning game. However, the opposite direction is not
clear – how do we treat the online learning game as a convex optimization problem.
Algorithm 1 suggests the following: treat the losses ℓt as gradients and treat the
weights wt as iterates, which are projected to the convex set of distributions over |A|
known as the probability simplex.
Definition 1.2.1. The K-dimensional probability simplex is the set ∆K−1 := {p ∈
[0, 1]K : ∑︁Ki=1 pi = 1} of all probability distributions over K items.
The key ingredient of the mirror descent algorithm is a potential function, Ψ,
which maps between the space of iterates and the space of gradients. For the rest of this
work we will only consider Ψ : ∆|A|−1 → R which are proper, lower semi-continuous
and strictly convex. For definitions of the above terms and an introduction to basic
convex optimization we refer the reader to Appendix A. The Online Mirror Descent








In Equation 1.4, DΨt(·||·) is the Bregman divergence induced by the potential
Ψt. A formal definition of the Bregman divergence can be found in Appendix A.





the re-scaled negative entropy.
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A related algorithm to OMD is Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL), also known











It can be shown that for Ψt = Ψη , i.e., constant step-size updates, OMD and FTRL
follow the same trajectory if initialized at the appropriate point. Somewhat surprisingly
if the step-sizes ηt are decreasing throughout the game, it turns out that FTRL and
OMD can follow different trajectories (Orabona and Pál, 2018).
The OMD and FTRL algorithms are applicable to a large number of online learning
games, and as we will see soon, enjoy meaningful regret guarantees. The general
problem of when sublinear regret is achievable for an online learning game is addressed
by Rakhlin et al. (2015); Bhatia and Sridharan (2020).
1.2.2.2 Stochastic multi-armed bandits
As alluded to previously, games with bandit feedback are harder due to the amount of
information observed by the player. In general we are going to distinguish two types of
bandit games – one in which the losses are generated from some unknown distribution
and the goal of the player is to compete against the action with smallest expected
loss. This problem is known as the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit (stochastic
MAB) problem. The stochastic bandit problem dates back to Thompson (Thompson,
1933), and the motivation for the problem was to determine if in a healthcare scenario
some treatment is better than placebo or not online, without having to wait for the
complete trial to conclude. The second type of bandit game is one in which we do not
make any assumptions about how the losses are generated, but only assume that they
are in a bounded range (usually [0, 1]). We note that actions in the bandit game are
referred to as arms.
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For convenience we will discuss the stochastic bandit problem in terms of rewards
rt rather than losses. The stochastic K-armed bandit problem is characterized by the
expected reward vector µ, with E[rt] = µ ∈ RK . We will focus on distributions which
are sub-Gaussian with variance proxy equal to 1 or with bounded support in [0, 1]K .
The mean of the arm with highest reward will be denoted as µi∗ or µ1. The regret for
the stochastic MAB problem can now be written as







where it is the arm played at time t and the expectation is with respect to the
randomness in the player’s strategy and the sampling of the rewards.
In general there are three types of algorithms used for solving the stochastic bandit
problem. The first type is based on a Bayesian view of the world, in which the player
maintains a prior over possible distributions from which the rewards are sampled
and further updates a posterior based on the observed rewards. The posterior is
then used to sample a distribution and the player plays the best arm of the sampled
distribution. This approach is known as Thompson Sampling (Thompson, 1933).
While Thompson Sampling has enjoyed wide applications in practice, its regret was
not completely understood until recently (Agrawal and Goyal, 2012, 2013; Kaufmann
et al., 2012; Agrawal and Goyal, 2017). First, Agrawal and Goyal (2013) show that
Thompson sampling with a Beta distribution prior achieves regret O(
√︂
TK log (T )),
and regret O(
√︂
TK log (K)) with a Gaussian prior. The second result is in general not
improvable for the Thompson sampling strategy as shown by the authors. Kaufmann
et al. (2012) provide another type of regret upper bound for Thompson sampling which







, where kl(a||b) is the KL-divergence between two Bernoulli random
variables with means a and b respectively and ∆i = µi∗ − µi is the sub-optimality
gap. This regret is asymptotically optimal.
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The second type of algorithms are the ones based on optimism in the face of
uncertainty (OFU) principle, which has become a powerful tool in different extensions
of the MAB problem such as contextual bandits and Reinforcement Learning. The
principle suggests that if the player is uncertain about which the best action is, she
should proceed to play the action which could attain the highest reward, based on
her observations so far. More formally, at every round of the game, for every arm
i, the player keeps empirical estimates of the mean, ˆ︁µi, and further adds a bonus
term depending on how many times the arm have been observed. The player then
selects the arm with highest empirical mean plus bonus term. This strategy was
proposed by Auer et al. (2002a) in the form of the UCB-I algorithm and comes with
O(
√︂







The final type of strategies are ones that we have already discussed for the full
information setting in the form of OMD and FTRL. The idea is to construct unbiased
estimators of each of the reward vectors at time t and feed them to the OMD algorithm
with appropriate potential function. As long as the second moment of the estimators
is well controlled, regret bounds of the order Õ(
√
KT ) are obtainable, where the Õ
notation hides poly-logarithmic factors. In particular Auer et al. (2002b) propose the
Exp3 algorithm which is just Algorithm 1 with ˆ︁rt = eit ritpt,it . The Exp3 algorithm enjoys
a regret bound of the order O(
√︂
KT log (K)). Gap-dependent bounds are harder to
show for OMD strategies, however, recent works have made significant progress on
the matter (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Seldin and Lugosi, 2017; Wei and Luo, 2018;
Zimmert and Seldin, 2019), with Zimmert and Seldin (2019) solving the problem
optimally, under the condition that there exists a unique best arm.
1.2.2.2.1 Min-max lower bounds and instance-dependent lower bounds.
All of the three approaches described so far enjoy upper bounds on their regret of
the order Õ(
√
KT ) or an instance dependent regret bound which depends on the
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distribution of the unknown reward vector. Are these bounds optimal? As it turns out,
the min-max regret (maximizing over all possible problem instances and minimizing
over all possible algorithms) for the stochastic MAB problem is Θ(
√
KT ). The first
algorithm to achieve this rate is MOSS (Audibert and Bubeck, 2009), which falls into
the category of OFU algorithms.
The results for instance dependent lower bounds are more involved. To understand
the bounds, we first need to define the set of confusing bandit environments for a
fixed arm i ̸= i∗. Let Pi denote the distribution of arm i with mean µi in our original
bandit problem. We define the set
Λi = {P′i : EP′i [rt(i)] > µi∗}.
This is precisely the set of distributions for the reward of the i-th arm, which have
larger expected reward than the optimal µi∗ . Lai and Robbins (1985) show that any










as T → ∞, where KL(P ||Q) is the KL-divergence between












Equation 1.7 implies that Thompson Sampling is asymptotically optimal for rewards
sampled from Bernoulli or Gaussian distributions. Further, the UCB-I algorithm
is asymptotically optimal for rewards sampled from Gaussian distributions as the
KL-term in the bound evaluates to ∆2i . Another algorithm from the OFU family
which achieves the same guarantees as Thompson Sampling and has favorable practical
performance is KL-UCB (Garivier and Cappé, 2011).
Finally, we mention another asymptotically optimal strategy which is used in the
problem of best arm identification known as successive elimination (Even-Dar et al.,
2002). The strategy is similar to the UCB-I algorithm as it also keeps confidence
intervals around the empirical means for each arm, however, every arm is played until
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we can confidently say that it is worse than another arm at which point the worse
arm is discarded and never played until the end of the game again.
1.2.2.3 Adversarial multi-armed bandits
In the adversarial MAB problem, there are no assumptions made regarding the observed
losses, except that they are bounded in [0, 1]. The problem was first studied by Auer
et al. (2002b), who propose the Exp3 algorithm, which as we already mentioned is
a modification of Algorithm 1. Exp3 comes with a O(
√︂
KT log (K)) regret bound
in the adversarial setting. Other popular potential functions with which the OMD
(or FTRL) algorithms are initialized and enjoy adversarial regret guarantees are the
Log-Barrier potential defined as Ψ(p) = −∑︁Ki=1 log (pi) and the 1/2-Tsallis entropy
defined as Ψ(p) = −∑︁Ki=1 √pi. The log-barrier based OMD algorithm comes with a
O(
√︂
KT log (T )) guarantee and the FTRL algorithm based on the 1/2-Tsallis entropy
introduced by Audibert and Bubeck (2009) and later also studied in Zimmert and Seldin
(2019) enjoys O(
√
KT ) regret. Because the adversarial bandit problem subsumes the
stochastic bandit problem, the same min-max lower bound applies and hence the
1/2-Tsallis entropy FTRL algorithm, known as Tsallis-INF, satisfies the desired regret
bound. It is natural to ask if there are “instance dependent” upper bounds for the
adversarial setting. The work of (Hazan and Kale, 2011) answers this question to
the affirmative by defining a notion of total variation of the losses and bounding the
regret in terms this variation. Further extensions and similar quantities can be found
for the full information setting in (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013) and for the bandit
setting in (Bubeck et al., 2018, 2019; Wei and Luo, 2018).
The topic of bandit learning is broad and we will only scratch the surface in this
thesis. For a more complete introduction we refer the reader to the works of Bubeck
et al. (2012) and Lattimore and Czepesvari (2018).
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1.3 Graph theory concepts
Part of this thesis will address a setting for the online learning game which interpolates
between full information and bandit feedback. Such feedback is modeled by a feedback
graph with vertices corresponding to actions and edges describing which actions reveal
information about each other. We now revisit some graph theoretic concepts which
are used in Chapter 2.
We begin by recalling the definition of a graph.
Definition 1.3.1 (Undirected graph). An undirected graph G = (V,E) is a tuple
containing a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, where an edge {u, v} ∈ E, u, v ∈ V
is an unordered pair of vertices.
We will only work with undirected graphs, however, all of the results in Chapter 2
extend to directed graphs as well.
Definition 1.3.2 (Directed graph). A directed graph G = (V,E) is a tuple contain-
ing a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, where an edge (u, v) ∈ E, u, v ∈ V is an
ordered pair of vertices.
We say that u, v are neighbors (or adjacent) in an undirected graph if {u, v} is an
edge of the graph. Further, we say that u is an in-neighbor to v in a directed graph if
(u, v) ∈ E and is an out-neighbor to v if (v, u) ∈ E.
The next set of definitions are for undirected graphs.
Definition 1.3.3 (Complete graph). A complete graph G is a graph such that
there is an edge {u, v} ∈ E for every two vertices u, v ∈ V .
We call a sub-graph of G a graph with a vertex set which is a subset of V and an
edge set which a subset of E.
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Definition 1.3.4 (Clique partition (Erdöos et al., 1988)). A clique of a graph G is a
complete sub-graph of G. A clique partition is a set of cliques of G such that each
vertex of G is contained in exactly one clique.
Definition 1.3.5 (Clique partition number). The clique partition number χ̄(G)
for a graph G is the size of the minimum clique partition, that is the smallest size
clique partition over all clique partitions.
Finding a clique partition of G is known to be NP-hard. Further, approximating
the clique partition number to a factor of O(|V |1−ϵ) for any ϵ > 0 is also likely
computationally hard (Hastad, 1999; Engebretsen and Holmerin, 2000). Cliques are
tightly related to the notion of independent set of a graph.
Definition 1.3.6 (Independent set). A subset of vertices of G is an independent
set if no two vertices are adjacent.
Definition 1.3.7 (Independence number). The independence number , α(G) of a
graph G is the size of a maximum independent set.
An clique of size k in G corresponds to an independent set of size k in the graph
constructed from G by taking the same vertex set and an edge set consisting of edges
{u, v} iff {u, v} is not part of the edge set of G. This suggests that approximating
the independence number to a factor better than |V |1−ϵ is also likely computationally
hard (Hastad, 1999).
Another important graph theoretic quantity for our work is the domination number.
Definition 1.3.8 (Dominating set). A dominating set for a graph G is a subset of
V such that every vertex in V is adjacent to some vertex in the dominating set.
Definition 1.3.9 (Domination number). The domination number , γ(G) of a graph
G is the size of a minimum dominating set.
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Figure 1-1: Graph example
The graph in Figure 1-1 has a maximum independent set of size 5 with vertices
in blue and a minimum dominating set of size 1 in red. Further, the clique partition
number for the graph consists of the blue vertices and is again equal to 5. It turns
out that the domination number is always no larger than the independence number
and the independence number is always no larger than the clique partition number,
that is γ(G) ≤ α(G) ≤ χ̄(G) (Bollobás and Cockayne, 1979; Goddard and Henning,
2013). We note that there is a fourth quantity of interest which is the size of the
maximum acyclic graph denoted by mas(G). And acyclic graph is a graph which
contains no cycles, that is a sequence of edges {u1, u2}, {u2, u3}, . . . , {un, u1} which
trace a closed path in the graph starting and ending at the same vertex. It turns out
that in undirected graphs mas(G) = α(G).
Unlike the clique partition number and the independence number, there is a very
simple algorithm which can approximate the domination number up to a log (|V |)
factor. The pseudo code is given in Algorithm 2.
The following notes http://ac.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/teaching/ss_
12/netalg/lectures/chapter7.pdf provide us with a proof that the greedy Al-
gorithm 2 returns a dominating set R which is 2 + log (∆) approximation to the
smallest size minimal dominating set, where ∆ is the maximum degree if G. It
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Algorithm 2: Greedy algorithm for minimum dominating set
Input: An undirected graph G(V,E)
Output: A dominating set S
1: R = ∅
2: if V == ∅ then
3: Return S
4: else
5: Find v ∈ V s.t. deg(v) is maximized
6: R = S ⋃︁{v}
7: V = V \ {{v}⋃︁N(v)} and update G to be the induced graph on the new set of
vertices V .
8: end if
is possible to implement the algorithm so that it has total runtime of the or-
der O((|V | + |E|) log (|V |)) (e.g. http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/~sriram/3330/
spring17/greedyMDS.pdf). We note that this is essentially the Greedy Set Cover
algorithm of Chvatal (1979) and that it is possible to extend to directed graphs, by
replacing the degree of v by the out-degree of v and the neighbours of v by just the
vertices which have in-going edge from v.
1.4 Algorithmic Game theory
Algorithmic game theory is a broad topic which in general studies the performance of
self-interested agents in games, what strategies lead to good performance guarantees in
games and how to design games where self-interested agents enjoy good performance
guarantees. Here good performance guarantees pertain to some type of socially-
economic metrics such as maximizing the overall utility of players participating in the
game.
In this work we focus on the following type of multi-player games. The game
consists of n players. The i-th player has a finite action set Ai, |Ai| = ki and a reward
(or utility) function ui : A → [0, 1], where A = ×ni=1Ai. Further, we will assume that
the game proceeds in T rounds and during each round the players get to interact
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with each other only through choosing actions in their own action set and observing
the utility for the selected actions at the given round. Our goal is to study what
player strategies would lead to a steady-state of the game in which no player will have
an incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategy. Such states are known as an
equilibrium of the game.
Existence of different types of equilibrium has been a fundamental question in
game theory. Perhaps the most natural equilibrium in multi-player games is the
one in which no player has incentive to change the action they are playing as long
as every other player continues to play the same action. This is known as a Pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE). Even though PNEs are easy to describe and seem like a
reasonable equilibrium for self-interested agents, PNEs are not even guaranteed to
exist in some types of games. For example consider the simple two-player game of
Rock, Paper, Scissors, in which rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper and paper
beats rock. It turns out that there is no one fixed action a player can choose, such
that that action wins all the time, while the other player has no incentive to switch
from their losing/tie action. Instead of considering only the best fixed action it is
natural to extend the policy of each player to the best fixed distribution over actions.
Such reasoning leads us to the concept of a Mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE).
Definition 1.4.1. A Mixed Nash equilibrium is a product distribution σ = ×ni=1 over
A, where σi is a distribution over Ai satisfying the following:
E(a1,...,ai,...,an)∼σ[ui(a1, . . . , an)] ≥ E(a1,...,ai,...,an)∼σ[ui(a1, . . . , (a′)i, . . . , an)],
for all actions (a′)i ∈ Ai and all players i ∈ [n].
MNEs are natural and do not require any coordination between the players as the
i-th player only needs to sample according to their own distribution σi. Further MNEs
exist for all (reasonable) games (Nash et al., 1950; Nash, 1951). Unfortunately it is very
likely that there are no polynomial time algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria
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(Daskalakis et al., 2009) even for two-player games (Chen and Deng, 2006), outside
of some special type of games such as zero-sum games. The fact that approximating
MNE is most likely computationally intractable motivates the study of other types of
natural equilibria which always exist and can also be found efficiently.
Consider the following 2-player traffic light game. Each player can choose between
two actions: stop and go. The utility functions are given in Table 1-I. In the table we
distinguish between a column player and a row player. The utility of the row player
is shown in the first entry of the tuple and the utility of the column player is the




Table 1-I: Traffic light game
a traffic signal instructs the column player to stop and the row player to go. The
column player only sees their own signal, however, they can deduce that the row
player has the right of way and so the column player’s best action is to obey the signal.
The same reasoning holds for the row player. Suppose now that the traffic light is
randomized in the sense that with probability 1/2 it signals the column player to
stop and the row player to go, and with probability 1/2 it signals the column player
to go and the row player to stop. If both players decide to obey the traffic signal
they observe, then they are at an equilibrium as if either player deviates, their utility
will decrease. The traffic signal plays the role of a central agent which coordinates
and hence correlates the actions of the two players. The type of equilibrium which
we just described is known as a Correlated equilibrium (CE)(Aumann, 1987).
Notice that this equilibrium also can not be a Nash, as it does not factor into product
distributions over the action sets of each player. Indeed, the induced distribution over
A is σ((stop, go)) = 1/2, σ((go, stop)) = 1/2.
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Definition 1.4.2. A Correlated equilibrium is a distribution σ over the action space
A such that for every player i it holds that
Eσ[ui(a1, . . . , an)|ai] ≥ Eσ[ui(a1, . . . , (a′)i, . . . , an)|ai],∀(a′)i ∈ Ai.
The interpretation of a CE is that if the i-th player is shown their action, sampled
according to σ, then they have no incentive to deviate, given that every other player
behaves according to σ. The existence of CEs can be confirmed by observing that any
MNE is also a CE. Further, CEs are computable in polynomial time, for example by
linear programming (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008).
The final equilibrium concept we discuss is that of a Coarse correlated equilib-
rium (CCE). Similarly to MNE and CE, a CCE is a distribution σ over A. Unlike
CEs, however, the agent must commit before hand to following the action sampled
according to σ. Formally, a CCE is defined as follows.
Definition 1.4.3. A Coarse correlated equilibrium is a distribution σ over the action
space A such that for every player i it holds that
Eσ[ui(a1, . . . , an)] ≥ Eσ[ui(a1, . . . , (a′)i, . . . , an)],∀(a′)i ∈ Ai.
CCEs are also computable in polynomial time and in fact every CE is also a CCE.
To conclude we have the following nestedness of equilibria PE ⊂ MNE ⊂ CE ⊂ CCE,
where each of the inclusions are non-strict.
Even though CEs and CCEs are efficiently computable, the question of: “How
good this equilibria are compared to Nash?” remains. There are multiple ways to
quantify the goodness of an equilibrium of a game. Two such notions are the Price
of Anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS). For a given social welfare function,
mapping players policies to a real value, the PoA is defined as the ratio between the
welfare of the best overall policy to the welfare of the worst policy belonging to an
equilibrium class. The PoS is defined similarly, however, we compare the best overall
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policy to the best overall policy in the equilibrium class. Part of algorithmic Game
theory studies how PoA and PoS of Nash equilibrium compare to PoA and PoS of
other equilibrium. For example in the special type of “smooth” games, the worst Nash
is no worse than the worst CCE (Roughgarden, 2015).
1.4.1 Equilibrium and no-regret algorithms
CCEs and CEs are also efficient to approximate through natural strategies in which
every player minimizes their own regret in the repeated game (Foster and Vohra,
1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1999; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000; Blum and Mansour,
2007). In particular minimizing swap regret leads players to a correlated equilibrium
and minimizing external regret leads to coarse correlated equilibrium. Hazan and
Kale (2008) show a very general correspondence between finding equilibria, fixed-point
computation and the existence of certain types of no-regret algorithms. In followup
work Mohri and Yang (2014) and Mohri and Yang (2017) showed that minimizing
their notions of conditional swap regret and transductive regret also leads to new
notions of equilibrium.
We now outline how to convert a no-external regret algorithm to an algorithm
which approximates a CCE. First, assume that the i-th player acts according to a
no-regret algorithm with action space Ai and reward function at time t given by
rt(·) = u(a1t , . . . , ai−1t , ·, ai+1t , . . . , ant ), where a
j
t denotes the action taken by player j
at time t. The no-regret algorithm guarantees that after T rounds of the game for
any action ai ∈ Ai it holds that E
[︂∑︁T




T ). After T rounds
of the game we define the distribution ˆ︁σT on A as follows. A central agent who
coordinates the players samples a round t ∈ [T ] uniformly at random. Next the i-th
player acts according to the strategy which prescribes they play action ait at round








E(a1,...,an)∼ˆ︁σT [ui(a1, . . . , an)]. Further, the no-regret guarantee implies that




















= E(a1,...,an)∼ˆ︁σT [ui(a1, . . . , (ai)′, . . . , an)] −O (︂1/√T)︂ .
Thus the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of CCE in a weak conver-
gence sense. Because we are considering finite action-space games, weak convergence
is equivalent to strong convergence and we arrive at the fact that any convergent
sub-sequence of (ˆ︁σT )∞T=1 will have a limit point in the set of CCEs. Showing that
no-swap regret play leads to a CE is slightly more involved, however, follows the same
general idea.
Finally, we note that it is possible to derive John von Neumann’s min-max theorem
for two-player zero sum games using the fact that no-regret algorithms exist and
following their empirical play would lead to a MNE in a two-player zero sum game.
1.5 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning also studies the online learning game, however, additional
complexity is introduced into the problem by considering it as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) (Puterman, 1994). Formally, an MDP consists of an action set A, a
set of states S, a (deterministic) reward functions r : S × A → [0, 1] mapping state-
action pairs to rewards, a transition kernel P : S × A → ∆|S|−1 mapping state-action
pairs to a distribution over states, and a distribution over starting states σ0. Without
loss of generality we can assume that there is a single starting state s0 with a single
available action a0 such that P (·|s0, a0) ≡ σ0. The number of states is |S| = S and
the number of actions is |A| = A. Further, after playing a state-action pair, (s, a), the
player only observes a random variable R(s, a) with expectation E[R(s, a)] = r(s, a)
and her transition to the state s′ ∼ P (·|s, a). The player does not know r or P
and the goal of the player is to maximize her cumulative reward. We have already
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encountered a simple type of MDP in the form of the stochastic MAB problem. Indeed
the stochastic bandit problem is an MDP with a single state and actions A.
There are several types of RL problems one can consider based on the interaction
protocol, cumulative reward and size of the state-action space. In this work we will
consider the episodic, finite horizon, tabular setting. The protocol is as follows.
The game proceeds in K episodes (not to be confused with the size of the action set
in the online game). Each episode is of length H. At every episode the agent chooses
a (deterministic4) policy π : S → A, that is a function mapping states to actions and
proceeds to observe the rewards and transitions generated by following π for H rounds.
At the end of the episode the player’s total reward is Eπ[
∑︁H
t=1 R(St, At)], where St, At
are random variables sampled according to the Markov process induced by following
π and the transition kernel P . After the episode has concluded, the player updates
her policy and proceeds onto the next episode. We will again measure the success of
the player through regret, where the comparator is the policy with highest cumulative


























where πk is the policy selected by the player at episode k. We additionally assume
that the MDP has a layered structure. That is, every state s belongs to some layer
κ(s) = h ∈ [H] and the only non-zero transition probabilities are between states s and
s′ such that κ(s) + 1 = κ(s′), i.e., P (s′|s, a) > 0 =⇒ κ(s) + 1 = κ(s′).
1.5.1 Value function, Q-function, Bellman optimality
The value function of a policy π is a functional mapping from states to real numbers
and it assigns to each state the expected reward of policy π starting from state s.




V π(s) = Eπ
⎡⎣ H∑︂
h=κ(s)
R(Sh, Ah)|Sκ(s) = s
⎤⎦ . (1.9)
With this notation we can concisely write the cumulative reward of the strategy of a
player as ∑︁Kk=1 V πk(s0).
The second quantity of interest is the Q-function which maps a state-action pair
to a real number. It is defined as follows
Qπ(s, a) = Eπ
⎡⎣ H∑︂
h=κ(s)
R(Sh, Ah)|Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a
⎤⎦ , (1.10)
and captures the expected reward of the player if she plays according to π after playing
action a in state s. Note that the following identities hold from the definition of the
value function and Q-function
V π(s) = Qπ(s, π(s)) = r(s, π(s)) + ES′∼P (·|s,π(s)) [V π(S ′)] .
Further, we can think of V π as a vector in RS indexed by states, and similarly think
of Qπ as a vector in RS×A indexed by state-action pairs. This implies we can write
the expectation ES′∼P (·|s,a) [V π(S ′)] as an inner product between the transition kernel
and the value function as
ES′∼P (·|s,a) [V π(S ′)] = ⟨P (·|s, a), V π⟩.
Further, using P : RS → RS×A as a linear operator with (s, a)-th row equal to P (·|s, a),
we can write in vector notation
Qπ = r + PV π.
We also adopt the following standard notation Vk = V πk and Qk = Qπk .
We defined the regret of the player’s strategy by comparing against an optimal
policy π∗, but it is not entirely clear that such an optimal policy exists. Such a
policy exists and can be thought of as the deterministic policy maximising the value
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function on s0, that is π∗ = argmaxπ V π(s0). The optimal policy is not necessarily
unique, however, the value of the optimal policy V ∗ ≡ V π∗ is unique. Further, one
can show that the greedy policy with respect to the Q-function is an optimal policy.




r(s, a) + ⟨P (·|s, a), V π∗⟩, ∀s ∈ S.
This equation is known as the Bellman optimality equation and is at the core of
designing algorithms for regret minimization (Puterman, 1994). Finally, we use the
notation Q∗ = Qπ∗ .
1.6 Adaptive adversaries and Policy regret
So far we have seen several different measures of regret – external regret, internal
regret, swap regret, etc. Further, even though we made a point to distinguish between
expected regret for adaptive adversaries and expected regret for oblivious adversaries
the main idea behind our comparator class remained the same – compare with the
best fixed action or policy in hind sight. Consider the following simple example: the
player is a self-driving car and the available actions determine whether the car turns,
accelerates, decelerates, uses a turn signal, etc. If the player decides to go through a
red light at an intersection then the next available actions and respective losses she
would observe are all going to be poor as the player would have to avoid a car crash.
Given all of the observed losses are poor it might turn out that the best action in
hind sight would be to just go as fast as possible through the intersection. However, a
better player, who stops at the red light, would have observed a different sequence
of losses for which the best action in hind sight was to stop and wait for the traffic
light to turn green. We can now see that external regret might not be the best choice
for how we measure performance of the agent, as from a practical point of view we
would much rather prefer the agent stopping at the red light rather than going full
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speed ahead. In general, because adaptive adversaries tailor their loss sequence to the
player’s past actions and overall strategy, it is not necessary for the best action in
hind sight on the observed loss sequence to be the best overall action for the game, as
a different strategy chosen by the player can result in a different loss sequence.
The above problem was first investigated by Merhav et al. (2002) in the full
information setting and by Arora et al. (2012a) in the bandit setting. To address the
critical issue described above, Arora et al. (2012a), propose Policy regret defined as
follows






ℓt(a1:t) − ℓt(a, . . . , a)
]︄
, (1.11)
where we use the shorthand ai:j to denote ai, ai+1, . . . , aj. It is not hard to see that
if the adversary is not constrained in any other way then it is impossible to obtain
sublinear policy regret bounds. This follows by observing that all the losses could
just depend on the very first action the player has chosen and it is impossible for
the player to know which is the best action before the game begins. Most work on
policy regret has constrained the adversary to have bounded memory, that is the
adversary can only base its losses on the last m actions the player has chosen. In our
notation this is equivalent to saying that ℓt(a1:t) = ℓt(at−m+1:t),∀t ∈ [T ].
1.6.1 Policy regret bounds in the full information game
Merhav et al. (2002) consider the full information game, where the player gets to
observe the full loss for all available sequences of m actions. They propose a strategy
with regret bounded by O(T 2/3(log (K))1/3) for m = 2. Later, Anava et al. (2013)
observe that the policy regret minimization when the adversary is m-memory bounded
can be reduced to minimizing external regret when there is an associated cost for
switching between different actions in consecutive rounds and propose an algorithm for
the general online convex optimization problem with regret Õ(
√
mT ) (the asymptotic
notation hides the complexity of the decision space for the convex optimization game).
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The first algorithm in the full information game which was able to minimize regret in
the presence switching costs (and therefore policy regret) was proposed by Kalai and
Vempala (2005) and is based on the Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) strategy.
The same algorithm can be modified to achieve a O(
√︂
mT log (K)) policy regret bound.
Another algorithm which enjoys O(
√︂
mT log (K)) regret is the shrinking dartboard
algorithm proposed by Geulen et al. (2010). Finally, the more general question of
when sublinear policy regret is achievable is addressed in the work of Bhatia and
Sridharan (2020).
1.6.2 Policy regret bounds in the bandit game
In the bandit game, Arora et al. (2012a) show how to reduce any sub-linear external
regret algorithm to a sub-linear policy regret algorithm via a mini-batching trick. The
proposed algorithms enjoy a Õ(m1/3K1/3T 2/3) regret bound in the multi-armed bandit
problem. There is a discrepancy between the
√
T regret bounds achievable in the full
information setting versus the above T 2/3 bound. Somewhat surprisingly, Dekel et al.
(2014), show that this gap can not be breached, by showing a lower bound of the order
Ω̃(K1/3T 2/3) for the setting of bandits with switching costs. This lower bound also
extends to the policy regret setting, because the two settings are equivalent whenever
m is constant, compared to T . The dichotomy between the achievable regret in the
full information setting versus the achievable regret in the bandit setting introduces
the following interesting question – is it possible to achieve improved policy regret
guarantees if the player is not faced with the worst-case setting. The following chapters
try to answer this question in the positive.
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Chapter 2
Policy regret in the presence of side
observations
We study the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem where the learner is supplied
with partial observations modeled by a feedback graph and where shifting to a
new action incurs a fixed switching cost. We give two new algorithms for this
problem in the informed setting. Our best algorithm achieves a pseudo-regret of
Õ(γ(G) 13T 23 ), where γ(G) is the domination number of the feedback graph. This
significantly improves upon the previous best result for the same problem, which was
based on the independence number of G. We also present matching lower bounds for
our result that we describe in detail. Finally, we give a new algorithm with improved
policy regret bounds when partial counterfactual feedback is available. The main
contributions of this chapter are based on Arora et al. (2019). This work was done in
collaboration with Dr. Raman Arora and Dr. Mehryar Mohri.
2.1 Online learning with partial feedback
In Chapter 1 we discussed to types of feedback for the online learning game – full
information, in which the player observes the losses of all her actions, and bandit
feedback in which the player observes only the loss of the action she has played at the
current round. We further saw that policy regret minimization for bounded memory
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adversaries has very different min-max rates, i.e. Θ(
√︂
T log (K)) in the full information
game versus Θ(K1/3T 2/3) in the bandit game. In this chapter we study a third model
of partial feedback which lays between full information and bandit feedback. In the
partial feedback setting after playing a action, the player observes the loss of her action
(as in the bandit setting), and also can observe the loss of other “neighboring” actions.
A motivating example is as follows. A commercial bank issues various credit card
products, many of which are similar, e.g., different branded cards with comparable
fees and interest rates. At each round of the game, the bank offers a specific product
to a particular sub-population (e.g., customers at a store). The payoff observed for
this action also reveals feedback for related cards and similar sub-populations.
Formally, which actions reveal information about each other is determined by a
feedback graph, or more generally a sequence of feedback graphs {Gt}Tt=1. In an
undirected feedback graph, each vertex represents an action and an edge between
vertices a and a′ indicates that the loss of action a′ is observed when action a is
selected and vice-versa. The bandit setting corresponds to a feedback graph reduced
to only self-loops at each vertex, the full information setting to a complete graph.
The work of Mannor and Shamir (2011) is the first to study the online learning
problem when feedback graphs model which losses the player gets to observe after
choosing an action. Their work proposes two algorithms, the ExpBan, which has
regret O(
√︂∑︁T
t=1 χ̄(Gt)), where χ̄(G) is the clique partition number, and the ELP
algorithm which has regret O(
√︂∑︁T
t=1 α(Gt)). They also show a regret lower bound
when Gt = G for all G of the order Ω(
√︂
α(G)T ). The work of Alon et al. (2013)
improves on that Mannor and Shamir (2011) in two significant ways. First the authors
consider a setting in which the feedback graphs are directed and can be observed
only after taking an action. Secondly the provided algorithms even for the informed
setting are more efficient than the ones in Mannor and Shamir (2011). Their algorithm
Exp3-SET has regret Õ(
√︂∑︁T
t=1 mas(Gt)) for the uninformed setting with directed
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feedback graphs. Here mas(Gt) is the size of the maximum acyclic subgraph of Gt.
When considering the undirected setting mas(Gt) can be replaced by α(Gt). In the
informed setting Alon et al. (2013) propose the algorithm Exp3-DOM, which requires
approximating or computing a minimum dominating set of Gt. Kocák et al. (2014)
avoid such tedious computation with their algorithm Exp3-IX. The regret achieved
by their algorithm is of the order Õ(
√︂∑︁T
t=1 α(Gt)) even in the uninformed setting.
The paper also extends the implicit exploration trick used by Exp3-IX to Follow the
Perturbed Leader and solves the combinatorial bandit problem with side observations,
where at each round the player is permitted to select n out of the |A| available actions.
The achieved regret is of the order Õ(n2/3
√︂∑︁T
t=1 α(Gt)). In Alon et al. (2015) the
authors consider a setting where the feedback graph system is fixed i.e. Gt = G for all
t ∈ [T ], however, the graph need not have self loops. The authors distinguish between
three settings. First a setting in which each vertex either has a self loop or is revealed
by all other vertices, called the strongly observable setting. The second setting assumes
that every vertex is revealed by some other vertex but there exists at least one vertex
which is not strongly observable. This setting is called the weakly observable setting.
The third setting is that of some vertex not being revealed by any other vertex. This
is called the not observable setting. Alon et al. (2015) show that the regret bounds
are respectively Θ̃(
√︂
α(G)T ) in the strongly observable setting, Θ̃(γ(G)1/3T 2/3) in the
weakly observable setting and Θ(T ) in the not observable setting. The work of Cohen
et al. (2016) studies a setting where the feedback graph is never fully revealed to the
player. They show that if the feedback graph and the losses are generated by the
adversary a lower bound for the regret of any strategy is Ω(
√︂
|A|T ), which matches the
lower bound of the bandit setting. In contrast it is possible to recover a Θ̃(
√︂
α(G)T )
regret bound if the losses are stochastic.
Very recently the works of (Lykouris et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020b) derive regret
bounds depending on the loss of the best action, and in the case of (Lee et al., 2020b),
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the average loss of a revealing set for the best action, in the weakly observable setting.
Lykouris et al. (2018) achieve their regret bounds through a black-box reduction from
general small-loss bound algorithms. In the fixed, observable feedback graph setting
their bounds either scale sub-optimally with the value of the smallest loss across time
or scales with the clique-partition number of the graph, instead of the independence
number. Lee et al. (2020b) improve on such results by recovering optimal dependence
on both the small loss quantity and independence number. Their results can be
extended to time-varying feedback graphs and weakly observable graphs.
We note that online learning with feedback graphs has also been studied in the
setting of stochastic losses by numerous works (Caron et al., 2012; Buccapatnam et al.,
2014a; Wu et al., 2015a,b; Tossou et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018), however, we chose not
to discuss these works here as our focus is on the adversarial case. For more extensive
discussion on bandits with graph feedback we refer the reader to the work of Valko
(2016).
The main regret upper bound of this chapter can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 2.1.1. There exists an algorithm for the setting of policy regret minimization
with partial feedback provided by a graph G with regret bounded by Õ((mγ(G))1/3T 2/3),
where γ(G) is the domination number of the graph and m is the memory of the
adversary.
2.2 Regret minimization in the presence of switch-
ing costs and policy regret
In Section 1.6.2 we mentioned that policy regret minimization for memory-bounded
adversaries is equivalent to regret minimization in the presence of switching costs.
The regret for the switching costs problem is defined as follows










where χA is the characteristic function of the event A.
Let us formally argue the equivalence between m-memory bounded adversaries
(for m > 1) and the switching cost problem. First notice that an m-memory bounded
adversary for m > 1 can model a switching cost so policy regret minimization is at
least as hard as minimizing RS(T ). Suppose that we have some algorithm A which
minimizes RS(T ) and works with losses ˆ︁ℓt : A → [0, 1]. The following reduction solves
the policy regret problem. We split the stream of T losses into mini-batches of size m
such that ˆ︁ℓt(·) = 1m ∑︁mj=1 ℓ(t−1)m+j(·). Now we would simply feed the sequence (ˆ︁ℓt)T/mt=1
to Algorithm A if it were not for intervals of length m at which there is a switched
action, that is at ̸= at+1. Suppose that between the t-th mini-batch and the t+ 1-st
mini-batch Algorithm A decides to switch actions so that at ̸= at+1. In this case no
additional feedback is available for ˆ︁ℓt+1(at+1) and the algorithm can not proceed as
normal. To fix this minor problem, the provided feedback to the algorithm is that
the loss of all actions in A is 0. This modification can not occur more times than the
number of switches Algorithm A does. Pseudocode for the above algorithm can be
found in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Policy regret with side observations
Input: Parameters required by Algorithm A and memory m
Output: Action sequence (at)t.
1: Initialize Algorithm A.
2: for t = 1, . . . , ⌊T/m⌋ do
3: Receive action at from Algorithm A and play it for the next m rounds.
4: if at−1 == at then
5: Observe mini-batched loss ˆ︁ℓt(at) = 1m ∑︁mj=1 ℓ(t−1)m+j(at) (and additional side
observations). Feed mini-batched loss (and additional side observations) to
Algorithm A.
6: else
7: Set ˆ︁ℓt = 0 and feed losses to Algorithm A.
8: end if
9: end for
Algorithm 3 enjoys the following regret guarantee.
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Theorem 2.2.1. The Policy regret of Algorithm 3 is bounded by mRS(T/m).
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Combined with the regret bound, the above implies
1
m





The second term in the right hand side bounded by the number of switches bound






Multiplying Inequality 2.2 by m on both sides finishes the proof.
Thus if we have an algorithm with bounded RS(T ) we also have a reasonable policy
regret-minimizing algorithm for bounded memory adversaries. The standard bounds
for RS(T ) scale as O(T 2/3) and hence Algorithm 3 enjoys a O(m1/3T 2/3) regret bound
in that case which is meaningful for all m = o(T ).
2.3 Bandits with feedback graphs and switching
Costs
The reduction in Section 2.2 allows us to focus on the problem of minimizing the
switching costs regret RS(T ). For the rest of this chapter we are only going to consider
minimizing RS(T ), or deriving information theoretic lower bounds on RS(T ).
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The only work we are familiar with, which studies both bandits with switching costs
and side information is that of Rangi and Franceschetti (2019). The authors propose
two algorithms for time-varying feedback graphs in the uninformed setting. When
reduced to the fixed feedback graph setting, their regret bound becomes Õ(α(G) 13T 23 ).
We note that, in the informed setting with a fixed feedback graph, this bound can
be achieved by applying the mini-batching technique of Arora et al. (2012a) to the
EXP3-SET algorithm of Alon et al. (2013).
The main contributions outlined in this chapter are two-fold. First, we propose
two algorithms for online learning in the informed setting with a fixed feedback
graph G and switching costs. Our best algorithm admits a pseudo-regret bound in
Õ(γ(G) 13T 23 ), where γ(G) is the domination number of G. We note that the domination
number γ(G) can be substantially smaller than the independence number α(G) and
therefore that our algorithm significantly improves upon previous work by Rangi and
Franceschetti (2019) in the informed setting. We also extend our results to achieve a
policy regret bound in Õ(γ(G) 13T 23 ) when partial counterfactual feedback is available.
The Õ(γ(G) 13T 23 ) regret bound in the switching costs setting might seem at odds with
a lower bound stated by Rangi and Franceschetti (2019). However, the lower bound of
Rangi and Franceschetti (2019) can be shown to be technically inaccurate. Our second
main contribution is a lower bound in Ω̃(T 23 ) for any non-complete feedback graph.
We also extend this lower bound to Ω̃(γ(G) 13T 23 ) for a class of feedback graphs that
we will describe in detail. We show a lower bound for the setting of evolving feedback
graphs, matching the originally stated lower bound in (Rangi and Franceschetti, 2019).
2.3.1 Problem setup and notation
The main quantity of interest is going to be the switching cost regret RS(T ). We
assume that the player has access to an undirected graph G = (A, E), which determines
which expert losses can be observed at each round. The vertex set A is the set of
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experts (or actions) and the graph specifies that, if at round t the player selects
action at, then, the losses of all experts whose vertices are adjacent to that of at can
be observed: ℓt(a) for a ∈ N(at), where N(at) denotes the neighborhood of at in G
defined for any u ∈ A by: N(u) = {v : (u, v) ∈ E}. We will denote by deg(u) = |N(u)|
the degree of u ∈ A in graph G. We assume that G admits a self-loop at every vertex,
which implies that the player can at least observe the loss of their own action (bandit
information). In all our figures, self-loops are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
We assume that the feedback graph is available to the player at the beginning
of the game (informed setting). The independence number of G is the size of
a maximum independent set in G and is denoted by α(G). The domination
number of G is the size of a minimum dominating set and is denoted by γ(G).
The following inequality holds for all graphs G: γ(G) ≤ α(G) (Bollobás and Cockayne,
1979; Goddard and Henning, 2013). In general, γ(G) can be substantially smaller
than α(G), with γ(G) = 1 and α(G) = |A| − 1 in some cases. We note that all our
results can be straightforwardly extended to the case of directed graphs.
2.3.2 An adaptive mini-batch algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm for online learning with switching costs, using
adaptive mini-batches.
The standard exploration versus exploitation dilemma in the bandit setting is
further complicated in the presence of a feedback graph: if a poor action reveals the
losses of all other actions, do we play the poor action? The lower bound construction
of Mannor and Shamir (2011) suggests that we should not, since it might be better to
just switch between the other actions.
Adding switching costs, however, modifies the price of exploration and the lower
bound argument of Mannor and Shamir (2011) no longer holds. It is in fact possible
to show that EXP3 and its graph feedback variants switch too often in the presence of
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two good actions, thereby incurring Ω(T ) regret, due to the switching costs. One way
to deal with the switching costs problem is to adapt the fixed mini-batch technique
of Arora et al. (2012a). That technique, however, treats all actions equally while, in
the presence of switching costs, actions that provide additional information are more
valuable.
We deal with the issues just discussed by adopting the idea that the mini-batch
sizes could depend both on how favorable an action is and how much information an
action provides about good actions.
2.3.2.1 Algorithm for Star Graphs
We start by studying a simple feedback graph case in which one action is adjacent to
all other actions with none of these other actions admitting other neighbors. For an
example see Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1: Example of a star
graph.
We call such graphs star graphs and we re-
fer to the action adjacent to all other actions as
the revealing action. The revealing action is
denoted by r. Since only the revealing action can
convey additional information about other actions,
we will select our mini-batch size to be propor-
tional to the quality of this action. Also, to prevent our algorithm from switching
between two non-revealing actions too often, we will simply disallow that and allow
switching only between the revealing action and a non-revealing action. Finally, we
will disregard any feedback a non-revealing action provides us. This simplifies the
analysis of the regret of our algorithm. The pseudocode of the algorithm is given in
Algorithm 4.
The following intuition guides the design of our algorithm and its analysis. We
need to visit the revealing action sufficiently often to derive information about all
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm for star graphs
Input: Star graph G(A, E), learning rates (ηt), exploration rate β ∈ [0, 1], maximum
mini-batch τ .
Output: Action sequence (at)Tt=1.
1: q1 = 1|A| .
2: while ∑︁t⌊τt⌋ ≤ T do
3: pt = (1 − β)qt + βδ(r) % δ(r) is the Dirac distribution on r
4: Draw at ∼ pt, set τt = pt(r)τ
5: if at−1 ̸= r and at ̸= r then
6: Set at = at−1
7: end if
8: Play at for the next ⌊τt⌋ iterations
9: Set ˆ︁ℓt(i) = ∑︁t+⌊τt⌋−1j=t I(at = r) ℓj(i)pt(r)
10: For all i ∈ A, qt+1(i) =
qt(i) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(i))∑︁
j∈A qt(j) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(j))
11: t = t+ 1
12: end while
other actions, which is determined by the explicit exploration factor β. If r is a good
action, our regret will not be too large if we visit it often and spent a large amount
of time in it. On the other hand if r is poor, then the algorithm should not sample
it often and, when it does, it should not spend too much time there. Disallowing
the algorithm to directly switch between non-revealing actions also prevents it from
switching between two good non-revealing actions too often. The only remaining
question is: do we observe enough information about each action to be able to devise
a low regret strategy? The following regret guarantee provides a precise positive
response.
Theorem 2.3.1. Suppose that the inequality E[ℓ2t (i)] ≤ ρ holds for all t ≤ T and all
i ∈ A, for some ρ and β ≥ 1
τ















Proof sketch. The complete proof can be found in Section 2.4. The key elements of
the proof are as follows. First we analyze the standard regret of an algorithm which
excludes lines 5 and 6 from Algorithm 4. The analysis follows standard arguments for
bounding the regret of the Exp3 algorithm. Next, we show that the analyzed algorithm
will follow the same trajectory as Algorithm 4. Finally, we show that Algorithm 4 will
not switch between the revealing action r and another action too often due to our
choice of τt. In particular, either τt is large when we have high probability to sample
r and hence we spend a large number of iterations at r or the probability to visit r is
small and the algorithm continues playing the same non-revealing action.
The exploration parameter β is needed to ensure that τt = pt(r)τ ≥ 1, so that at
every iteration of the while loop Algorithm 4 plays at least one action. The bound
assumed on the second moment E[ℓ2t (i)] might seem unusual since in the adversarial
setting we do not assume a randomization of the losses. For now, the reader can just
assume that this is a bound on the squared loss, that is, ℓ2t (i) ≤ ρ. The role of this
expectation and the source of the randomness will become clear in Section 2.3.2.3. We
note that the star graph admits independence number α(G) = |A| − 1 and domination
number γ(G) = 1. In this case, the algorithms of Rangi and Franceschetti (2019) and
variants of the mini-batching algorithm only guarantee a regret bound of the order
Õ(α(G) 13T 23 ), while Algorithm 4 guarantees a regret bound of the order Õ(T 23 ) when
we set η = 1/T 23 , τ = T 23 , and β = 1/T 13 .
2.3.2.2 Algorithm for General Feedback Graphs
We now extend Algorithm 4 to handle arbitrary feedback graphs. The pseudocode of
this more general algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
The first step of Algorithm 5 consists of computing an approximate minimum
dominating set for G using the Greedy Set Cover algorithm (Chvatal, 1979). The
Greedy Set Cover algorithm naturally partitions G into disjoint star graphs with
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Algorithm 5: Algorithm for general feedback graphs
Input: Graph G(A, E), learning rates (ηt), exploration rate β ∈ [0, 1], maximum
mini-batch τ .
Output: Action sequence (at)t.
1: Compute an approximate dominating set R
2: q1 ≡ Unif(A), u ≡ Unif(R)
3: while ∑︁t τt ≤ T do
4: pt = (1 − β)qt + βu.
5: Draw i ∼ pt, set τt = pt(ri)τ , where ri is the dominating vertex for i and set
at = i.
6: if at−1 ̸∈ R and at ̸∈ R then
7: Set at = at−1
8: end if
9: Play at for the next ⌊τt⌋ iterations.
10: Set ˆ︁ℓt(i) = ∑︁t+⌊τt⌋−1j=t I(at = ri) ℓj(i)pt(ri) .
11: For all i ∈ A, qt+1(i) =
qt(i) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(i))∑︁
j∈A qt(j) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(j)) .
12: t = t+ 1.
13: end while
revealing actions/vertices in the dominating set R. Next, Algorithm 5 associates with
each star-graph its revealing arm r ∈ R. The mini-batch size at time t now depends
on the probability pt(r) of sampling a revealing action r, as in Algorithm 4. There
are several key differences, however, that we now point out. Unlike Algorithm 4, the
mini-batch size can change between rounds even if the action remains fixed. This
occurs when the newly sampled action is associated with a new revealing action in R,
however, it is different from the prior revealing action. The above difference introduces
some complications, because τt conditioned on all prior actions a1:t−1 is still a random
variable, while it is a deterministic in Algorithm 4. We also allow switches between
any action and any vertex r ∈ R. This might seem to be a peculiar choice. For
example, allowing only switches within each star-graph in the partition and only
between revealing vertices seems more natural. Allowing switches between any vertex
and any revealing action benefits exploration while still being sufficient for controlling
the number of switches. If we further constrain the number of switches by using the
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more natural approach, it is possible that not enough information is received about
each action, leading to worse regret guarantees. We leave the investigation of such
more natural approaches to future work. Algorithm 5 admits the following regret
bound.
Theorem 2.3.2. For any β ≥ |R|
τ
The expected regret of Algorithm 5 is
log (|A|)
η
+ ητT + βT.
Further, if the algorithm is augmented similar to Algorithm 8, then it will switch
between actions at most 2T |R|
τ
times.
Setting η = 1/(|R| 13T 23 ), τ = |R| 23T 13 and β = |R| 13/T 13 , recovers a pseudo-regret
bound of Õ(|R| 13T 23 ), with an expected number of switches bounded by 2|R| 13T 23 .
We note that |R| = O(γ(G) log (|A|)) and thus the regret bound of our algorithm
scales like γ(G) 13 . Further, this is a strict improvement over the results of Rangi
and Franceschetti (2019) as their result shows a scaling of α(G) 13 . The proof of
Theorem 2.3.2 follows the ideas in the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 while carefully handling
the construction the unbiased estimators of the losses. The proof can be found in
Section 2.4.
2.3.2.3 Corralling Star Graph Algorithms
An alternative natural method to tackle the general feedback graph problem is
to use the recent corralling algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2016). In this section, we
describe that technique, even though it does not seem to achieve an optimal rate.
Here too, the first step consists of computing an approximate minimum dominating
set. Next, we initialize an instance of Algorithm 4 for each star graph. Finally, we
combine all of the star graph algorithms via a mini-batched version of the corralling
algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2016). Mini-batching is necessary to avoid switching
between star graph algorithms too often. The pseudocode of this algorithm is given in
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Algorithm 6: Corralling star-graph algorithms
Input: Feedback graph G(A, E), learning rate η, mini-batch size τ
Output: Action sequence (at)Tt=1.
1: Compute an approximate minimum dominating set R and initialize |R| base
star-graph algorithms, B1, B2, . . . , B|R|, with step size η
′




2: T ′ = T
τ
, β = 1
T ′





, η1,i = η, ρ1,i = 2|R| for all i ∈ [|R|],
q1 = p1 = 1|R|
3: for t = 1, . . . , T ′ do
4: Draw it ∼ pt
5: for jt = (t− 1)τ + 1, . . . , (t− 1)τ + τ do
6: Receive action aijt from Bi for all i ∈ [|R|].
7: Set ajt = aitjt , play ajt and observe loss ℓjt(ajt).
8: Send ℓjt (ajt )
pt(it) I{i = it} as loss to algorithm Bi for all i ∈ [|R|].
9: Update ˆ︁ℓt(i) = ˆ︁ℓt(i) + 1τ ℓjt (ajt )pt(it) I{i = it}.
10: end for
11: Update qt+1 = Algorithm 7(qt, ˆ︁ℓt, ηt).
12: Set pt+1 = (1 − β)qt+1 + β 1|R| .
13: for i = 1, . . . , |R| do
14: if 1
pt(i) > ρt,i then








Algorithm 6. Since during each mini-batch we sample a single star graph algorithm,
we need to construct appropriate unbiased estimators of the losses ℓjt , which we feed
back to the sampled star graph algorithm. The bound on the second moment of these
estimators is exactly what Theorem 2.3.1 requires. Our algorithm admits the following
guarantees.
Theorem 2.3.3. Let τ = T 13/|R| 14 , η = |R| 14/(40c log (T ′)T 13 log (|A|)), and η′ =
1/T 23 , where c is a constant independent of T , τ , |A| and |R|. Then, for any a ∈ A,
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Algorithm 7: Log-Barrier-OMD(qt, ℓt, ηt)
Input: Previous distribution qt, loss vector ℓt, learning rate vector ηt.
Output: Updated distribution qt+1.








2: Return qt+1 such that 1qt+1(i) =
1
qt(i) + ηt,i(ℓt(i) − λ).














Furthermore, the expected number of switches of the algorithm is bounded by T 23 |R| 13 .
Sketch of proof. The basic idea behind the proof-sketch is to first partition the graph
G into star graphs using the greedy algorithm for finding a dominating set. Next, we
know that running Algorithm 4 on each star graph comes with an RS(T ) ≤ Õ(T 2/3)
regret guarantee. We could directly use the corralling algorithm on top of the star
graph algorithms, however, we still need to make sure that the corralling algorithm
does not switch too often. To this end we just use the reduction outlined in Arora
et al. (2012a) to obtain a corralling algorithm with bounded switches. Unfortunately,
this reduction leads to the sub-optimal dependence on the size of the dominating
set.
This bound is suboptimal compared to the γ(G) 13 -dependency achieved by Algo-
rithm 5. We conjecture that this gap is an artifact of the analysis of the corralling
algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2016). However, we were unable to improve on the current
regret bound by simply corralling.
2.4 Detailed proofs from Section 2.3.2
2.4.1 Adaptive Mini-batching for Star Graphs
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 begins by considering a slightly modified version of
Algorithm 4. In particular we remove lines 5 through 7 which disallow switching
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between non-revealing actions. This intuitively should not change the policy which
Algorithm 4 produces as such switches do not provide any new information to the
algorithm. For convenience of the reader we give the pseudo-code of the modified
algorithm in Algorithm 8, where the lines in red are commented out and are not part
of the algorithm.
Algorithm 8: Algorithm for star graphs (modified)
Input: Star graph G(A, E), learning rate sequence (ηt), exploration rate β ∈ [0, 1],
maximum mini-batch τ .
Output: Action sequence (at)t.
1: q1 ≡ Unif(A).
2: while ∑︁t τt ≤ T do
3: pt = (1 − β)qt + βδ(r).
4: Draw at ∼ pt, set τt = pt(r)τ .
5: if at−1 ̸= r and at ̸= r then
6: Set at = at−1
7: end if
8: Play at for the next ⌊τt⌋ iterations.






10: For all i ∈ A, qt+1(i) =
qt(i) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(i))∑︁
j∈A qt(j) exp(−ηtˆ︁ℓt(j)) .
11: t = t+ 1.
12: end while
Algorithm 8 comes with the following regret guarantee.
Theorem 2.4.1. Suppose that for all t ≤ T and all i ∈ A it holds that E[ℓt(i)2] ≤ ρ
and β ≥ 1
τ










for any a ∈ A.
Proof. Since β ≥ 1
τ
, this implies that ⌊τt⌋ ≥ 1 and the algorithm terminates, producing





Let wt(i) = exp
(︂















−η∑︁t+⌊τt⌋−1j=t I(at = r) ℓj(i)pt(r))︂
Wt
⎞⎠











































where the first inequality follows from log (x) ≤ x − 1 for all x > 0 and the second
inequality follows from e−x ≤ 1 − x+ x2/2 for x ≥ 0. Rearranging terms in the above
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+ E[Lt+1,∗ − Lt,∗].





































where T ′ is the random variable equaling the number of mini-batches. The last
inequality in the above follows since τT ∈ o(T ) and from our while loop we know
that ∑︁T ′−1t=1 τt ≤ T , thus we can bound E[∑︁T ′t=1 τt] ≤ 2T . Notice that the LHS in the
above inequality is almost equal to the expected regret of our algorithm. We have














Proof. The number of switches can be upper bounded by twice the number of times





E[∑︁T ′t=1 pt(r)τ ] = 1τE[∑︁T ′t=1 τt] ≤ 2Tτ .
To finish the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 we need to verify that the expected regret of
Algorithm 8 is the same as the expected regret of Algorithm 4.
Lemma 2.4.3. Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 4 have the same expected regret bound.
Proof. Let (pt)Tt=1 be the sequence of random vectors generated by Algorithm 8 and
let (p′t)Tt=1 be the sequence of random vectors generated by Algorithm 4. First we
show by induction that the distribution of pt is the same as that of p′t. The base case
is trivial as p1 = p′1. To see that the induction step holds we just notice that if we
condition on pt either both algorithms update pt+1 and p′t+1 because action r was
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sampled, in which case the updates are exactly the same, or both algorithms do not
update pt+1, respectively p′t+1. Let at and a′t denote the t-th action of Algorithm 8
and Algorithm 4 respectively. We now show that E[ℓt(at)] = E[ℓt(a′t)]. Let Xt denote
the random variable indicating the last time before t in which action r was played by
Algorithm 8 and let X ′t be the random variable indicating the last time before t in
which action r was played by Algorithm 4. Since Xt is function of p1, . . . , pt−1 and X ′t





























P(X ′t = j)E[ℓt(a′t)|X ′t = j] = E[ℓt(a′t)].












Lemma 2.4.2 together with the fact that Algorithm 4 can only switch between the
revealing action and non-revealing actions imply the bound on number of switches.
2.4.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3.2
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. First note that because of the condition β ≥ |R|
τ
each of




and thus the algorithm will terminate in at most 2T iterations. Next, similarly
to Lemma 2.4.3, we can analyze the regret of Algorithm 5 by removing lines 6
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and 7 when bounding the cumulative loss of the algorithm and then use lines 6











i∈A wt(i), so that qt(i) = wt(i)Wt . Let
Ar be the subset of actions dominated by the vertex r. Let i∗t be the best action at time
t and let Lt,∗ =
∑︁t
s=1






































































where the first inequality follows from the fact that log (()x) ≤ x − 1 for all x ≥ 0
and the second inequality follows from the fact that e−x ≤ 1 − x+ x2/2, for all x ≥ 0.
Set ηt = η and divide both sides by η. Shuffling terms around, taking expectation and
noting that if one drops the floor function from the quadratic term it will only get

































































ℓj(i) + Lt+1,∗ − Lt,∗
⎤⎦ ,
where in the last inequality we used that ℓj(i) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ A. Now we consider the














































. We have at = r with probability pt(r) and so
τt = pt(r)τ . Otherwise we have I(at=r)pt(r)2 τ
2


































pt(r)τP[τt = pt(r)τ ]
]︄
= τE[τt].






















⎤⎦ ≤ log (|A|)
η
+ ητT.
Next we notice that the LHS is almost the expected regret of the algorithm, except
we need to replace qt(i) by pt(i). This is done at the cost of an additional βT term,
since qt(r) ≤ pt(r) − β|R| for r ∈ R. Finally we upper bound the number of times the
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r∈R I(at = r)
]︂




































































where the second inequality follows from the fact that ∑︁i∈Ar pt(i) ≥ pt(r), the third
inequality follows from the fact that (∑︁r∈R pt(r))2 ≤ |R|∑︁r∈R pt(r)2 and the fourth
inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality for conditional expectations.
2.4.3 Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
We use a mini-batch version of Algorithm 1 in Agarwal et al. (2016) where each of the
base algorithms is Algorithm 4. We note that the greedy algorithm for computing an
approximate minimum dominating set gives a natural way to partition the feedback
graph G into star graphs. In particular, whenever the greedy algorithm adds a vertex
v to the dominating set, we create a new instance of the star graph algorithm with
revealing vertex v and leaf nodes all neighbors of v which have not already been
assigned to a star graph algorithm.
















40η log (T ′)
]︄




⟨pt − ei, ˆ︁ℓt⟩ ≤ O
(︄











40η log (T ′) .
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Notice that by construction we have E[ˆ︁ℓt(at)] = ∑︁i∈[|R|] 1τ ∑︁t+τ−1j=t ℓj(aij) ≤ |R|. Also

























40η log (T ′) .
Multiplying by τ and using the fact that T ′τ = T finishes the proof.
The following theorem from Agarwal et al. (2016) shows that restarting the i-th
algorithm in line 16 of Algorithm 6 does not hinder the regret bound by too much.
Theorem 2.4.5 (Theorem 15 (Agarwal et al., 2016)). Suppose a base algorithm Bi is
such that if the loss sequence (ℓt)Tt=1 is replaced by ℓ′t = ρtℓt such that E[ℓ′t] = ℓt, its
regret bound changes from R(T ) to E[ρα]R(T ), where ρ = maxt≤T ρt. Let (ait)t≤T be
the action sequence generated by Bi ran under Algorithm 6. Then for any action a in











Proof of Theorem 2.3.3. For any action a ∈ A, let ia be the star-graph algorithm
which has a in its actions and let its regret be Ria(T ). Notice that the loss estimators
ℓ′t(i) =
ℓt+j(at+j)
pt(it) I{i = it} we feed the algorithm are such that E[ℓ
′
t(i)2] ≤ ρT . Now
Theorem 2.3.1 implies that the condition of Theorem 2.4.5 is satisfied with α = 1/2.











2 + 1)E[ρ1/2T ′,ia ]3T
2/3 log (|A|) .






















2 + 1)E[ρ1/2T ′,ia ]T
2/3 log (|A|)




2 + 1). We now consider the terms containing ρT ′,ia in the above
inequality.
cE[ρ1/2T ′,ia ]T
2/3 log (|A|) − E
[︄
τρT ′,ia




⎛⎝cT 2/3 log (|A|) − τρ1/2T ′,ia40η log (T ′)
⎞⎠⎤⎦ .
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Set τ = T 1/3|R|1/4 , η =
|R|1/4
40 log(T ′)T 1/3c log(|A|) to get
E
⎡⎣ρ1/2T ′,ia
⎛⎝cT 2/3 log (|A|) − τρ1/2T ′,ia40η log (T ′)
⎞⎠⎤⎦ = cT 2/3 log (|A|)E
⎡⎣ρ1/2T ′,ia





|R| log (|A|)T 2/3.
Plugging in the the values of η and τ in the rest of the bound finishes the regret
bound.
The number of switches is bounded from the fact that Algorithm 6 can switch
between star-graph algorithms at most T 2/3|R|1/3 times and Lemma 2.4.2.
2.5 Policy regret bound
For deriving Theorem 2.1.1 we assume that we are provided with a feedback graph
for losses with memory m. We restrict the feedback graph to only have vertices
for repeated m-tuples of actions in A. In particular we can only observe additional
feedback for losses of the type ℓt(a, a, . . . , a), where a ∈ A. The algorithm for this
setting is based on Algorithm 5. The feedback graph we provide to our policy
regret algorithm is the same as for the m-memory bounded losses, however, each
m-tuple vertex is replaced by a copy of a single action e.g. the vertex (a, . . . , a) is
replaced by a. Next we split the stream of T losses into mini-batches of size m such
that ˆ︁ℓt(·) = 1m ∑︁mj=1 ℓ(t−1)m+j(·). Now we would simply feed the sequence (ˆ︁ℓt)T/mt=1 to
Algorithm 5 if it were not for the constraint on the additional feedback. Suppose
that between the t-th mini-batch and the t+ 1-st mini-batch Algorithm 5 decides to
switch actions so that at ̸= at+1. In this case no additional feedback is available forˆ︁ℓt+1(at+1) and the algorithm can not proceed as normal. To fix this minor problem,
the provided feedback to Algorithm 5 is that the loss of action at+1 was 0 and all
actions adjacent to at+1 also incurred 0 loss. This modification can not occur more
times than the number of switches Algorithm 5 does. Since the expected number of
switches is bounded by O(γ(G)1/3T 2/3), intuitively the modification becomes benign
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to the total expected regret. Formally, we use Algorithm 5 as Algorithm A in the
reduction provided by Algorithm 3. Theorem 2.2.1 now implies Theorem 2.1.1 because
RS(T ) = Õ(γ(G)1/3T 2/3) (by Theorem 2.3.2) and the reduction (Theorem 2.2.1)
guarantees that P (T ) = mÕ(γ(G)1/3(T/m)2/3 = Õ((mγ(G))1/3T 2/3).
2.6 Lower bounds
The main tool for constructing lower bounds when switching costs are involved is the
stochastic process constructed by Dekel et al. (2014). The crux of the proof consists of
a carefully designed multi-scale random walk. The two characteristics of this random
walk are its depth and its width. At time t, the depth of the walk is the number of
previous rounds on which the value of the current round depends. The width of the
walk measures how far apart two rounds that depend on each other are in time. The
loss of each action is equal to the value of the random walk at each time step, and the
loss of the best action is slightly better by a small positive constant. The depth of
the process controls how well the losses concentrate in the interval [0, 1]1. The width
of the walk controls the variance between losses of different actions and ensures it is
impossible to gain information about the best action, unless one switches between
different actions.
2.6.1 Lower bound for non-complete graphs
v1 v2
v3
Figure 2-2: Feedback graph for switch-
ing costs
We first verify that the dependence on the
time horizon cannot be improved from T 23 for
any feedback graph in which there is at least
one edge missing, that is, in which there exist
two vertices that do not reveal information
about each other. Without loss of generality,
1Technically, the losses are always clipped between [0, 1].
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assume that the two vertices not joined by an edge are v1 and v2. Take any vertex
that is a shared neighbor and denote this vertex by v3 (see Figure 2-2 for an example).
We set the loss for action v3 and all other vertices to be equal to one. We now focus
the discussion on the subgraph with vertices {v1, v2, v3}. The losses of actions v1 and
v2 are set according to the construction in (Dekel et al., 2014). Since {v1, v2} forms
an independent set, the player would need to switch between these vertices to gain
information about the best action. This is also what the lower bound proof of Rangi
and Franceschetti (2019) is based upon. However, it is important to realize that
the construction in Dekel et al. (2014) also allows for gaining information about the
best action if its loss is revealed together with some other loss constructed from the
stochastic process. In that case, playing vertex v3 would provide such information.
This is a key property which Rangi and Franceschetti (2019) seem to have missed
in their lower bound proof. We discuss this mistake carefully and provide a lower
bound matching what the authors claim in the uninformed setting in Section 2.6.3.
Our discussion suggests that we should set the price for revealing information about
multiple actions according to the switching cost and this is why the losses of all vertices
outside of the independent set are equal to one. We note that the losses of the best
action are much smaller than one sufficiently often, so that enough instantaneous
regret is incurred when pulling action v3. Our main result follows.
Theorem 2.6.1. For any non-complete feedback graph G, there exists a sequence of
losses on which any algorithm A in the informed setting incurs expected regret at least




Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 2.6.1, we introduce the stochastic
process defined in Dekel et al. (2014).
Stochastic process definition. We denote by ξ1:T a sequence of i.i.d. zero-
mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2 and ρ : [T ] → {0}⋃︁[T ] the parent
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function, which assigns to t ∈ [T ] a parent ρ(t) ∈ [T ] with ρ(t) < t. The stochastic
process Wt associated with ρ(t) is defined as
W0 = 0
Wt = Wρ(t) + ξt.
(2.4)
The set of ancestors of t is the set ρ∗(t) = ρ∗(ρ(t))⋃︁{ρ(t)} with ρ∗(0) = {}. The
depth of ρ is d(ρ) = maxt∈[T ] |ρ∗(t)|. The cut of ρ is cut(t) = {s ∈ [T ] : ρ(s) < t ≤ s}
i.e. the set of rounds which are separated from their parent by t. The width of ρ
is defined as ω(ρ) = maxt∈[T ] |cut(t)|. The specific random walk which Dekel et al.
(2014) consider has both depth and width logarithmic in T . In particular the parent
function is defined as
ρ(t) = t− 2δ(t),where , δ(t) = max{i ≥ 0 : t ≡ 0 mod 2i} (2.5)
Let us consider two examples of a stochastic processes defined by Equation 2.4. The
first one is just setting ρ(t) = 0, so that Wt is just a standard Gaussian variable. The
width of this process is just T and its depth is 1. While we have good concentration
guarantees over the maximum value of Wt uniformly over all t ∈ [T ], which is important
for controlling the losses, it is very easy to gain information about actions 1 and 2
without switching. Indeed one can just first play 1 for a sufficient number of iteration
and then play 2 for fixed number of iterations to be able, with high probability, to
distinguish between the two losses. Now consider a Gaussian random walk where
ρ(t) = t−1. In this case the cut is 1 but the depth is T . It turns out that to distinguish
between two processes with small width, we require that we observe both the processes
at the same time (or times differing by a small amount). This is intuitively because
of the large drift of the process that occurs between Wt and Wt+k. We note that the
simple Gaussian walk is not a good process for the losses, since its depth is too large
for us to be able to control the size of the (unclipped) losses.
The feedback graph we work for the reset of this section is G(A, E), where
A = {1, 2, 3} and E = {(1, 3), (2, 3), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)} (see Figure 2-2).
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Constructing the losses. We consider the following adversarial sequence of
losses. First sample an action uniformly at random from {1, 2}. WLOG we condition
on the event that the sampled action is 1. Next set ℓt(3) = 1, ℓt(2) = clip(Wt + 12),
ℓt(1) = clip(Wt + 12 − ϵ), where clip(α) = min{max{α, 0}, 1}. The intuition behind
our lower bound is very simple and holds for a general feedback graph. It is as follows:
if we do not have a complete feedback graph then there are at least two actions which
do not tell us anything about each other. We leverage this by selecting one of the two
actions uniformly at random to be the best action. If we play an action which is not 1
or 2 we incur constant regret in that turn but we can gain information about the losses
of both 1 and 2. If we play 2, then we do not learn anything about 1 and if we play 1
we do not learn anything about 2. In these two cases the per round regret incurred is
ϵ, however, because of the loss construction, we need to switch between these actions
to be able to distinguish them and thus we will incur regret from switching. Overall
the loss construction together with the result in Dekel et al. (2014) implies that to
distinguish between 1 and 2 we need to observe the losses of both actions at the same
time or switch between them at least Ω̃(T 2/3) rounds. This is what we formally argue
below.
Let Yt be the observed loss vector associated with the action at time t, at, i.e.
if at = 2 then Yt = Wt + 12 , if at = 1 then Yt = Wt +
1




Wt + 12 − ϵ
)︄
. We let Y0 = 1/2. We let Q1 be the probability measure on the
σ-field F generated by {Yt}Tt=0. Let Q0 be the probability measure on the same σ-field
if ℓt(1) = ℓt(2) = clip(Wt + 12) i.e. there is no best action. In this case Yt = Wt +
1
2





if at = 2. Denote by dFTV (Q0,Q1) the total
variational distance between Q0 and Q1 on the σ-field F . Let DKL (Q0||Q1) be the
KL-divergence between Q0 and Q1. We now show that a sufficiently large number
of switches between actions 1 and 2 or choosing action 3 is required to distinguish
between Q0 and Q1. As it was discussed above, the width of the process plays an
59
important role, which is clarified by the lemma below. It essentially is an upper bound
on the number of switches required to distinguish between Q0 and Q1.
Lemma 2.6.2. Let M be the number of times the player’s strategy switched between
actions 1 and 2. Let N be the number of times the payer chose to play action 3. Then
dFTV (Q0,Q1) ≤ ϵ2σ
√︂
ω(ρ)EQ0 [M +N ].
Next we show that, because of the depth of the random walk, we are able to say
that with high probability most of the non-clipped losses will be equal to the clipped
losses. The implications of this result are two-fold. First the regret incurred on the
non-clipped versions is close to the regret incurred on the clipped version. Secondly,
we are able to say that loss of action 3 is worse by a constant from the losses of actions
1 and 2 often enough, so that we also incur constant regret when playing action 3 as


















Lemma 4 in Dekel et al. (2014) compares R′ to R
Lemma 2.6.3. For T ≥ 6, E[R] ≥ E[R′] − ϵT/6.
The lower bound for E[R′] is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6.4. Let Q2 be the conditional distribution induced by sampling the best
action to be equal to 2. Then








Putting the above two lemmas together, we are able to show Theorem 2.6.1.
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Proof of Theorem 2.6.1. First assume that the event M +N/7 > ϵT does not occur
on losses generated from Q0 or Qi. This implies Q0(M +N/7 > ϵT ) = Qi(M +N/7 >
ϵT ) = 0. Then
EQ0 [M +N/7] − E[M +N/7]
= EQ0 [M +N/7] − EQ1 [M +N/7] + EQ0 [M +N/7] − EQ2 [M +N/7]2
≤ ϵT2 (d
F
TV (Q0,Q1) + dFTV (Q0,Q2)).
The above, together with Lemma 2.6.4 implies
E[R′] ≥ ϵT2 − ϵT (d
F





Applying Lemma 2.6.3 now gives
E[R] ≥ ϵT3 − ϵT (d
F





On the other hand we can bound (dFTV (Q0,Q1) + dFTV (Q0,Q2))/2 by Lemma 2.6.2 as






EQ0 [M +N ] log (T ).
This implies












EQ0 [M +N ]. Then we have















x has minimum −7 log(T )ϵ
4T 2
2σ2 . We set ϵ = c
1
T 1/3 log(T )
for a constant c to be determined later. We then have
E[R] ≥ cT
2/3




log (T )3 σ2
.



















Suppose there is some strategy for which M + N/7 ≥ c T 2/3log(T ) occurs. Let this
strategy have regret R. We change the strategy in the following way. Keep track of
M +N/7 and the moment it exceeds c T 2/3log(T ) pick an action which has had loss smaller
than 5/6. If there is no such action, pick any action and play it until the end of the
game. With probability at least 1/T we know that such an action exists and that it
was set according to the stochastic process construction. Thus the regret of the new
strategy R∗ is bounded by E[R∗] ≤ E[R] + (1 − 1/T )ϵT + 1/T × T ≤ 2E[R] + 1. Since
the lower bound holds for E[R∗] the proof is complete.
2.6.2 Lower Bound for Disjoint Union of Star Graphs
Let G be the graph which is a union of star graphs. Let R be the set of revealing
vertices for the star graphs. We denote by Ai the set of vertices associated with the
star graph with revealing vertex vi. First for each star graph we sample an active
vertex uniformly at random from its leaves. Next we sample the best vertex uniformly
at random from the set of active vertices. We set the loss of the best vertex to be
clip(Wt + 1/2 − ϵ) and the loss of all other active vertices to clip(Wt + 1/2). For any
star graph consisting of a single vertex, we treat the vertex as a leaf. The following
theorem follows as an easy reduction from the proof of Dekel et al. (2014).
Theorem 2.6.5. The expected regret of any algorithm A on a disjoint union of star
graphs is lower bounded as follows:






Proof of Theorem 2.6.5. Let I be the set of all possible ways to sample a set of active
vertices. Let Ei be the expectation conditioned on the event that the set of active
vertices indexed by i ∈ I is sampled in the beginning of the game. Consider the
subgraph induced by the active vertices I and all of their neighbors R. Suppose
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. We claim this






. We convert the player’s strategy over I ⋃︁R to a strategy over I. For
every time that at ∈ R is played, we replace at by the unique neighbor of at in I. This
updated strategy’s regret is at most the regret of the original strategy and thus by our










. This is in contradiction
with the result of Dekel et al. (2014) since the subgraph induced by I is precisely
modeling bandit feedback and the losses of actions in I are exactly constructed as
in Dekel et al. (2014). Thus we have E[R] ≥ 1|I|
∑︁






Even though the above theorem is a trivial consequence of the result in Dekel
et al. (2014) it can also be proved in another way. Let I denote the set of conditional
distributions induced by the observed losses, where the conditioning is with respect
to the random sampling of vertices as described in the beginning of the section. The
general idea of the complicated proof is to count the number of distributions which each
strategy of the player gains information about. For example a strategy which switches
between two revealing vertices vi and vj will gain information about deg(vi)deg(vj)
distributions. Now the lower bound follows from a careful counting of the number of
distributions for which we gain information by switching between revealing vertices.
This counting argument can be generalized beyond union of star graphs, by considering
an appropriate pair of minimal dominating/maximal independent sets. We leave a
detailed argument for future work.
2.6.2.1 Counting Argument for Theorem 2.6.5
Let I denote the set of all possible ways to sample active vertices. The cardinality of
this set is |I| = ∏︁vi∈R deg(vi). Denote by Qi0 the conditional distribution generated
by the observed losses if all losses for active vertices indexed by i ∈ I were set to
clip(Wt + 1/2). Denote by Qij the conditional distribution generated by the observed
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losses when active vertex j is chosen to be the best given the active vertices are
indexed by i ∈ I. Let M ij denote the random variable counting the number of times
the player switched from and to an action adjacent to j. Let N ij denote the random
variable counting the number of times the player played an action adjacent to j.








j +N ij ].
Let Mi denote the random variable measurable with respect to the draw of i ∈ I
which counts the total number of switches. Similarly let Ni count the total number of
times a revealing vertex of degree at least 2 was played.




















Proof. Notice that conditioned on the draw of i ∈ I we have ∑︁j∈[|R|] N ji ≤ Ni. This
happens because there is only one revealing vertex adjacent to the best vertex for every





where the constant two appears because we have counted each switch twice – once
from action j and once to action j. Using Lemma 2.6.6 with concavity of the square
root finishes the proof.
The above lemma was easy to prove because we did not have two vertices which are
dominated simultaneously by two different neighbors in R. This allowed us to count
very easily the number of times we might have over-count Ni for two different choices
of the best action. We were also lucky that it was impossible to gain information
about the best action proportional to the degree of a revealing vertex. For a general
graph both of these events can happen and the counting argument would have to be
more careful.
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Lemma 2.6.8. The following holds





















Let M denote the random variable counting the total number of switches and N
the random variable denoting the total number of times a revealing action with degree
at least 2 was played. We can write 1|I|
∑︁
i∈I Ei[Mi] ≤ 1|I|
∑︁
i∈I Ei[M ] = E[M ] and
similarly 1|I|
∑︁
i∈I Ei[Ni] ≤ E[N ]. The proof of Theorem 2.6.5 can now be completed
by following the proof of Theorem 2.6.1. We note that bounding Mi by M is in
general tight for disjoint union of star graphs and equality occurs for all strategies
which switch only between revealing vertices. For general graphs this upper bound
can become very loose and we should exercise caution when constructing an upper
bound. In particular we should carefully count how many distributions are covered by
a single switch.
2.6.3 Lower bound for a sequence of feedback graphs in the
uninformed setting.
While going through the proof of Theorem 1 in Rangi and Franceschetti (2019), we
came across an important technical mistake. In page 2 of the supplementary material,
in the paragraph after Equation 8, the authors state that, at a single time instance,
the loss of only one single action can be observed from the independent set in their
construction. This is not correct since a player’s strategy can play an action that is
not in the independent set but is adjacent to two or more vertices in the independent
set.
The problem with this statement becomes apparent when one considers a fixed
feedback graph system, i.e., Gt = G,∀t ∈ [T ], where G is a star graph. In that
case, the construction of the losses by Rangi and Franceschetti (2019) amounts to
sampling a best action from the leaves of G, setting its loss to be ϵ1 smaller than the
loss of all other actions in the leaves of G, and setting the revealing action to be ϵ2
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larger than the losses in the leaves of G. The losses of the remaining actions are set
according to the stochastic process of Dekel et al. (2014). With these choice of losses
and ϵ1 and ϵ2 set according to what the authors suggest, a very simple strategy is
information-theoretically optimal: the player only needs to play the revealing action
T 2/3 times to distinguish which of the leaves of G contains the best action. This
strategy would actually incur expected regret of the order Θ̃(
√
T ).
Let α(G1:T ) denote the largest cardinality among all intersections of independent
sets of the sequence (Gt)Tt=1. A lower bound of Ω̃(α(G1:T )1/3T 2/3) is still possible under
additional assumptions about how the feedback graph system is generated in the
uninformed setting. In particular, we show that if we allow the feedback graphs to
be chosen by the adversary, there still exists a sequence of feedback graphs for which
the lower bound is Ω̃(α(G1:T )1/3T 2/3), while for each Gt, we have γ(Gt) = 1.
rt
Figure 2-3: Gt
Formally, we show that in the uninformed
setting, when we allow the graphs to be cho-
sen by the adversary, there exists a sequence
(Gt)Tt=1 such that for all t ∈ [T ], γ(Gt) = 1,
α(Gt) ≫ 1 and α(G1:t) = Θ(α(Gt)), for which
any player’s strategy will incur regret of the or-
der Ω̃(α(G1:t)1/3T 2/3). In particular, there is
a non-trivial example of a sequence of graphs
for which the independence number is arbitrarily larger than the domination number
and every strategy has to incur regret depending on the independence number.
We now present our construction. Fix α ≫ 1 and let |A| = 2α. Let I be a subset
of A of size α and let R = A \ I. Set the losses of actions in I according to the
construction of Dekel et al. (2014), as described in Section 2.6.1. Set the losses of
actions in R equal to one. The edges of the graph Gt = (A, Et) at round t are defined
as follows. The vertices in R form a clique. A vertex r is sampled uniformly at random
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from R to be the revealing action and all edges (r, vi), vi ∈ I are also added to Et. We
note that α(Gt) = α + 1, γ(Gt) = 1 for all t ∈ [T ] and α(G1:T ) = α. We present an
illustration for our construction in Figure 2-3. Here α = 6, the set I are the vertices
in red, the set R are the vertices in blue.
The intuition behind our construction is that the player needs on average α rounds
to observe the losses of all actions, due to the randomization over the revealing vertex
r. The switching cost again contributes to the T 2/3 time-horizon regret.
Again assume that the strategy of the player is deterministic. We let Qi denote
the conditional distribution generated by the observed losses, when the best action
was sampled to be vi ∈ I and Q0 denotes the distribution over observed losses when
there is no best action in I. Let Mi be the number of times the player’s strategy
switched between an action in I \ {i} and i. Let M ′i be the number of times that the
player switched between i and the revealing action. Let N be the total number of
times a vertex in R was played and let N ′ be the total number of times a revealing
vertex was played. We have the following.
Lemma 2.6.9. For all i ∈ [|I|]⋃︁{0}
1
α
EQi [N ] = EQi [N ′].
Let M denote the random variable counting the total number of switches.
Lemma 2.6.10. The following inequality holds: 1
α
∑︁







EQ0 [M +N ].
Repeating the rest of the arguments in Section 2.6.4 with ϕ(G) replaced by 1
α
shows the following theorem.
Theorem 2.6.11. For any α > 1, α ∈ N, there exists an adversarially generated
sequence of feedback graphs (Gt)Tt=1, with α(Gt) = α + 1, γ(Gt) = 1,∀t ∈ [T ] and





16 log (T ) .
2.6.4 Lower Bound for Arbitrary Graphs
In this section we propose a construction leading to a non-tight lower bound for general
graphs. We choose to present this construction due to it developing tools which can
be useful for a tight generic bound. In particular the way we use Lemma 2.6.12 in
the proof of Lemma 2.6.6 can be mimicked for general graphs when coupled with a
careful counting argument.
Let G = (A, E) be a feedback graph with vertex set A and edge set E. Let I
denote the set of all maximal independent sets I of G. For any I we say that I is
dominated by S ⊆ A if for every v ∈ I, there exists a neighbor of v in S. For any I
let SI be a minimal set of vertices which dominates I and let SI be the set of all such
SI . Let δ(SI) equal the maximum number of neighbors in I, which a vertex in SI can
have. Let δ(SI) be the maximum over all δ(SI) and let ϕ(G) = minI∈I δ(SI)|I| . Let I
∗ be
a maximal independent set for which |SI∗| = ϕ(G). To construct our adversarial loss
sequence we begin by uniformly sampling an action i from I∗ and setting it to be the
action with smallest loss. Let Qi denote the conditional probability measure given the
sampled best action was i and let Q0 be the probability distribution when all of the
actions in I∗ are equal i.e. there is no best action. Let Wt be the stochastic process as
defined in Section 2.6.1. We set the losses for actions in I∗ to be clip(Wt + 1/2) for
v ∈ I∗ \ {i} and the loss of i to be clip(Wt + 1/2 − ϵ). The loss of all other actions is
set to be 1. We let Yt denote the loss vector of observed losses only on I∗. WLOG we
can disregard other losses, since they will not let us distinguish between Qi and Q0.
We denote by Yt(j) the loss of action j ∈ I∗ if that loss was observed at time t. Let F
be the σ-field generated by (Yt)Tt=1.
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Our intuition behind the definition of ϕ(G) and the above construction is the
following. First we require that the losses based on the stochastic process (Wt)Tt=1 be
assigned to vertices in an independent set. Otherwise, there would exist a setting in
which the best action would be adjacent to another action with losses generated from
(Wt)Tt=1 and in this case it is information theoretically possible to obtain O(
√
T ) regret
by playing the best action or its adjacent action enough times, without switching. For
every independent set, once a best action is fixed, from the lower bound in Section 2.6.1
we know two ways to distinguish it. First we switch between the best action and some
other action in the independent set (or more generally switch between actions giving
information about the best action and another action in the independent set), or play
an action which is adjacent to the best action and another action in the independent
set. In the general setting there might be an action which is adjacent to multiple
actions in the independent set and not adjacent to the best action. In such cases
switching between the best action and said action, reveals information proportional to
the degree of said action. Similarly if there is an action adjacent to the best action
and multiple other actions, selecting it again reveals information proportional to its
degree. Since we do not want to assume anything about the strategy of the player, it
is natural to select an independent set, such that minimum amount of vertices have
a common neighbor. Because the size of the independent set also gives freedom to
hide information from the player, we would simultaneously like to maximize its size.
This suggests that we search for and independent set which minimizes the ratio in the
definition of ϕ(G). In Figure 2-4 we give three examples of graphs with different ϕ(G).
For the first example the independent set |I∗| is the set of all vertices. The set SI∗ is
also the set of all vertices and δ(SI∗) = 1 thus ϕ(G) = 1/|A| and this is exactly equal
to γ(G)−1. For the second example I∗ is the set of leafs of the star graph and SI∗
is the vertex adjacent to all other vertices. In this case δ(SI∗) = |I∗| and ϕ(G) = 1
which again equals the inverse of the dominating number of G. Our final example
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· · ·
Figure 2-4: Example of feedback graphs with different ϕ(G).
shows that ϕ(G) can be arbitrary close to 1 even though γ(G)−1 < 1. In particular
SI∗ consists of the bottom 4 vertices and this is also the minimum dominating set of
G. However, there exists a vertex (the first vertex of the bottom four) of arbitrary
large degree so that δ(SI∗ )|I∗| can be arbitrary close to 1. The problem with our lower
bound construction becomes clear from this example. The player has a strategy in
which too much information is revealed by playing the action of arbitrary large degree.
To try and fix this problem we could set only one of the vertices adjacent to the action
of large degree according to (Wt)Tt=1 and the rest of the adjacent actions are set to
have loss equal to 1. This construction can fail for general graphs, as it might happen
that there exists another action which is adjacent to exactly the four actions whose
losses were chosen according to (Wt)Tt=1 in the right most graph of Figure 2-4.
Lemma 2.6.12. Let Mi be the number of times the player’s strategy switched be-
tween action adjacent only to i and another action not adjacent to i but adjacent
to at least one other action in I∗. Let Ni be the number of times the player chose





Let M denote the total number of switches and N the total number of times an
action revealing adjacent to at least two vertices in I∗ is played.
Lemma 2.6.13. It holds that 1|I∗|
∑︁





EQ0 [M +N ].
Lemma 2.6.14. It holds that











Theorem 2.6.15. The expected regret of a deterministic player is at least
E[R] ≥ 4 T
2/3
log (T )ϕ(G)1/3
Proof. First assume that the event M +N/7 > ϵT does not occur on losses generated
from Q0 or Qi for a deterministic player strategy. This implies Q0(M +N/7 > ϵT ) =
Qi(M +N/7 > ϵT ) = 0. Then











The above, together with Lemma 2.6.14 implies










Applying Lemma 2.6.3 now gives










On the other hand we can bound 1|I∗|
∑︁












EQ0 [M +N ].
This implies












EQ0 [M +N ]. Then we have














x has global minimum − ϵ
4T 2 log(T )ϕ(G)
14 We set ϵ =
c 1
T 1/3 log(T ) for a constant c to be determined later. We then have
E[R] ≥ cT
2/3




log (T )3 σ2
.
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guarantees E[R] ≥ T 2/316 log(T )ϕ(G)1/3 .
The case when M + N/7 > ϵT is treated in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 2.6.1
2.7 Detailed proofs for Section 2.6
2.7.1 Detailed proofs for Section 2.6.1
Proof of Lemma 2.6.2. Let Y0:t denote (Y0, Y1, . . . , Yt) and whenever Yt is a vector,
let Yt(i) be its i-th coordinate. We assume that the player is deterministic. By
Yao’s minimax principle this is without loss of generality. Thus we have that at is a
deterministic function of Y0:t−1. Using the chain rule for relative entropy and by the
construction of Wt, we have:












. First assume that at =
aρ(t) ̸= 3. Then Yt = N (Yρ(t), σ2) under both Q0 and Q1. Next consider the case















under Q1. If at ̸= aρ(t) we have 6 options:
1. aρ(t) = 3
(a) at = 1, in this case Yt = N (Yρ(t)(2), σ2) under Q0 and Yt = N (Yρ(t)(2)−ϵ, σ2)
under Q1;
(b) at = 2 in this case Yt = N (Yρ(t)(2), σ2) under Q0 and Yt = N (Yρ(t)(2), σ2)
under Q1;
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2. aρ(t) = 1















(b) at = 2 in this case Yt = N (Yρ(t), σ2) under Q0 and Yt = N (Yρ(t) + ϵ, σ2)
under Q1;
3. aρ(t) = 2






















= Q0(at = aρ(t) = 3)DKL
(︂
N (0, σ2)||N (−ϵ, σ2)
)︂
+ Q0(aρ(t)=3, at = 1)DKL
(︂
N (0, σ2)||N (−ϵ, σ2)
)︂
+ Q0(aρ(t)=1, at = 3)DKL
(︂
N (0, σ2)||N (ϵ, σ2)
)︂
+ Q0(aρ(t)=1, at = 2)DKL
(︂
N (0, σ2)||N (ϵ, σ2)
)︂
+ Q0(aρ(t)=2, at = 3)DKL
(︂
N (0, σ2)||N (−ϵ, σ2)
)︂
+ Q0(aρ(t)=2, at = 1)DKL
(︂





where At is the event that either action 3 was played at round t or there were odd
number of switches between actions 1 and 2. Let N denote the random number of
times action 3 was played and let M denote the random number of switches between
action 1 and action 2. Let S1:M denote the random sequence of times during which








χAt +N ≤ ω(ρ)(M +N),
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2σ2 EQ0 [M +N ].
Pinsker’s inequality that dFTV (Q0,Q1) ≤ ϵ2σ
√︂
ω(ρ)EQ0 [M +N ]
Proof of Lemma 2.6.4. First let us consider the amount of regret the player incurs for
picking action 3 N times. To do this we consider the number of times 1/2 +Wt > 5/6.


























Thus in expectation the regret for picking action 2 N times is at least (1/6 + ϵ)(N − 1).
Since we choose ϵ = Θ̃(T−1/3), for sufficiently large T we have that in expectation
the regret for picking action 3 N times is at least (N − 1)/6. Let χ denote the
uniform random variable over actions {1, 2}, which picks the best action in the
beginning of the game. Denote by Bi the number of times action i was played. Then
E[R′] ≥ E[ϵ(T −N −Bχ) +M + (N − 1)/6] (this is a lower bound since M only tracks
the switches between actions 1 and 2, so the switches to and from action 2 are left
out). Thus we have
E[R′] = E[ϵ(T −N −B1) +M + (N − 1)/6|χ = 1] + E[ϵ(T −N −B2) +M + (N − 1)/6|χ = 2]2
= ϵT − ϵ2 (EQ1 [B1] + EQ2 [B0]) + E
[︃
M + N − 16 − ϵN
]︃
.
Since ϵ = Θ̃(T−1/3) we have N−16 − ϵN ≤
N
7 . Consider EQ1 [B1], we have
EQ1 [B1] − EQ0 [B1] =
T∑︂
t=1
(Q1(at = 1) − Q0(at = 1)) ≤ TdFTV (Q0,Q1) .
A similar inequality holds for EQ2 [N0] and thus we get
EQ1 [B1] + EQ2 [B0] ≤ T (dFTV (Q0,Q1) + dFTV (Q0,Q2)) + EQ0 [B0 +B1]
≤ T (dFTV (Q0,Q1) + dFTV (Q0,Q2)) + T − EQ0 [N ].
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The above implies








+ ϵ2EQ0 [N ].
2.7.2 Detailed proofs from Section 2.6.2
Proof of Lemma 2.6.8. Let Ei denote the conditional distribution for sampling the
active vertex set indexed by i ∈ I. We have E[R′] = 1|I|
∑︁
i∈I Ei[R′]. First let us
consider the amount of regret the player incurs for picking a revealing action Ni times.
To do this we consider the number of times 1/2 +Wt > 5/6. The expected number of


























Thus in expectation the regret for picking a revealing action Ni times is at least
(1/6 + ϵ)(Ni − 1). Let χi denote the uniform random variable over R which picks the
best action. Denote by Bij the number of times action j was played from the active
vertices. Then Ei[R′] ≥ Ei[ϵ(T −Ni −Biχi) +Mi +Ni/6 − 1/6]. Thus we have
E[R′] =
∑︁
i∈|I| Ei[ϵ(T −Ni −Biχi) +Mi +Ni/6 − 1/6]
|I|













6 − 1/6 − ϵNi
]︃
.






j]. For each term of the sum we have
EQij [B
i

















































Using the assumption that |I| ≥ 2, the above implies



















6 − 1/6 − ϵNi
]︃
Since ϵ = Θ̃(T−1/3) we have Ei
[︂







2.7.3 Detailed proofs from Section 2.6.3
Proof of Lemma 2.6.9. Let rt denote the revealing action at time t.
EQi [N ′] =
T∑︂
t=1
EQi [I(at = rt)] =
T∑︂
t=1























This completes the proof.





ω(ρ)EQ0 [αM ′i +Mi +N ′],
since the amount of information that can be revealed by a switch is at most α and
this precisely happens when the player switches from i to the revealing action. Notice
that ∑︁vi∈IM ′i ≤ N ′, because the number of switches between any i and a revealing
action is bounded by the number of times a revealing action is played. Lemma 2.6.9
implies that EQ0 [αM ′i + Mi + N ′] ≤ EQ0 [N/α + Mi + αM ′i ]. Next, we note that∑︁





























EQ0 [M +N ],
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where the second to last inequality follows again from Lemma 2.6.9.
2.7.4 Detailed proofs from Section 2.6.4
Proof of Lemma 2.6.12. Using Yao’s minimax principle we can assume the player is
deterministic and thus their t-th action at is a deterministic function of Y0:t−1.Using
the chain rule for relative entropy and by the construction of Wt, we have:












. First assume that at = aρ(t)
is not an action adjacent to i or at = aρ(t) = i. Then for any observed j ∈ I∗ we have
Yt(j) = N (Yρ(t), σ2) under both Q0 and Qi. Next consider the case when at = aρ(t) is an
action adjacent to i and some other j ∈ I∗. In this case Yt(j) = Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2)
under Q0 and Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(j) − ϵ, σ2), Yt(j) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under Qi for all
observed j ∈ I∗ \ {i}. If at ̸= aρ(t) we have 6 options:
1. aρ(t) is an action adjacent to i and another action j ∈ I∗ \ {i}
(a) at is an action adjacent to i, in this case Yt(j) = Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(j′), σ2)
under Q0 for all observed j′ ∈ I∗ and Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(j) − ϵ, σ2), Yt(j′) =
N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under Qi for all observed j′ ∈ I∗;
(b) at is an action not adjacent to i in this case Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under
Q0 and Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under Qi for all observed j′ in I∗;
2. aρ(t) is an action not adjacent to i but adjacent to j
(a) at is an action adjacent to i, in this case Yt(j′) = Yt(i) = N (Yt(j), σ2) under
Q0 and Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(j) − ϵ, σ2), Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under Qi for all
observed j′;
(b) at is an action not adjacent to i, in this case Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under
Q0 and Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j), σ2) under Qi for all observed j′;
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3. aρ(t) is an action only adjacent to i and no other j ∈ I∗
(a) at is an action adjacent to i, in this case Yt(j′) = Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(i), σ2)
under Q0 and Yt(i) = N (Yρ(t)(i), σ2), Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(j′) + ϵ, σ2) under Qi
for all observed j′;
(b) at is an action not adjacent to i, in this case Yt(j′) = N (Yρ(t)(i), σ2) under












where At is the event that aρ(t) was adjacent to at least one action in I∗ \ {i} and at
time t action i was observed and Bt is the event that aρ(t) was adjacent only to i and
the player switched at time t to an action which is adjacent to an action in I∗ \ {i}.
Let Ni denote the random number of times an action adjacent to i was played and let
Mi denote the random number of switches between an action adjacent to i and an
action not adjacent to i. Let S1:M denote the random sequence of times during which
there was a switch. Then we have
T∑︂
t=1





χAt +Ni ≤ ω(ρ)(Mi +Ni),









Pinsker’s inequality that dFTV (Q0,Qi) ≤ ϵ2σ
√︂
ω(ρ)EQ0 [|I∗|ϕ(G)Mi +Ni].


















Now ∑︁i∈I∗ Mi = 2M since we count each switch twice, once from i and once to i. On
the other hand each action which is adjacent to n actions in I∗ has been overcounted
n times. Since n ≤ |I∗|ϕ(G) we have ∑︁i∈I∗ Ni ≤ |I∗|ϕ(G)N .
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Proof of Lemma 2.6.14. First let us consider the amount of regret the player incurs
for picking action adjacent to two actions in I∗ N times. To do this we consider the


























Thus in expectation the regret for picking an action adjacent to actions in I∗ N times
is at least (1/6 + ϵ)(N − 1). Let χ denote the uniform random variable over actions
in I∗, which picks the best action in the beginning of the game. Denote by Bi the




i∈I∗ E[ϵ(T −N −Bi) +M + (N − 1)/6|χ = i]
|I∗|




EQi [Bi] + E
[︃
M + N − 16 − ϵN
]︃
.
Consider EQi [Bi], we have
EQi [Bi] − EQ0 [Bi] =
T∑︂
t=1














dFTV (Q0,Qi) + T − EQ0 [N ].
Using the assumption that |I∗| ≥ 2, the above implies





dFTV (Q0,Qi) + E
[︃
M + N − 16 − ϵN
]︃
+ ϵ2EQ0 [N ].
Since ϵ = Θ̃(T−1/3) we have E
[︂
M + N−16 − ϵN
]︂








We study the problem of corralling stochastic bandit algorithms, that is combining
multiple bandit algorithms designed for a stochastic environment, with the goal of
devising a corralling algorithm that performs almost as well as the best base algorithm.
We give two general algorithms for this setting, which we show benefit from favorable
regret guarantees. We show that the regret of the corralling algorithms is no worse than
that of the best algorithm containing the arm with the highest reward, and depends
on the gap between the highest reward and other rewards. The main contributions of
this chapter are based on Arora et al. (2021). This work was done in collaboration
with Dr. Raman Arora and Dr. Mehryar Mohri.
3.1 The corralling problem
In the corralling problem the player is tasked with selecting, at each round, one out of a
fixed collection of bandit algorithms and playing the action returned by that algorithm.
Note that the player does not directly select an arm, but only a base algorithm. She
never requires knowledge of the action set of each base algorithm. The objective of the
player is to achieve a large cumulative reward or a small pseudo-regret, over the course
of her interactions with the environment. Further, the player only sends feedback to
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the base algorithms based on the observed reward. This complicates the problem as
the state of the base learners at a fixed round depends on the player’s strategy and
selections made up to the round. Thus the best base learner might seem sub-optimal
in the beginning of the game if it has not been selected enough times and a poor
exploration strategy by the player might discard it. Solving the corralling problem
amounts to policy regret minimization because the observed reward at every round of
the game depends on the state of the base learners which in turn depends on all prior
actions chosen by the player. Because policy regret minimization is impossible without
restricting the adversary it is natural to make additional assumptions how the base
learners behave. To this end we will require that the best of the base learners satisfies
an any-time regret guarantee, that is at any time t, the i∗-th base algorithm, Ai∗ will
have pseudo-regret E[Ri∗(t)] ≤ R̄i∗(t) ≤ o(t). Further, we are going to investigate
the stochastic setting, in which each of the base learners is solving an instance of the
stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. The main regret upper bound in our work
depends on the difference between the expected reward of the best arm of the best
algorithm and the best arm of the i-th algorithm denoted by ∆i.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Informal). If the regret of Ai∗ is bounded by R̄i∗(t) ≤ O(
√
t),∀t ∈ [T ],
then there exists an algorithm which guarantees a regret bound of the order











+ log (T ) R̄i∗(T )
⎞⎠ ,
where µ1,1 is the expected reward of the best arm of the best algorithm and rt(ait,jt) is
the reward of the jt-th action played by the algorithm, it, selected at time t.
The corralling problem was first investigated by Odalric and Munos (2011) by
combining Exp3 or UCB-I base learners through an Exp4 (Auer et al., 2002b) strategy
with added uniform exploration. The achieved regret bounds are of the order O(T 2/3).
Agarwal et al. (2016) study corralling problem in the adversarial setting, that is the
rewards/losses on which the base learners compete are assumed to be adversarially
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generated. The authors assume that the base learners obey certain stability, which we
will address shortly, and design a corralling strategy with favorable regret guarantees
dependent on the worst-case regret guarantees of all learners. Their algorithm is based
on OMD, however, instead of using a fixed step-size, a special non-decreasing step-size
is employed, which grows whenever the probability to play a base learner becomes
too small. The authors were not able to demonstrate that the proposed corralling
strategy enjoys regret guarantees better than Ω(
√
T ). Parallel, work (Cutkosky et al.,
2020), studies the same stochastic setting as our work and actually improves on the
regret bounds stated in Theorem 3.1.1 by removing the additional logarithmic factors
with the caveat that the time-horizon is known before the start of the game.
3.2 The model selection problem
Corralling can also be seen as a form of model selection, in which the player is tasked
with selecting the best base algorithm for an apriori unknown environment, e.g., choose
between a contextual bandits algorithm such as Exp4 or a MAB algorithm such as
UCB-I. Recently the model selection problem has received a lot of attention in the
linear stochastic bandits setting which we now describe carefully.
3.2.1 Linear contextual bandits
In the contextual bandit problem the player receives additional information before
she is required to select an action from her action set. The additional information
is in the form of a context xt ∈ X , where X is some very large (possibly infinite)
set of contexts. In practice contexts can be any characteristics associated with the
action. For example, in the adds allocation problem, in which the player has to choose
among multiple adds to display for a given user, the player might also get additional
information about the user such as their age, music preferences, if they like ice-cream,
etc. Each of these attributes can be modeled by a contextual vector. Contexts can be
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sampled from some unknown distribution, D, or generated adversarially. The rewards
in the contextual bandit problems also take into account the current context, i.e.,
rt : X × A → R. We are interested in the following variant of the contextual problem
– there exists an embedding ϕ : X × A → Rd which maps context-action pairs into a
d-dimensional vector space. The rewards now satisfy rt(xt, at) = ⟨β, ϕ(xt, at)⟩ + ξt,
where β ∈ Rd is unknown and ξt is random noise sampled from a sub-Gaussian
distribution with variance proxy bounded by 1. Further, the contexts are sampled
from some distribution which is unknown to the player. The player only observes







E[⟨β, ϕ(xt, a)⟩] − E[⟨β, ϕi∗(xt, at)⟩]
)︃
.
The contextual stochastic bandit problem was first investigated by Abe and Long
(1999), with the first algorithm based on the OFU principle proposed by Auer (2002)
with regret bounded by Õ(
√︂
dT log (|A|)), where the Õ notation only hides poly-
logarithmic factors in the horizon T . Li et al. (2010); Chu et al. (2011) propose
the LinUCB and SupLinUCB algorithms, respectively, for the setting in which A is
finite. These algorithms are based on the OFU principle with bonuses based on a
confidence ellipsoid around an estimator or β and enjoy a regret bound of the order
Õ(
√︂
dT log (|A|)). For infinite action sets, Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011), propose the
OFUL algorithm which has regret upper bounded as Õ(d
√
T ). It turns out that both
OFUL and SupLinUCB achieve the min-max optimal regret, up to poly-logarithmic
factors for their respective settings. Lattimore et al. (2020) propose an approach
based on Optimal design for the least squares problem (Kiefer and Wolfowitz, 1960),
which can handle miss-specification in the linear model, that is the observed losses are
not linear, however, can be approximated by a linear loss up to ϵ. If ϵ is known, the
authors propose an algorithm which enjoys a O(
√︂
dT log (|A|) + ϵT
√
d log (n)) regret
bound. Foster et al. (2020a) remove the requirement that ϵ is known and achieve
similar regret bounds through a corralling approach.
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3.2.2 Model selection for linear bandits
In the model selection problem for linear bandits, the player is given a nested sequence
of classes F1 ⊆ F2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ FK = F , where each Fi is defined as
Fi = {(x, a) → ⟨βi, ϕi(x, a)⟩ : βi ∈ Rdi},
for some feature embedding ϕi : X × A → Rdi . It is assumed that each feature
embedding ϕi contains ϕi−1 as its first di−1 coordinates. It is further assumed that
there exists a smallest i∗ ≤ K = |A| to which the optimal parameter β∗ belongs,
that is the observed rewards for each context-action pair (x, a) satisfy E[rt(x, a)] =
E [⟨β∗, ϕdi∗ (x, a)⟩]. The goal in the model selection problem is to identify i∗ and
compete against the smallest loss for the t-th context in Rdi∗ by minimizing the







, where γ3 is the smallest eigenvalue of the covariance





a∈A ϕK(x, a)ϕK(x, a)⊤
]︂
. Pacchiano et al.
(2020b) propose a different approach based on the corralling algorithm of Agarwal
et al. (2016) which enjoys a Õ(di∗
√
T ) regret bound for finite action sets and Õ(d2i∗
√
T )
bound for arbitrary action sets A. Later, Pacchiano et al. (2020a) design an algorithm
which enjoys a gap-dependent guarantee under the assumption that all of the miss-
specified models have regret Ri(t) ≥ ∆t,∀t ∈ [T ]. Under such an assumption, the
authors recover a regret bounds of the order Õ(di∗
√
T + d4i∗/∆) for arbitrary action
sets. Cutkosky et al. (2020) also manage to recover the O(di∗
√
T ) and O(d2i∗
√
T )
bounds for the model selection problems through their corralling algorithm. Our
corralling strategy is also able to recover these bounds and further enjoys a certain
gap-dependent guarantee as well, similar in spirit to the bounds shown by Pacchiano
et al. (2020a). Our model selection result is stated below.
Theorem 3.2.1. Assume that every base learner Ai, i ≥ i∗, admits a Õ(dαi
√
T ) regret.






T ). Moreover, under the additional assumption that the following holds for any
i < i∗, for all (x, a) ∈ X × A
max
a∈A









All of the above results fall short from a true model-selection algorithm which
would enjoy a regret guarantee of the order O(dαi∗T 1−α) for the finite action set case,
where α ∈ (0, 1). It turns out that this is not just a shortcoming of our and prior
work, but is rather information theoretically impossible as shown by Zhu and Nowak
(2021). Zhu and Nowak (2021) provide a detailed characterization of the possible
model selection rates by showing both information theoretic lower bounds and an
algorithm with regret guarantees which nearly match the lower bounds.
3.3 Preliminaries and additional notation for the
corralling problem
We consider the problem of corralling K stochastic multi-armed bandit algorithms
A1, . . . ,AK , which we often refer to as base algorithms (base learners). At each
round t, a corralling algorithm selects a base algorithm Ait , which plays action
ait,jt . The corralling algorithm is not informed of the identity of this action but it
does observe its reward rt(ait,jt). The top algorithm then updates its decision rule and
provides feedback to each of the base learners Ai. We note that the feedback may be
just the empty set, in which case the base learners do not update their state. We will
also assume access to the parameters controlling the behavior of each Ai such as the
step size for mirror descent-type algorithms, or the confidence bounds for UCB-type
algorithms. Our goal is to minimize the cumulative pseudo-regret of the corralling
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algorithm as defined in Equation 3.1:1







where µ1,1 is the mean reward of the best arm.
We denote by ei the ith standard basis vector, by 0K ∈ RK the vector of all 0s,
and by 1K ∈ RK the vector of all 1s. For two vectors x, y ∈ RK , x⊙ y denotes their
Hadamard product. We also denote the line segment between x and y as [x, y].
For the base algorithms A1, . . . ,AK , let Ti(t) be the number of times algorithm
Ai has been played until time t. Let Ti,j(t) be the number of times action j has been
proposed by algorithm Ai until time t. Let [ki] denote the set of arms or action set
of algorithm Ai. We denote the reward of arm j in the action set of algorithm i at
time t as rt(ai,j) and denote its mean reward by µi,j. We also use ai,jt to denote the
arm proposed by algorithm Ai during time t. Further, the algorithm played at time t
is denoted as it, its action played at time t is ait,jt and the reward for that action is
rt(ait,jt) with mean µit,jt . Let i∗ denote the index of the base algorithm that contains
the arm with the highest mean reward. Without loss of generality, we will assume that
i∗ = 1. Similarly, we assume that ai,1 is the arm with highest reward in algorithm Ai.
We assume that the best arm of the best algorithm has a gap to the best arm of every
other algorithm. We denote the gap between the best arm of A1 and the best arm of
Ai as ∆i: ∆i = µi∗,1 − µi,1 > 0 for i ̸= i∗. Further, we denote the intra-algorithm gaps
by ∆i,j = µi,1 − µi,j. We denote by R̄i(t) an upper bound on the regret of algorithm
Ai at time t and by Ri(t) the actual regret of Ai, so that E[Ri(t)] is the expected
regret of algorithm Ai at time t.
1For conciseness, from now on, we will simply write regret instead of pseudo-regret.
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3.4 Lower bounds without anytime regret guaran-
tees
As we already mentioned in Section 3.1 we require that each of the base learners
satisfy an any-time regret bound. We now show that this assumption is necessary
through a simple lower bound. Our lower bound is based on corralling base algorithms
that only admit a fixed-time horizon regret bound and do not enjoy anytime regret
guarantees. We further assume that the corralling strategy cannot simulate anytime
regret guarantees on the base algorithms, say by using the so-called doubling trick.
This result suggests that the base algorithms must admit a strong regret guarantee
during every round of the game.
The key idea behind our construction is the following. Suppose one of the corralled
algorithms, Ai, incurs a linear regret over the first Ri(T ) rounds. In that case, the
corralling algorithm is unable to distinguish between Ai and an another algorithm that
mimics the linear regret behavior of Ai throughout all T rounds, unless the corralling
algorithm plays Ai at least Ri(T ) times. Formally, assume that the corralling algorithm
can play one of two algorithms, A1 or A2, with the rewards of each arm played by
these algorithms distributed according to a Bernoulli random variable. Algorithm A1
plays a single arm with expected reward µ1 and algorithm A2 is defined as follows.
Let β be drawn according to the Bernoulli distribution β ∼ Ber(12) and let α be
drawn uniformly over the unit interval, α ∼ Unif[0, 1]. If β = 1, A2 alternates between
playing an arm with mean µ2 and an arm with mean µ3 every round, so that the
algorithm incurs linear regret. We set µi such that µ2 > µ1 > µ2+µ32 . If β = 0, then A2
behaves in the same way as if β = 1 for the first T (1−α) rounds and for the remaining
T − T (1−α) rounds A2 only pulls the arm with mean µ2. Notice that, in this setting,
A2 admits sublinear regret almost surely.
We denote by P(·|r1(ai1,j1), . . . , rt(ait,jt), β = i) the natural measure on the σ-
87
algebra generated by the observed rewards under the environment β = i and all
the randomness of the player’s algorithm. To simplify the notation, we denote by
r1:t the sequence {rs(ais,js)}ts=1. Let N denote the random variable counting the
number of times the corralling strategy selected A1. Information-theoretically, the
player can obtain a good approximation of µ1 in time O(log (T )) and, therefore, for
simplicity, we assume that the player knows µ1 exactly. Note that this can only make
the problem easier for the player. Given this information, we can assume that the
player begins by playing algorithm A2 for T − N + 1 rounds and then switches to
A1 for the rest of the game. In particular, we assume that T − N + 1 is the time
when the player can figure out that β = 1. We note that at time T (1−α) we have
P(·|r1:T (1−α) , β = 1) = P(·|r1:T (1−α) , β = 0), as the distribution of the rewards provided
by A2 do not differ between β = 1 and β = 0. Furthermore, any random strategy
would also need to select algorithm A2 at least T (1−α) + 1 rounds before it is able
to distinguish between β = 1 or β = 0. It is also important to note that under the
event that β = 1, the corralling algorithm does not receive any information about the
value of α. This allows us to show that in the setting constructed above, with at least
constant probability the best algorithm i.e., A1 when β = 1 and A2 when β = 0, has
sublinear regret. Finally, a direct computation of the regret of this corralling strategy
gives the following result.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let algorithms A1 and A2 follow the construction in Section 3.4.
Then, with probability at least 1/2 over the random choice of α, any corralling strategy
incurs regret at least Ω̃(T ), while the regret of the best algorithm is at most O(
√
T ).
Lower bound for successive elimination. The behavior of A2 for the setting
given by β = 0, in the construction above, may seem somewhat artificial: a stochastic
bandit algorithm may not be expected to behave in that manner when the gap between
µ2 and µ3 is large enough. Here, we describe how to set µ1, µ2 and µ3 such that the
successive elimination algorithm (Even-Dar et al., 2002) admits a similar behavior
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to A2 with β = 0. Recall that successive elimination needs at least 1/∆2 rounds to
distinguish between the arm with mean µ2 and the arm with mean µ3. In other words,
for at least 1/∆2 rounds, it will alternate between the two arms. Therefore, we set
1
∆2 = T
(1−α) or, equivalently, ∆ = 1
T (1−α)/2
, and µ1 = µ2 − 14T (1−α)/2 to yield behavior
similar to A2. For this construction, we show the following lower bound.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let algorithms A1 and A2 follow the construction in Section 3.4.
With probability at least 1/4 over the random choice of α any corralling strategy will
incur regret at least Ω̃(
√
T ) while the gap between µ2 and µ3 is such that ∆ > ω(T−1/4)
and hence the regret of the best algorithm is at most o(T 1/4).
We note that, in our construction, if β = 1, then the inequality ∆ ≫ 1√
T
holds
almost surely. In this setting, the instance-dependent regret bound for A2 and
successive elimination is asymptotically smaller compared to the worst-case instance-
independent regret bounds for stochastic bandit algorithms, which scale as Õ(
√
T )
with the time horizon. This suggests that, even though A2 enjoys asymptotically
better regret bounds than Õ(
√




A lower bound when a worst case regret bound is known. Next, suppose
that we know a worst case regret bound of R2(T ) for algorithm A2. As before, we
sample β according to a Bernoulli distribution. If β = 1, then algorithm A2 has a single
arm with reward distributed as Ber((µ2 +µ3)/2); in that case, A2 admits a regret equal
to 0. If β = 0, then A2 has two arms distributed according to Ber(µ2) and Ber(µ3),
respectively. We sample α ∼ Unif[0, 1], and let A2 play an arm uniformly at random
for the first R2(T )(1−α) rounds. In particular, during each of the first R2(T )(1−α)
rounds, A2 plays with equal probability the arm with mean µ2 and the arm with mean
µ3. On round R2(T )(1−α), the algorithm switches to playing µ1 until the rest of the
game. Notice that the rewards up to time R2(T )(1−α), whether β = 1 or β = 0, have
the same distribution. Hence, P(·|r1:R2(T )(1−α) , β = 1) = P(·|r1:R2(T )(1−α) , β = 0). Then,
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following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we can prove the following
lower bound.
Theorem 3.4.3. Let algorithms A1 and A2 follow the construction in Section 3.4.
Suppose that the worst case known regret bound for Algorithm is R2(T ). With probability
at least 1/2 over the random choice of α any corralling strategy will incur regret at
least Ω̃(R2(T )) while the regret of A2 is at most O(
√︂
R2(T )).
3.5 Detailed proofs for Section 3.4
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. Let R(T ) denote the regret of the corralling algorithm. Direct
computation shows that if β = 1 the corralling regret is






(T −N)|β = 1, r1:T (1−α) , α
]︃
Further if β = 0 and A2 is the best algorithm the regret of corralling is
E[R(T )|β = 0, r1:T (1−α) , α] = E
[︂






(1−α) + µ2(T − T (1−α))








2 (T −N)|β = 0, r1:T (1−α) , α
]︃
,
where the characteristic functions describe the event in which we pull A1 less times
than is needed for A2 to switch to playing the best action. Notice that the total
regret for corralling is at least the above as we also need to add the regret of the best
algorithm to the above.
We first consider the case β = 1. Notice that in this case the corralling algorithm
does not receive any information about α because A2 alternates between µ2 and µ3 at
all rounds. This implies E[R(T )|β = 1, α] = E[R(T )|β = 1]. Condition on the event
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N ≤ T − T (1−α). We have
E[R(T )|β = 1, N ≤ T − T (1−α), r1:T (1−α) , α] =





















log (T ) ,
where in the first inequality we have replaced N by T − T 1−α. Next consider the case
β = 0. Condition on the event N > T − T (1−α). We have















(µ2 − µ1)T −
µ2
2 T










where in the inequality we have used the fact that N > T − T 1−α to bound −µ1N
and T ≥ N to bound µ1+µ32 N . Let A denote the event N ≤ T − T
(1−α). We are now
ready to lower bound the regret of the player’s strategy as follows.
E [R(T )|α] = 12E [E[R(T )|r1:T (1−α) , β = 1, α] + E[R(T )|r1:T (1−α) , β = 0, α]|α]
≥ 12E [P(A|r1:T (1−α) , β = 1, α)E[R(T )|r1:T (1−α) , β = 1, A, α]
+P(Ac|r1:T (1−α) , β = 1, α)E[R(T )|r1:T (1−α) , β = 0, Ac, α]|α]
≥ 12E
[︄







2 log (T )






where in the first inequality we have used the fact that the conditional measures
induced by β = 1 and β = 0 are equal for the first T 1−α rounds. Because α ≥ 1/2
with probability at least 1/2 it holds that the random variable E[R(T )|α] > Ω̃(T ) with




Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. From the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 we can compute, when
β = 1, we can directly compute
E
[︂


















2 log (T ) ,
Where in the equality we again used the fact that if β = 1, the corralling algorithm
receives no information about α. Further when β = 0 we have
E
[︂




(µ2 − µ1)T −
µ2
2 T













Again we note that with probability 1/2 we have α ≥ 1/2 and the above expression
becomes asymptotically larger than
√
T . The same computation as in the proof of
Theorem 3.4.1 finishes the proof.
3.6 UCB-style corralling algorithm
The negative result of Section 3.4 hinge on the fact that the base algorithms do not
admit anytime regret guarantees. Therefore, we assume, for the rest of the paper, that









for any time t ∈ [T ]. For UCB-type algorithms, such bounds can be derived from the
fact that the expected number of pulls, Ti,j(t), of a suboptimal arm j, is bounded
as E[Ti,j(t)] ≤ c log(t)(∆i,j)2 , for some time and gap-independent constant c (e.g., Bubeck
(2010)), and take the following form, R̄i(t) ≤ c′
√︂
kit log (t), for some constant c′.
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Suppose that the bound in Equation 3.2 holds with probability 1 − δt. Note that
such bounds are available for some UCB-type algorithms (Audibert et al., 2009).
We can then adopt the optimism in the face of uncertainty principle for each µi,1
by overestimating it with 1
t
∑︁t
s=1 rs(ai,js) + 1t R̄i(t). As long as this occurs with high
enough probability, we can construct an upper confidence bound for µi,1 and use it
in a UCB-type algorithm. Unfortunately, the upper confidence bounds required for
UCB-type algorithms to work need to hold with high enough probability, which is not
readily available from Equation 3.2 or from probabilistic bounds on the pseudo-regret
of anytime stochastic bandit algorithms. In fact, as discussed in Section 3.6.1, we
expect it to be impossible to corral any-time stochastic MAB algorithms with a
standard UCB-type strategy. However, a simple boosting technique, in which we run
2 log (1/δ) copies of each algorithm Ai, gives the following high probability version of
the bound in Equation 3.2.
Lemma 3.6.1. Suppose we run 2 log (1/δ) copies of algorithm Ai which satisfies
Equation 3.2. If Amedi is the algorithm with median cumulative reward at time t, then
P[tµi,1 −
∑︁t
s=1 rs(amedi,js) ≥ 2R̄i(t)] ≤ δ.
Proof of Lemma 3.6.1. First note that µmedi,1 = µis,1 and R̄is(t) = R̄medi(t)for all s
and t. The assumption in Equation 3.2 together with Markov’s inequality implies that
































where the first inequality follows from the definition of Amedi and Ail for l ∈ [n].
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Algorithm 9: UCB-C
Input: Stochastic bandit algorithms A1, . . . ,AK
Output: Sequence of algorithms (it)Tt=1.
1: t = 1
2: for i = 1, . . . , K do
3: Ai = ∅ % contains all copies of Ai
4: for s = 1, . . . , ⌈2 log (T )⌉ do
5: Initialize Ai(s) as a copy of Ai, ˆ︁µi(s) = 0
6: Append (Ai(s), ˆ︁µi(s)) to Ai
7: end for
8: end for
9: for i = 1, . . . , K do
10: Foreach (Ai(s), ˆ︁µi(s)) ∈ Ai, play Ai(s), update empirical mean ˆ︁µi(s),
t = t+ 2 log (T )
11: ˆ︁µmedi = Median({ˆ︁µi(s)}⌈2 log(T )⌉s=1 )
12: end for







, ∀ℓ ∈ [K]
15: i = argmaxℓ∈[K] {ˆ︁µmedℓ + bℓ(t)}
16: Foreach (Ai(s), ˆ︁µi(s)) ∈ Ai, play Ai(s), update empirical mean ˆ︁µi(s),
t = t + 2 log (T )
17: ˆ︁µmedi = Median({ˆ︁µi(s)}⌈2 log(T )⌉s=1 )
18: end while
We consider the following variant of the standard UCB algorithm for corralling.
We initialize 2 log (T ) copies of each base algorithm Ai. Each Ai is associated with the
median empirical average reward of its copies. At each round, the corralling algorithm
picks the Ai with the highest sum of median empirical average reward and an upper
confidence bound based on Lemma 3.6.1. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 9.
The algorithm admits the following regret guarantees.
Theorem 3.6.2. Suppose that algorithms A1, . . . ,AK satisfy the following regret
bound E[Ri(t)] ≤
√︂
αkit log (t), respectively for i ∈ [K]. Algorithm 9 selects a sequence
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of algorithms i1, . . . , iT which take actions ai1,j1 , . . . , aiT ,jT , respectively, such that
E[R(T )] ≤ O
⎛⎝∑︂
i ̸=i∗
ki log (T )2
∆i
+ log (T )E [Ri∗(T )]
⎞⎠ ,









Proof sketch. The ideas behind the proof are very similar to the standard analysis
of most UCB approaches. First one shows that because of the bonuses, each of
the empirical estimators of the means of best arms plus respective bonuses, are
overestimators of the true means. Next, because the bonuses are decreasing with the
number of times each sub-optimal algorithm is played, it turns out that we can not
play the i-th sub-optimal algorithm more than roughly ki/∆2i times as the optimistic
estimator of the best reward would become smaller than µ1,1. Finally, a union bound
ensures that optimism holds throughout the T rounds which finishes the proof.
We note that both the optimistic and the worst case regret bounds above involve
an additional factor that depends on the number of arms, ki, of the base algorithm
Ai. This dependence reflects the complexity of the decision space of algorithm Ai.
We conjecture that a complexity-free bound is not possible, in general. To see this,
consider a setting where each Ai, for i ̸= i∗, only plays arms with equal means
µi = µ1,1 − ∆i. Standard stochastic bandit regret lower bounds, e.g. (Garivier et al.,
2018), state that any strategy on the combined set of arms of all algorithms will incur
regret at least Ω(∑︁i ̸=i∗ ki log (T ) /∆i). The log (T ) factor in front of the regret of the
best algorithm comes from the fact that we are running Ω(log (T )) copies of it.
3.6.1 Discussion regarding tightness of bounds
A natural question is if it is possible to achieve bounds that do not have a log (T )2
scaling. After all, for the simpler stochastic MAB problem, regret upper bounds only
scale as O(log (T )) in terms of the time horizon. As already mentioned, the extra
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logarithmic factor comes from the boosting technique, or, more precisely, the need
for exponentially fast concentration of the true regret to its expected value, when
using a UCB-type corralling strategy. We now show that, in the absence of such
strong concentration guarantees, if only a single copy of each of the base algorithms
in Algorithm 9 is run, then linear regret is unavoidable.
Theorem 3.6.3. There exist instances A1 and A2 of UCB-I and a reward distribution,
such that, if Algorithm 9 runs a single copy of A1 and A2, then E[R(T )] ≥ Ω̃(∆2T ).






, there exists a
reward distribution such that if Algorithm 9 runs a single copy of A1 and A2, then
E[R(T )] ≥ Ω̃((∆1,2)c∆2T ).
Proof sketch. The idea behind the proof is to show that the algorithm containing the
best arm will not play the best arm sufficiently often with probability at least Ω(1/t)
during the first t rounds for sufficiently large t ≤ T . This in turn will imply that the
corralling algorithm will mistake the best algorithm for a sub-optimal one and will
only play it after exponentially many rounds (in t) resulting in regret of the order
Ω̃(T ).
The requirement that the regret of the best algorithm satisfies P[R1(t) ≥ 12∆1,2τ ] ≥
1
τc
in Theorem 3.6.3 is equivalent to the condition that the regret of the base algorithms
admit only a polynomial concentration. Results in (Salomon and Audibert, 2011)
suggest that there cannot be a tighter bound on the tail of the regret for anytime
algorithms. It turns out that a more careful construction of the bonuses as done by





∆i ). These bonuses are inspired by the work of Lattimore
(2015).
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3.7 Detailed proofs for Section 3.6
Proof of Theorem 3.6.2. For simplicity we assume that ⌈log (T )⌉ = log (T ). For the
rest of the proof we let tℓ = Tℓ(t) to simplify notation. Further, since R̄ℓs = R̄ℓ,∀s ∈









. The proof follows the standard ideas behind analyses of
UCB type algorithms. If at time t algorithm ℓ ̸= 1 is selected then one of the following
must hold true:





















The above conditions can be derived by considering the case when the UCB for A1
is smaller than the UCB for Aℓ and every algorithm has been selected a sufficient








> µ1,1 = µ1,ℓ + ∆ℓ











which contradicts the assumption that algorithm Aℓ was selected. With slight abuse
of notation we use [kℓ] to denote the set of arms belonging to algorithm Aℓ. Next we
bound the expected number of times each sub-optimal algorithm is played up to time













P [Equation 3.3 or Equation 3.4 hold]





































where the last inequality follows from the definition of δ and the fact that ˆ︁µmedℓ(s) ≤
ˆ︁µmedℓ,1(s) (empirical mean of arm 1 for algorithm Amedℓ at time s) and the standard
argument in the analysis of UCB-I. Setting δ = 1
T 2
finishes the bound on the number
of suboptimal algorithm pulls. Next we consider bounding the regret incurred only by




















































+ E [Rmed1(t)] +
√︂
αkℓ log (t) .











, for some other constant α′. To get










































α′kℓE[tℓ] log (t) ≤
√︃
α′Kt log (t) max
ℓ
(kℓ)
The theorem now follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.6.3. Consider an instance of Algorithm 9, except that it runs a
single copy of each base learner Ai. Let A1 be a UCB algorithm with two arms with
means µ1 > µ2, respectively. The arm with mean µ1 is set according to a Bernoulli
random variable, and the arm with mean µ2 is deterministic. Let algorithm A2
have a single deterministic arm with mean µ3, such that µ1 > µ3 and µ3 > µ2. Let
∆ = µ1 − µ3. We now follow the lower bounding technique of Audibert et al. (2009).
Consider the event that in the first q pulls of arm aA11 , we have rt(a1,1) = 0, i.e.
E = {r1(a1,1) = 0, r2(a1,1) = 0, . . . , rq(a1,1) = 0}. This event occurs with probability





during time t. This implies that for a1,1 to be pulled again we need√︃
α log(T1(t))
q
> µ2 and hence for the first exp (qµ22/α) rounds in which A1 is selected
by the corralling algorithm, a1,1 is only pulled q times. Further, on E , the upper




implies that for A1 to be selected again we need µ2 +
√︃
2β log(t)
T1(t) > µ3. Let ∆̃ = µ3 −µ2.






rounds, A1 is pulled
at most T1(t) times. Combining with the bound for the number of pulls of a1,1 we












Then, for large enough T , we have that the pseudo-regret of the corralling algorithm
















[︃ ˆ︁R(T ) ≥ 12∆τ
]︃











Let γ = α
µ22
log (1/(1 − µ1)). We can now bound the expected pseudo-regret of the
algorithm by integrating over 2 ≤ τ ≤ T , to get



























where the last inequality follows from the Hermite-Hadamart inequality.
It is important to note that the above reasoning will fail if γ is a function of T .
This might occur if in the UCB for A1 we have α = log (T ). In such a case the lower
bounds become meaningless as 1log((T+2)/2)
γ ≤ o(1/T ). Further, it should actually be
possible to avoid boosting in this case as the tail bound of the regret will now be
upper bounded as P[R1(t) ≥ ∆τ ] ≤ 1Tτc .
General Approach if Regret has a Polynomial Tail. Assume that, in general,










for some constant c. Results in Salomon and Audibert (2011) suggest that for stochastic
bandit algorithms which enjoy anytime regret bounds we can not have a much tighter
high probability regret bound. Let ET1(t) = {R1(T1(t)) ≥ T1(t)(µ1 − 1√2µ3)}. After












2µ3. This implies that in the first t rounds,






)︃2 ≤ 2αk1 log (t)µ23 .
Setting T1(t) = 2αk1 log(T )µ23 , we have that ET1(t) occurs with probability at least(︂ ∆1,2µ23
4αk1 log(T )
)︂c
and hence the expected regret of the corralling algorithm is at least(︄
∆1,2µ23









3.8 Corralling using Tsallis-INF
In this section, we consider an alternative approach, based on the work of Agarwal
et al. (2016), which avoids running multiple copies of base algorithms. Since the
approach is based on the OMD framework, which is naturally suited to losses instead
of rewards, for the rest of the section we switch to losses.
We design a corralling algorithm that maintains a probability distribution w ∈
∆K−1 over the base algorithms, {Ai}Ki=1. At each round, the corralling algorithm
samples it ∼ pt. Next, Ait plays ait,jt and the corralling algorithm observes the loss
ℓt(ait,jt). The corralling algorithm updates its distribution over the base algorithms
using the observed loss and provides an unbiased estimate ˆ︁ℓt(ai,jt) of ℓt(ai,jt) to
algorithm Ai: the feedback provided to Ai is ˆ︁ℓt(ait,jt) = ℓt(ait,jt )pt,it , and for all ai,jt ≠ ait,jt ,ˆ︁ℓt(ai,jt) = 0. Notice that ˆ︁ℓt ∈ RK , as opposed to ℓt ∈ [0, 1]∏︁i ki . Essentially, the loss
fed to Ai, with probability wt,i, is the true loss rescaled by the probability wt,i to
observe the loss, and is equal to 0 with probability 1 − wt,i.
The change of environment induced by the rescaling of the observed losses is
analyzed in Agarwal et al. (2016). Following Agarwal et al. (2016), we denote the
environment of the original losses (ℓt)t as E and that of the rescaled losses (ˆ︁ℓt)t as E ′.
Therefore, in environment E , algorithm Ai observes ℓt(ait,jt) and in environment E ′,
Ai observes ˆ︁ℓt(ait,jt). A few important remarks are in order. As in (Agarwal et al.,
2016), we need to assume that the base algorithms admit a stability property under
the change of environment. In particular, if ps,i ≥ 1ρt for all s ≤ t and some ρt ∈ R,
then E[Ri(t)] under environment E ′ is bounded by E[
√
ρtRi(t)]. For completeness, we
provide the definition of stability by Agarwal et al. (2016).
Definition 3.8.1. Let γ ∈ (0, 1] and let R : N → R+ be a non-decreasing function.
An algorithm A with action space A is (γ,R(·))-stable with respect to an environment
E if its regret under E is R(T ) and its regret under E ′ induced by the importance
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weighting is maxa∈A E
[︂∑︁T
t=1
ˆ︁ℓt(ait,jt) − ℓt(a)]︂ ≤ E[(ρT )γR(T )].
We show that UCB-I (Auer et al., 2002a) satisfies the stability property above
with γ = 12 . The techniques used in the proof are also applicable to other UCB-type
algorithms. Other algorithms for stochastic bandits like Thompson sampling and
OMD/FTRL variants have been shown to be 1/2-stable in (Agarwal et al., 2016).
The corralling algorithm of Agarwal et al. (2016) is based on Online Mirror Descent
(OMD), where a key idea is to increase the step size whenever the probability of
selecting some algorithm Ai becomes smaller than some threshold. This induces a
negative regret term which, coupled with a careful choice of step size (dependent on
regret upper bounds of the base algorithms), provides regret bounds that scale as a
function of the regret of the best base algorithm.
Unfortunately, the analysis of the corralling algorithm always leads to at least
a regret bound of Ω̃(
√
T ) and also requires knowledge of the regret bound of the
best algorithm. Since our goal is to obtain instance-dependent regret bounds, we
cannot appeal to this type of OMD approach. Instead, we draw inspiration from the
recent work of Zimmert and Seldin (2021), who use a Follow-the-Regularized-Leader
(FTRL) type of algorithm to design an algorithm that is simultaneously optimal for
both stochastic and adversarially generated losses, without requiring knowledge of
instance-dependent parameters such as the sub-optimality gaps to the loss of the best
arm. The overall intuition for our algorithm is as follows. We use the FTRL-type
algorithm proposed by Zimmert and Seldin (2021) until the probability to sample some
arm falls below a threshold. Next, we run an OMD step with an increasing step size
schedule which contributes a negative regret term. After the OMD step, we resume
the normal step size schedule and updates from the FTRL algorithm. After carefully
choosing the initial step size rate, which can be done in an instance-independent way,
the accumulated negative regret terms are enough to compensate for the increased
regret due to the change of environment.
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3.8.1 Algorithm and the main result
We now describe our corralling algorithm in more detail. The potential function Ψt











ηt,1, ηt,2, . . . , ηt,K
]︂
is the step-size schedule during time t. The algorithm proceeds
in epochs and begins by running each base algorithm for log (T ) + 1 rounds. Each
epoch is twice as large as the preceding, so that the number of epochs is bounded
by log2(T ), and the step size schedule remains non-increasing throughout the epochs,
except when an OMD step is taken. The algorithm also maintains a set of thresholds,
ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn, where n = O(log (T )). These thresholds are used to determine if the




ηt+1,i = βηt,i (for i : pt,i ≤ 1/ρsi),
wt+2 = argmin
w∈∆K−1
⟨ˆ︁ℓt+1, w⟩ +DΨt+1(w,wt+1), ρsi = 2ρsi
(3.6)
or the algorithm takes an FTRL step
wt+1 = argmin
w∈∆K−1
⟨ˆ︁Lt, w⟩ + Ψt+1(w), (3.7)
where ˆ︁Lt = ˆ︁Lt−1 + ˆ︁ℓt, unless otherwise specified by the algorithm. At every iteration
the algorithm also mixes wt with the uniform distribution to ensure that the variance










We note that the algorithm can only increase the step size during the OMD step.
For technical reasons, we require an FTRL step after each OMD step. Further, we
require that the second step of each epoch be an OMD step if there exists at least one
pt,i ≤ 1ρ1 . The algorithm also can enter an OMD step during an epoch if at least one
wt,i becomes smaller than a threshold 1ρsi which has not been exceeded so far.
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Algorithm 10: Corralling with Tsallis-INF
Input: Mult. constant β, thresholds {ρi}ni=1, initial step size η, epochs {τi}mi=1,
algorithms {Ai}Ki=1.
Output: Algorithm selection sequence (it)Tt=1.
1: Initialize t = 1, w1 = Unif(∆K−1), η1 = η
2: Initialize current threshold list θ ∈ [n]K to 1
3: while t ≤ K log (T ) +K do
4: for i ∈ [K] do
5: Ai plays ai,jt , ˆ︁L1,i+ = ℓt(ai,jt), t+ = 1
6: end for
7: end while
8: t = 2, w2 = ∇Φ2(−ˆ︁L1), 1/η2t+1 = 1/η2t + 1
9: while j ≤ m do
10: for t ∈ τj do
11: Rt = ∅,ˆ︁ℓt = PLAY-ROUND(wt)
12: if t is first round of τj and ∃pt,i ≤ 1ρ1 then
13: for i : pt,i ≤ 1ρ1 do
14: θi = min{s ∈ [n] : wt,i > 1ρs}, Rt = Rt
⋃︁{i}.
15: end for
16: (wt+3, ˆ︁Lt+2) = NRS(wt, ˆ︁ℓt, ηt,Rt, ˆ︁Lt−1), t = t+ 2, ˆ︁ℓt = PLAY-ROUND(wt)
17: end if
18: if ∃i : pt,i ≤ 1ρθi and prior step was not NRS then
19: for i : wt,i ≤ 1ρθi do
20: θi+ = 1, Rt = Rt
⋃︁{i}.
21: end for
22: (wt+3, ˆ︁Lt+2) = NRS(wt, ˆ︁ℓt, ηt,Rt, ˆ︁Lt−1), t = t+ 2, ˆ︁ℓt = PLAY-ROUND(wt)
23: else












. If it is, we increase the step size as ηt+1,i = βηt,i and run the OMD step. The
pseudocode for the algorithm is given in Algorithm 10. The routines OMD-STEP and
PLAY-ROUND can be found in Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 respectively. OMD-STEP
essentially does the update described in Equation 3.6 and PLAY-ROUND samples and
plays an algorithm, after which constructs an unbiased estimator of the losses and
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Algorithm 11: NEG-REG-STEP(NRS)
Input: Prior iterate wt, loss ˆ︁ℓt, step size ηt, set of rescaled step-sizes Rt, cumulative
loss ˆ︁Lt−1
Output: Plays two rounds of the game and returns distribution wt+3 and cumulative
loss ˆ︁Lt+2
1: (wt+1, ˆ︁Lt) = OMD-STEP(wt, ˆ︁ℓt, ηt,Rt, ˆ︁Lt−1)
2: ˆ︁ℓt+1 = PLAY-ROUND(wt+1), ˆ︁Lt+1 = ˆ︁Lt + ˆ︁ℓt+1
3: for all i such that wt,i ≤ 1ρ1 do
4: ηt+2,i = βηt,i, Rt = Rt ∪ {i} and restart Ai with updated environment θi = 12wt,i
5: end for
6: wt+2 = ∇Φt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1)
7: ˆ︁ℓt+2 = PLAY-ROUND(wt+2)
8: ˆ︁Lt+2 = ˆ︁Lt+1 + ˆ︁ℓt+2, ηt+3 = ηt+2, t = t+ 2
9: wt+1 = ∇Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt), t = t+ 1
Algorithm 12: OMD-STEP
Input: Previous iterate wt, current loss ˆ︁ℓt, step size ηt, set of rescaled step-sizes Rt,
cumulative loss ˆ︁Lt−1
Output: New iterate wt+1, cumulative loss ˆ︁Lt
1: ∇Ψt(w̃t+1) = ∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt
2: wt+1 = argminw∈∆K−1 DΦt(w, w̃t+1).
3: e = ∑︁i∈Rt ei
4: L̃t−1 = (1k − e) ⊙ (ˆ︁Lt−1 − (νt−2 + νt−1)1k) + 1β e ⊙ ((ˆ︁Lt−1 − (νt−2 + νt−1)1k)) //
νt−2 and νt−1 are the Lagrange multipliers from the previous two FTRL steps.
5: ˆ︁Lt = L̃t−1 + ˆ︁ℓt
Algorithm 13: PLAY-ROUND
Input: Sampling distribution wt
Output: Loss vector ˆ︁ℓt







2: Algorithm it plays action ait,jt . Observe loss ℓt(ait,jt) and construct unbiased
estimator ˆ︁ℓt = ℓt(ait,jt )pt,it eit of ℓt.
3: Give feedback to i-th algorithm as ˆ︁ℓt(ai,jt), where ai,jt was action provided by Ai
feeds these back to all of the sub-algorithms. We show the following regret bound for
the corralling algorithm.
Theorem 3.8.1. Let R̄i(·) be a function upper bounding the expected regret, E[Ri(·)],
of Ai for all i ∈ [K]. For β = e1/ log(T )











, the expected regret of Algorithm 10 is bounded as follows:







Proof sketch. The proof combines ideas both from (Zimmert and Seldin, 2021) and
(Agarwal et al., 2016). To achieve gap-dependent regret bounds we use the self-
bounding trick proposed by Wei and Luo (2018) and Zimmert and Seldin (2021).
We now quickly go over the self-bounding trick for the MAB problem with K arms.
First one rewrites the expected regret as E[R(T )] = ∑︁Tt=1∑︁i ̸=i∗ pt,i∆i. Next, using a







pt,i. Subtracting 1/2 of E[R(T )] from both sides we have that









The RHS of the above is bounded by noticing that 1√
t
√
pt,i − ∆iwt,i ≤ O( 1t∆i ), for
all t > Ω(1/∆2), which follows by maximizing the LHS with respect to wt,i. For
t < O(1/∆2) we can bound the sum ∑︁⌈1/∆2⌉t=1 1√t√pt,i < O(1/∆i) through a simple







The second part of the proof is integrating the negative regret step (OMD step)
into the FTRL framework. This is done by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.8.2. Let ˆ︁wt+2 be defined as in Equation 3.6. Let νt+1 be the constant such
that ∇Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) = ∇Ψ∗t+1(−ˆ︁Lt + νt1k). Let ˆ︁Lt+1 = (1k − e) ⊙ (ˆ︁Lt − (νt−1 + νt)1k) +
1
β
e ⊙ ((ˆ︁Lt − (νt−1 + νt)1k)) + ˆ︁ℓt+1 and ηt+2 = ηt+1. Then (ˆ︁Lt+1)i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [K]
and ˆ︁wt+2 = wt+2 = ∇Φt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1).
Finally we use the negative regret to balance the added variance from the impor-
tance weighted estimators of the losses we send as feedback.
To parse the bound above, suppose {Ai}i∈[K] are standard stochastic bandit
algorithms such as UCB-I. In Theorem 3.8.4, we show that UCB-I is indeed 12 -
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stable as long as we are allowed to rescale and introduce an additive factor to the
confidence bounds. In this case, a worst-case upper bound on the regret of any Ai is
E[Ri(t)] ≤ c
√︂
ki log (t) t for all t ∈ [T ] and some universal constant c. We note that
the min-max regret bound for the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem is Θ(
√
KT )
and most known any-time algorithms solving the problem achieve this bound up to







e log(T )2 . This





∆i + E[Ri∗(T )]
)︂
. In particular, if we instantiate E[Ri∗(T )] to the

















. In general we cannot exactly compare the current
bound with that of UCB-C (Algorithm 9), as the regret bound in Theorem 3.8.1 has
worse scaling in the time horizon on the gap-dependent terms, compared to the regret
bound in Theorem 3.6.2, but has no additional scaling in front of the E[Ri∗(T )] term.
In practice we observe that Algorithm 10 outperforms Algorithm 9.
Since essentially all stochastic multi-armed bandit algorithms enjoy a regret bound,
in time horizon, of the order Õ(
√
T ), we are guaranteed that 1/η2t,i scales only poly-
logarithmically with the time horizon. What happens, however, if algorithm Ai has a
worst case regret bound of the order ω(
√
T )? For the next part of the discussion, we
only focus on time horizon dependence. As a simple example, suppose that Ai has
worst case regret of T 2/3 and that Ai∗ has a worst case regret of
√
T . In this case,
Theorem 3.8.1 tells us that we should set η1,i = Õ(1/T 1/6) and hence the regret bound
scales at least as Ω(T 1/3/∆i + E[Ri∗(T )]). In general, if the worst case regret bound
of Ai is in the order of Tα we have a regret bound scaling at least as T 2α−1/∆i. This
is not unique to Algorithm 10 and a similar scaling of the regret would occur in the
bound for Algorithm 9 due to the scaling of confidence intervals.
Corralling in an adversarial environment. Because Algorithm 10 is based on a
best of both worlds algorithm, we can further handle the case when the losses/rewards
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are generated adversarially or whenever the best overall arm is shared across multiple
algorithms, similarly to the settings studied by Agarwal et al. (2016); Pacchiano et al.
(2020b).
Theorem 3.8.3. Let R̄i∗(·) be a function upper bounding the expected regret of Ai∗,









and β = e1/ log(T )2 it holds that
the expected regret of Algorithm 10 is bounded as follows:














The bound in Theorem 3.8.3 essentially evaluates toO(max(
√
TK,maxi∈[K] R̄i(T ))+
E[Ri∗(T )]) and its proof is left to Section 3.9. Unfortunately, this is not quite enough
to recover the results in (Agarwal et al., 2016; Pacchiano et al., 2020b). This is
attributed to the fact that we use the 12 -Tsallis entropy as the regularizer instead of
the log-barrier function. It is possible to improve the above bound for algorithms with
stability γ < 1/2, however, because model selection is not the primary focus of this
work, we will not present such results here.
A few remarks are in order. First, when the rewards obey the stochastically
constrained adversarial setting i.e., there exists a gap ∆i at every round between
the best action and every other action during all rounds t ∈ [T ], then the regret for
corralling bandit algorithms with worst case regret bounds of the order Õ(
√
T ) in time
horizon is at most Õ(∑︁i ̸=i∗ log(T )5∆i +Ri∗(T )). On the other hand, if there is no gap in the
rewards then a worst case regret bound is still Õ(max{
√
KT,maxi R̄i(T )} +Ri∗(T )).
This implies that Algorithm 10 can be used as a model selection tool when we are not
sure what environment we are playing against. For example, if we are not sure if we
should use a contextual bandit algorithm, a linear bandit algorithm or a stochastic
multi-armed bandit algorithm, we can corral all of them and Algorithm 10 will perform
almost as well as the algorithm for the best environment. Further, if we are in a
distributed setting where we have access to multiple algorithms of the same type but
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not the arms they are playing, we can do almost as well as an algorithm which plays
on all the arms simultaneously. We believe that our algorithm will have numerous
other applications outside of the scope of the above examples.
3.8.2 Stability of UCB and UCB-like algorithms under a
change of environment
In this section we discuss how the regret bounds for UCB and similar algorithms
change whenever the variance of the stochastic losses is rescaled by Algorithm 10.
Assume that the UCB algorithm plays against stochastic rewards bounded in [0, 1]. We
begin by noting that after every call to OMD-STEP (Algorithm 12) the UCB algorithm
should be restarted with a change in the environment which reflects that the variance
of the losses has now been rescaled. Let the UCB algorithm of interest be Ai. If the
OMD step occurred at time t′ and it was the case that 1
ρs−1
≥ pt′,i > 1ρs , then we know
that the rescaled rewards will be in [0, ρs] until the next time the UCB algorithm is
restarted. This suggests that the confidence bound for arm j at time t should become√︃
ρ2s log(t)




. A slightly more careful analysis using Bernstein’s inequality for martingales
(e.g. Lemma 10 Bartlett et al. (2008)) allows us to show the following.
Theorem 3.8.4. Suppose that during epoch τ of size T UCB-I is restarted and its








8ρskiT log (T )
Proof of Theorem 3.8.4. Let the reward of arm j at time t be rt,j and the rescaled
reward be ˆ︁rt,j. Without loss of generality assume that the arm with highest reward
is j = 1. Denote the mean of arm j as µj and denote the mean of the best arm as
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µ∗. During this run of UCB we know that each |ˆ︁rt,j| ≤ ρs. Further if we denote the
probability with which the algorithm is sampled at time t as pt,i we have E[ˆ︁rt,j −
µj|p1:t−1,i] = 0 and hence rt,j − µj is a martingale difference. Further notice that the
conditional second moment of rt,j is E[ˆ︁r2t,j|p1:t−1,i] = E[wt,i r2t,jw2t,i + 0|p1:t−1,i] ≤ ρ. Let
Yt = (ˆ︁rτ,j − µj). Bernstein’s inequality for martingales (Bartlett et al. (2008)[Lemma




2T ρ log (1/δ) + 23ρ log (1/δ)
]︂
≤ δ. This implies
that the confidence bound should be changed to⌜⃓⃓⎷4ρs log (t)
Ti,j(t)
+ 4ρs log (t)3Ti,j(t)
.
Following the standard proof of UCB we can now conclude that a suboptimal arm




































In general the argument can be repeated for other UCB-type algorithms (e.g.
Successive Elimination) and hinges on the fact that the rescaled rewards ˆ︁rt,j have
second moment bounded by ρ since with probability pt,i we have ˆ︁r2t,j = r2t,jp2t,i and with
probability 1 − pt,i it equals ˆ︁r2t,j = 0. We are not sure if similar arguments can be
carried out for more delicate versions of UCB, like KL-UCB and leave it as future
work to check.
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3.9 Detailed proofs from Section 3.8
3.9.1 Proof of Theorem 3.8.1
3.9.1.1 Potential function and auxiliary lemmas
First we recall the definition of conjugate of a convex function f , denoted as f ∗
f ∗(y) = max
x∈Rd
⟨x, y⟩ − f(x).


















∇Ψ∗t (Y )i =
1(︂
−ηt,i2 Yi + 1
)︂2
Φt(Y ) = max
w∈∆K−1
⟨Y,w⟩ − Ψt(w) = (Ψt + I∆K−1)∗ (Y ).
(3.9)
Further for a function f we use Df (x, y) to denote the Bregman divergence between x
and y induced by f equal to
Df (x, y) = f(x) − f(y) − ⟨∇f(y), x− y⟩ = f(x) + f ∗(∇f(y)) − ⟨∇f(y), x⟩,
where the second inequality follows by the Fenchel duality equality f ∗(∇f(y))+f(y) =
⟨∇f(y), y⟩. We now present a couple of auxiliary lemmas useful for analyzing the
OMD and FTRL updates.
Lemma 3.9.1. For any x, y ∈ ∆K−1 it holds
DΨt(x, y) = DΦt(∇Φ∗t (y),∇Φ∗t (x)).
Proof. Since Ψt+I∆K−1 is a convex, closed function on ∆K−1 it holds that Ψt+I∆K−1 =
((Ψt + I∆K−1)∗)∗ (see for e.g. (Brezis, 2010) Theorem 1.11). Further, Φ∗t (x) =
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((Ψt + I∆K−1)∗)∗(x) = Ψt(x). The above implies
DΨt(x, y) = DΦ∗t (x, y) = DΦt(∇Φ
∗
t (y),∇Φ∗t (x)).
Lemma 3.9.2. For any positive ˆ︁Lt and wt+1 generated according to update 3.7 we
have
wt+1 = ∇Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) = ∇Ψ∗t+1(−ˆ︁Lt + νt+11),
for some scalar νt. Further (ˆ︁Lt − νt+11)i > 0 for all i ∈ [K].
Proof. The proof is contained in Section 4.3 in Zimmert and Seldin (2021).
Lemma 3.9.3 (Lemma 16 Zimmert and Seldin (2021)). Let w ∈ ∆K−1 and w̃ =






We begin by studying the instantaneous regret of the FTRL update. The bound follows
the one in Zimmert and Seldin (2021). Let u = ei∗ be the unit vector corresponding
to the optimal algorithm Ai∗ . To help with notation we will treat the algorithms as
sampled from wt instead of pt. This is WLOG as the extra regret incurred due to the
uniform exploration mixed in pt is only O(1). First we decompose the regret into a
stability term and a penalty term:
⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt − u⟩ = ⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt⟩ + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1) (Stability)
− Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1) − ⟨ˆ︁ℓt, u⟩ (Penalty).
The bound on the stability term follows from Lemma 11 in Zimmert and Seldin (2021),
however, we will show this carefully, since parts of the proof will be needed to bound
other terms. Recall the definition of Φt(Y ) = maxw∈∆K−1⟨Y,w⟩ − Ψt(w). Since w is in
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the simplex we have Φt(Y + α1k) = maxw∈∆K−1⟨Y,w⟩ + ⟨α1, w⟩ − Ψt(w) = Φt(Y ) +α.
We also note that from Lemma 3.9.2 it follows that we can write ∇Ψt(wt) = −ˆ︁Lt−1+νt1.
Combining the two facts we have
⟨ℓt, wt⟩ + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1) = ⟨ℓt, wt⟩ + Φt(∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt − νt1) − Φt(∇Ψt(wt) − νt1)
= ⟨ℓt − α1k, wt⟩ + Φt(∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + α1k) − Φt(∇Ψt(wt))
≤ ⟨ℓt − α1k, wt⟩ + Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + α1k) − Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt))










ˆ︁ℓt − α1∥2∇2Ψ−1t (w),
where the first inequality holds since Ψ∗t ≥ Φt and Ψ∗t (∇Ψ(wt)) = ⟨∇Ψ(wt), wt⟩ −
Ψt(wt) = Φt(∇Ψ(wt)) and the second inequality follows since by Taylor’s theorem
there exists a z on the line segment between ∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + α1k and Ψt(wt) such that
DΨ∗t (∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + α1k,∇Ψt(wt)) = 12∥ˆ︁ℓt − α1∥2∇2Ψt∗(z).
Lemma 3.9.4. Let wt ∈ ∆K−1 and let it ∼ wt. Let ˆ︁ℓt,it = ℓt,itwt,it and ˆ︁ℓt,i = 0 for all
i ̸= it. It holds that
E
⎡⎣ max


















Proof. First notice that:
E
⎡⎣ max










i (ˆ︁ℓt,i − α)2
⎤⎦
From the definition of ∇Ψ∗(Y )i (Equation 3.9) we know that ∇Ψ∗(Y )i is increasing
on (−∞, 0] and hence for α = 0 we have wt,i ≥ ∇Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt)i. This implies the
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When α = χ(it=j)ℓt,j we consider several cases. First if it ≠ j the same bound as
above holds. Next if it = j for all i ̸= j we have ˆ︁ℓt,i − α = −α = −ℓt,j ≥ −1 and
for ∇Φ∗t (∇Φt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + ℓt,j) = ∇Φ∗t (∇Φt(wt) + ℓt,j) ≤ 22/3wt,i by Lemma 3.9.3. This
implies that in this case the maximum in the terms is bounded by 2w3/2t,i ℓ2t,j . Finally if
it = j for the j-th term we again use the fact that wt,j ≥ ∇Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + ℓt,j)j
since −ˆ︁ℓt,j + ℓt,j ≤ 0. Combining all of the above we have
E
⎡⎣ max
























































Now the stability term is bounded by Lemma 3.9.4. Next we proceed to bound
the penalty term in a slightly different way. Direct computation yields
DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt−1,∇Φ∗t (u)) −DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u)) = −Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1) − ⟨−ˆ︁Lt−1 + ˆ︁Lt, u⟩
+ Φt(∇Φ∗t (u)) − Φt(∇Φ∗t (u))
= −Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1) − ⟨ˆ︁ℓt, u⟩.
(3.10)
Using the next lemma and telescoping will result in a bound for the sum of the penalty
terms
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Lemma 3.9.5. Let u = ei∗ be the optimal algorithm. For any wt+1 such that
wt+1 = ∇Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) and ηt+1 ≤ ηt it holds that















= Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) + Φ∗t+1(u) − Φ∗t (u) − ⟨u, ˆ︁Lt − ˆ︁Lt⟩
= Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) + Ψt+1(u) − Ψt(u)





































The first equality holds by Fenchel duality and the definition of Bregman divergence.
The second equality holds by the fact that on the simplex Φ∗t (·) = Ψt(·). The third
equality holds because Ψt(u) = −4(
√
1 − 12). The fourth equality holds because wt+1
is the maximizer of ⟨−ˆ︁Lt, w⟩ + Ψt+1(w) and this is exactly how Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) is defined.
The first inequality holds because
−Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) = max
w∈∆K−1
⟨−ˆ︁Lt, w⟩ + Ψt(w)
≤ ⟨−ˆ︁Lt, wt+1⟩ + Ψt(wt+1).





wt+1,i/2) and the fact that
√
wt+1,i∗ − 12wt+1,i∗ ≤
1
2 .
Next we focus on the OMD update. By the 3-point rule for Bregman divergence
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we can write
⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt − u⟩ = ⟨∇Ψt(wt) − ∇Ψt(w̃t+1), wt − u⟩
= DΨt(u,wt) −DΨt(u, w̃t+1) +DΨt(wt, w̃t+1)
≤ DΨt(u,wt) −DΨt(u, ˆ︁wt+1) +DΨt(wt, w̃t+1),
⟨ˆ︁ℓt+1, ˆ︁wt+1 − u⟩ ≤ DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+1) −DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2) +DΨt+1( ˆ︁wt+1, w̃t+2),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that DΨt(u, w̃t+1) ≤ DΨt(u, ˆ︁wt+1) as
ˆ︁wt+1 is the projection of w̃t+1 with respect to the Bregman divergence onto ∆K−1.
We now explain how to control each of the terms. First we begin by matching
DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+1) with −DΨt(u, ˆ︁wt+1).
DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+1) −DΨt(u, ˆ︁wt+1) = Ψt+1(u) − Ψt(u) + Ψt( ˆ︁wt+1) − Ψt+1( ˆ︁wt+1)




























































where we have set u = ei∗ . Since the step size schedule is non-decreasing during OMD
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updates, we have that the above is bounded by























Next we explain how to control the terms DΨt(wt, w̃t+1) and DΨt+1( ˆ︁wt+1, w̃t+2).
These can be thought of as the stability terms in the FTRL update.
































where w̃t+1 is any iterate such that ˆ︁wt+1 = argminw∈∆K−1 DΨt(w, w̃t+1).
Proof. We show the first two inequalities. The second couple of inequalities follow
similarly. First we notice that we have
ˆ︁wt+1 = argmin
w∈∆K−1
⟨w, ˆ︁ℓt⟩ +DΨt(w,wt+1) = argmin
w∈∆K−1
⟨w, ˆ︁ℓt − α1k⟩ +DΨt(w,wt+1),
for any α. This implies that ˆ︁wt+1 = argminw∈∆K−1 DΨt(w, w̃t+1) for w̃t+1 = argminw∈RK ⟨w, ˆ︁ℓt−
α1k⟩ +DΨt(w,wt+1). We can now write
DΨ∗t (∇Ψt(w̃t+1),∇Ψt(wt)) = DΨ∗t (∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt + α1k,∇Ψt(wt))
≤ max
w∈[wt,∇Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt)−ˆ︁ℓt+α1k)] ∥ˆ︁ℓt − α1k∥2∇2Ψ−1t (w).
The proof is finished by Lemma 3.9.4.
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Finally we explain how to controlDΨt(u,wt) andDΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2). First by Lemma 3.9.1
it holds that
DΨt(u,wt) = DΦt(−Lt−1,∇Φ∗t (u)).
This term can now be combined with the term −DΦt−1(−Lt−1,∇Φ∗t−1(u)) coming from
the prior FTRL update and both terms can be controlled through Lemma 3.9.5. To
control −DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2) we show that −DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2) = −DΦt+1(−ˆ︁Lt+1,∇Φ∗t+1(u)).
This is done by showing that if ˆ︁wt+1 and ˆ︁wt+2 are defined as in Equation 3.6 we can
equivalently write ˆ︁wt+2 as an FTRL step coming from a slightly different loss.
Lemma 3.9.7. Let ˆ︁wt+2 be defined as in Equation 3.6. Let νt+1 be the constant such
that ∇Φt+1(−ˆ︁Lt) = ∇Ψ∗t+1(−ˆ︁Lt + νt1k). Let ˆ︁Lt+1 = (1k − e) ⊙ (ˆ︁Lt − (νt−1 + νt)1k) +
1
β
e ⊙ ((ˆ︁Lt − (νt−1 + νt)1k)) + ˆ︁ℓt+1 and ηt+2 = ηt+1. Then (ˆ︁Lt+1)i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [K]
and ˆ︁wt+2 = wt+2 = ∇Φt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1).
Proof. By the definition of the update we have
ˆ︁wt+1 = ∇Φt(∇Ψt(wt) − ˆ︁ℓt) = ∇Φt(−ˆ︁Lt + νt−11k)
= ∇Ψ∗t (−ˆ︁Lt + (νt−1 + νt)1k),
ˆ︁wt+2 = ∇Φt+1(∇Ψt+1( ˆ︁wt+1) − ˆ︁ℓt+1),
where in the first equality we have used the fact that ∇Ψt(wt) = −Lt−1 + νt−11k. For
any i such that the OMD update increased the step size, i.e. ηt+1,i = βηt,i it holds
from the definition of ∇Ψt+1(·) that ∇Ψt+1(w)i = 1β∇Ψt(w)i. Since ∇Ψ
∗
t inverts ∇Ψt
coordinate wise, we can write
∇Ψt+1( ˆ︁wt+1)i = 1
β
∇Ψt( ˆ︁wt+1)i = 1
β
(−ˆ︁Lt + (νt−1 + νt)1k)i.
If we let e be the the sum of all ei’s such that ηt+1,i = βηt,i we can write
ˆ︁wt+2 = ∇Φt+1
(︄
(1k − e) ⊙ (−ˆ︁Lt + (νt−1 + νt)1k) + 1
β




The fact that ˆ︁Lt+1,i ≥ 0 for any i follows since any coordinate ∇Ψt( ˆ︁wt+1)i ≤ 0 which
implies that any coordinate of (−ˆ︁Lt + (νt−1 + νt)1k)i ≤ 0.
We can finally couple −DΦt+1(−ˆ︁Lt+1,∇Φ∗t+1(u)) with the term from the next FTRL
step which is DΦt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1,∇Φ∗t+2(u)) and use Lemma 3.9.5 to bound the sum of this
two terms. Putting everything together we arrive at the following regret guarantee.
Theorem 3.9.8. The regret bound for Algorithm 10 for any step size schedule which





















































Proof. Let TFTRL be the set of all rounds in which the FTRL step is taken except for
all rounds immediately before the OMD step and immediately after the OMD step.



























⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt⟩ + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1)
+DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt−1,∇Φ∗t (u)) −DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u))]︂ .













































⎤⎦− E [︂DΦT (−ˆ︁LT ,∇Φ∗T (u))]︂ .
We are now going to complete the penalty term by considering the extra terms which
do not bring negative regret from ∑︁t∈[T ]\TFTRL E[⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt − u⟩].∑︂
t∈[T ]\TFTRL
E[⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt − u⟩] ≤ ∑︂
t∈TOMD










































DΦt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1,∇Φ∗t+2(u)) −DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2)]︂ ,
where in the first inequality we have used the 3-point rule for Bregman divergence





⟨ˆ︁ℓt+2, wt+2⟩ + Φt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+2) − Φt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1) +DΨt(wt, w̃t+1) +DΨt+1( ˆ︁wt+1, w̃t+2)]︂



























where we have used the i ̸= i∗ bound from the above lemmas for all terms past
T0 and the bound which includes all i ∈ [K] for the first T0 terms. The term∑︁
t∈TOMD E
[︂








































































+ E[DΦ1(0,∇Φ∗1(u))] − E[DΦT (−ˆ︁LT ,∇Φ∗T (u))].
(3.12)





















By definition of w1 we have DΦ1(0,∇Φ∗1(u)) = Ψ1(u) − Ψ1(w1). Plugging back into






















































The algorithm begins by running each algorithm for log (T ) + 1 rounds. We set the
probability thresholds so that ρ1 = 36, ρj = 2ρj−1 and 1ρn ≥
1
KT
, because we mix each
wt with the uniform distribution weighted by 1/KT . This implies n ≤ log2(T ). The
algorithm now proceeds in epochs. The sizes of the epochs are as follows. The first
epoch was of size K log (T ) +K, each epoch after doubles the size of the preceding
one so that the number of epochs is bounded by log (T ). In the beginning of each
epoch, except for the first epoch we check if wt,i < 1ρ1 . If it is we increase the step size
ηt+1,i = βηt,i and run the OMD step. Let the τ -th epoch have size sτ . Let 1ρτ be the
largest threshold which was not exceeded during epoch τ . We require that each of
the algorithms have the following expected regret bound under the unbiased rescaling
of the losses R̄i(t): E[R̄i(
∑︁S




ρτR(sτ )]. This can be ensured by
restarting the algorithms in the beginning of the epochs if at the beginning of epoch τ
it happens that wt,i > 1ρτ−1 . Let ℓt be the loss over all possible actions. Let it be the
algorithm selected by the corralling algorithm at time t. Let a∗ be the best overall
action.
Lemma 3.9.9. Let R̄i∗(·) be a function upper bounding the expected regret of Ai∗,















































)︂⎤⎦+ 1 + 36E[Ri∗(T )].
Proof. First we note that E[ˆ︁ℓt(i∗)] = E [︃wi∗,t ℓt(ai∗,jt )wi∗,t
]︃
= E[ℓt(ai∗,jt)]. Using Theo-
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rem 3.9.8 we have
T∑︂
t=1
E [ℓt(ait,jt) − ℓt(a∗)] =
T∑︂
t=1





































































⎤⎦ ≤ log(T )∑︂
τ=1
E[√ρτRi∗(sτ )].
We now claim that during epoch τ there is a t in that epoch such that also t ∈ TOMD
and for which wt,i∗ ≤ 1ρτ−1 . We consider two cases, first if OMD was invoked because at
least one of the probability thresholds ρs was passed by a wts,i∗ , we must have ρs ≤ ρτ .
Also by definition of ρτ as the largest threshold not passed by any wt,i∗ there exists at
least one t′ ≥ ts for which 1ρτ−1 ≥ wt′,i∗ >
1
ρτ




















the second case we have that for all t in epoch τ it holds that 1
ρτ−1
≥ wt,i∗ > 1ρτ
or wt,i∗ > 1ρ1 . In the second case we only incur regret E[R1(t)] scaled by 36 and










negative contribution, where t indexes




















. This follows by noting that there are log2(T ) epochs and during each epoch





. Thus if tτ is the
beginning of epoch τ we subtract at least β
′√tτρτ−1
25η1,i∗
. Notice that the length of each
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and so as long as we set η1,i∗ ≤ β
′√2tτ
50R̄i∗ (2tτ )
, where E[Ri∗(2tτ )] ≤ R̄i∗(2tτ ) we have
log(T )∑︂
τ=1















ρτRi∗(2tτ )] ≤ 0.
We can now use the self-bounding trick of the regret as in Zimmert and Seldin












χit ̸=i∗(ℓt(ait,jt) − µ∗)
]︄
















Theorem 3.9.10 (Theorem 3.8.1). Let R̄i∗(·) be a function upper bounding the expected










and β = e1/ log(T )2 it holds that the expected regret of Algorithm 10 is bounded as






















+ 2 + 72Ri∗(T ),
where T0 = maxi ̸=i∗
225η21,i
∆i .
























































































































































In the first inequality we used the fact that for any i we have ηt,i ≤ 25η1,i/
√
t, in
the second inequality we have used the self bounding property derived before the
statement of the theorem and in the third inequality we again used the bound on the
expected regret E[R(T )] from the first inequality. We are now going to use the fact
that for any w > 0 it holds that 2α
√
w − βw ≤ α2
β











































































We now choose T0 = maxi ̸=i∗
225η21,i
∆i . To bound E [Ψ1(u) − Ψ1(w1)] we have set w1 to be














. Putting everything together we have






















+ 2 + 72Ri∗(T )
3.9.2 Proof of Theorem 3.8.3
We now consider the setting in which the best overall arm does not maintain a gap at
every round. Following the proof of Theorem 3.9.8 we are able to show the following.
Theorem 3.9.11. The regret bound for Algorithm 10 for any step size schedule which















































⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt⟩ + Φt(−ˆ︁Lt) − Φt(−ˆ︁Lt−1)




































⎤⎦− E [︂DΦT (−ˆ︁LT ,∇Φ∗T (u))]︂ .




























DΦt+2(−ˆ︁Lt+1,∇Φ∗t+2(u)) −DΨt+1(u, ˆ︁wt+2)]︂ .
















































































DΦt+1(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u)) −DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u))]︂
+ E[DΦ1(0,∇Φ∗1(u))] − E[DΦT (−ˆ︁LT ,∇Φ∗T (u))].
(3.13)





DΦt+1(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u)) −DΦt(−ˆ︁Lt,∇Φ∗t (u))]︂
+ E[DΦ1(0,∇Φ∗1(u))] − E[DΦT (−ˆ︁LT ,∇Φ∗T (u))]
















































































































αi over the simplex, for αi ≥ 0 is the same for all t ∈ [T ].
Following the proof of Lemma 3.9.9 and replacing the bound on E
[︂∑︁T
t=1⟨ˆ︁ℓt, wt − u⟩]︂
from Theorem 3.9.8 with the one from Theorem 3.9.11 finishes the proof.
3.10 Model selection with Tsallis-Inf and proof of
Theorem 3.2.1
Recall the model selection problem for linear bandits from Section 3.2. We assume
that there are K base learners {Ai}Ki=1 such that the regret of Ai, for i ≥ i∗, is
bounded by Õ(dαi
√
T ). That is, whenever the model is correctly specified, the i-th
algorithm admits a meaningful regret guarantee. In the setting of Foster et al. (2019),
Ai can be instantiated as LinUCB and in that case α = 1/2. Further, in the setting
of infinite arms, Ai can be instantiated as OFUL (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011), in
which case α = 1. Both α = 1/2 and α = 1 govern the min-max optimal rates in
the respective settings. Our algorithm is now a simple modification of Algorithm 10.
At every time-step t, we update ˆ︁Lt = ˆ︁Lt−1 + ˆ︁ℓt + d, where di = d2αi√T . Intuitively, our
modification creates a gap between the losses of Ai∗ and any Ai for i > i∗ of the
order d2αi . On the other hand for any i < i∗, perturbing the loss can result in at
most additional d2αi∗
√
T regret. With the above observations, the bound guaranteed
by Theorem 3.8.1 implies that the modified algorithm should incur at most Õ(d2αi∗
√
T )
regret. We arrive at the statement of Theorem 3.2.1.
Theorem 3.10.1 (Theorem 3.2.1). Assume that every base learner Ai, i ≥ i∗, admits
a Õ(dαi
√





T ). Moreover, under the additional assumption that the following
holds for any i < i∗, for all (x, a) ∈ X × A
E[⟨βi, ϕi(x, a)⟩] − min
a∈A










Typically, we have K = O(log (T )) and thus Theorem 3.2.1 guarantees a regret
of at most Õ(d2αi∗
√
T ). Furthermore, under a gap-assumption, which implies that
the value of the smallest loss for the optimal embedding i∗ is sufficiently smaller
compared to the value of any sub-optimal embedding i < i∗, we can actually achieve
a corralling regret of the order Ri∗(T ). In particular, for the setting of Foster et al.
(2019), our strategy yields the desired Õ(
√
di∗T ) regret bound. Notice that the regret
guarantees are only meaningful as long as di∗ = o(T 1/(2α)). In such a case, the second
assumption on the gap is that the gap is lower bounded by o(1). This is a completely
problem-dependent assumption and in general we expect that it cannot be satisfied.
3.10.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
Since the losses might not be bounded in [0, 1] as dK = Θ(T ) we need to slightly
modify the bound for the Stability term in Lemma 3.9.4 and the term DΨt(wt, w̃t+1) in
Lemma 3.9.6. Recall that we need to bound the term E
[︃
max
w∈[wt,∇Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt)−ˆ︁ℓt+α1k)] ∥ˆ︁ℓt∥2∇2Ψ−1t (w)
]︃
.
The argument is the same as in 3.9.4 up to
E
⎡⎣ max
w∈[wt,∇Ψ∗t (∇Ψt(wt)−ˆ︁ℓt+α1k)] ∥ˆ︁ℓt∥2∇2Ψ−1t (w)






































where in the last inequality we have used the fact that wt,i ≥ w3/2t,i together with the
our assumption that ξt is zero-mean with variance proxy 1. Following the proof of
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E[⟨d, wt − u⟩] + 36E[Ri∗(T )].
For a fixed t we have
−⟨d, wt − u⟩ =
d2αi∗√
T



















First we consider the terms i > i∗. Assume WLOG that d2αK ≤ T/4, as otherwise the


































Since η1,i = Θ̃(1/dαi ) we have that the above is further bounded by Õ(
√
T/t).






. Here we use our assump-
tion that the regret E
[︂∑︁T
t=1 ℓt(ait,jt) − ℓt(a∗)
]︂
≥ E [wt,i∆i], where ∆i = E[⟨βi, ϕi(x, a)⟩]−













, which holds by the gap assumption in the
theorem. All other terms in the regret bound are bounded by Õ(dαi∗
√
T ). Thus we
















In this section, we further examine the empirical properties of our algorithms via
experiments on synthetically generated datasets. We compare Algorithm 9 and
Algorithm 10 to the Corral algorithm (Agarwal et al., 2016)[Algorithm 1], which is
also used in (Pacchiano et al., 2020b). We note that Pacchiano et al. (2020b) also
use Exp3.P as a corralling algorithm. Recent work (Lee et al., 2020a) suggests that
Corral exhibits similar high probability regret guarantees as Exp3.P and that Corral
would completely outperform Exp3.P. One of the corralling algorithms in (Pacchiano
et al., 2020b) is precisely the Corral algorithm. The second algorithm considered in
(Pacchiano et al., 2020b) is the Exp3.P (Auer et al., 2002b) algorithm. We do not
compare against Exp3.P as we already expect that the performance will be worse than
the Corral algorithm. Our intuition is guided by the fact that the Corral algorithm
already comes equipped with high-probability regret guarantees, which match the once
provided by Exp3.P, without the need for additional exploration (Lee et al., 2020a).
Experimental setup. The algorithms that we corral are UCB-I, Thompson
sampling (TS), and FTRL with 12 -Tsallis entropy reguralizer (Tsallis-INF). We chose
these algorithms as they all come with regret guarantees for the stochastic multi-
armed problem and they broadly represent three different classes of algorithms, i.e,
algorithms based on the optimism in the face of uncertainty principle, algorithms
based on posterior sampling, and algorithms based on online mirror descent. When
implementing Algorithm 10 and Corral, we make an important deviation from what
theory prescribes: we never restart the corralled algorithms and run them with
their default parameters. Even though, there are no theoretical guarantees for this
modification of the corralling algorithms, we will see that the regret bounds remain
meaningful in practice. In all of the experiments we corral two instances of UCB-
I, TS, and FTRL for a total of six algorithms. The best algorithm plays over 10
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arms. Every other algorithm plays over 5 arms. Intuitively, the higher the number
of arms implies higher complexity of the best algorithm which would lead to higher
regret and a harder corralling problem. The rewards for each algorithm are Bernoulli
random variables setup according to the following parameters: base_reward,
in_gap, out_gap, and low_reward. The best overall arm has expected reward
base_reward+ in_gap+out_gap. Every other arm of Algorithm 1 has expected
reward equal to low_reward. For all other algorithms the best arm has reward
base_reward + in_gap and other arms have reward base_reward. In all of
the experiments we set base_reward = 0.5, in_gap = 0.01, low_reward = 0.2.
While a small in_gap implies a large regret for the algorithms containing sub-optimal
arms, it also reduces the likelihood that said algorithms would have small average
reward. Combined with setting low_reward = 0.2, this will make the average
reward of A1 look small in the initial number of rounds, compared to the average
reward of Ai, i > 1 and hence makes the corralling problem harder. We run two set
of experiments, an easy set for which out_gap = 0.19, which translates to gaps
∆i = 0.2 in our regret bounds, and a hard set for which out_gap = 0.01 which
implies ∆i = 0.02. Finally time horizon is set to T = 106.
Large gap experiments. Figure 3-1 reports the regret (top) and number of
plays of each algorithm found in our experiments when ∆i = 0.2. The plots represent
the average regret, in blue, and the average number of pulls of each algorithm (color
according to the legend) over 75 runs of each experiment. The standard deviation is
represented by the shaded blue region. The algorithm that contains the optimal arm
is A1 and is an instance of UCB-I. The red dotted line in the top plots is given by
4
√




∆i + E[R1(T )].
These lines serve as a reference across experiments and we believe they are more
accurate upper bounds for the regret of the proposed and existing algorithms. As




regret, while the regret of Algorithm 10 remains bounded in O(log (T )). Algorithm 9
admits two regret phases. In the initial phase, its regret is linear, while in the second
phase it is logarithmic. This is typical of UCB strategies in the stochastic MAB
problem (Garivier et al., 2018).
(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret
(e) Algorithm 10 number of
pulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution
Figure 3-1: UCB-I contains best arm,∆i = 0.2,ALG1:2 = UCB-I,ALG3:4 =
Tsallis-INF,ALG5:6 = TS.
Small gap experiments Figure 3-2 reports the results of our experiments for
∆i = 0.02. The setting of the experiments is the same as in the large gap case. We
observe that both Corral and Algorithm 10 behave according to the O(
√
T ) bounds.
This is expected since, when ∆i = 0.02, the optimistic bound dominates the
√
T -bound.
The result for Algorithm 9 might be somewhat surprising, as its regret exceeds both
the green and red lines. We emphasize that this experiment does not contradict
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Theorem 3.6.2. Indeed, if we were to plot the green and red lines according to the
bounds of Theorem 3.6.2, the regret would remain below both lines.
(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret (e) Algorithm 10 number ofpulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution
Figure 3-2: UCB-I contains best arm,∆i = 0.02,ALG1:2 = UCB-I,ALG3:4 =
Tsallis-INF,ALG5:6 = TS.
Our experiments suggest that Algorithm 10 is the best corralling algorithm. A





∆i + E[Ri∗(T )]
)︂
. Furthermore, we expect that the bounds of Theo-
rem 3.6.2 are tight. In Section 3.11.1 and Section 3.11.2 we show experiments from
the same setup as just described, however, the algorithm containing the best arm is
1/2-Tsallis-INF and Thompson Sampling respectively.
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3.11.1 Tsallis-INF contains best arm
Experiments can be found in Figure 3-3 for ∆i = 0.2 and in Figure 3-4 for ∆i = 0.02.
(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret
(e) Algorithm 10 number of
pulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution
Figure 3-3: Tsallis-INF contains best arm,∆i = 0.2,ALG1:2 =
Tsallis-INF,ALG3:4 = UCB-I,ALG5:6 = TS.
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(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret
(e) Algorithm 10 number of
pulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution
Figure 3-4: Tsallis-INF contains best arm,∆i = 0.02,ALG1:2 =
Tsallis-INF,ALG3:4 = UCB-I,ALG5:6 = TS.
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3.11.2 Thompson sampling contains best arm
Experiments can be found in Figure 3-5 for ∆i = 0.2 and in Figure 3-6 for ∆i = 0.02.
(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret
(e) Algorithm 10 number of
pulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution
Figure 3-5: Thompson sampling (TS) contains best arm,∆i = 0.2,ALG1:2 =
TS,ALG3:4 = UCB-I,ALG5:6 = Tsallis-INF.
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(a) Corral regret (b) Corral number of pulls (c) Corral distribution
(d) Algorithm 10 regret
(e) Algorithm 10 number of
pulls (f) Algorithm 10 distribution
(g) Algorithm 9 regret
(h) Algorithm 9 number of
pulls (i) Algorithm 9 distribution




Policy regret in repeated games
We first show that there are online learning settings in which policy regret and external
regret are incompatible: any sequence of play that achieves a favorable regret with
respect to one definition must do poorly with respect to the other. We then focus
on the game-theoretic setting where the adversary is a self-interested agent. In that
setting, we show that external regret and policy regret are not in conflict and, in
fact, that a wide class of algorithms can ensure a favorable regret with respect to
both definitions, so long as the adversary is also using such an algorithm. We also
show that the sequence of play of no-policy regret algorithms converges to a policy
equilibrium, a new notion of equilibrium that we introduce. Relating this back to
external regret, we show that coarse correlated equilibria, which no-external regret
players converge to, are a strict subset of policy equilibria. Thus, in game-theoretic
settings, every sequence of play with no external regret also admits no policy regret,
but the converse does not hold. The main contributions of this chapter are based
on Arora et al. (2018). This work was done in collaboration with Dr. Raman Arora,
Dr. Michael Dinitz, and Dr. Mehryar Mohri.
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4.1 Incompatibility of policy regret and external
regret
Arora et al. (2012a) show that there exists an adaptive adversary against which any
online learning algorithm admits linear policy regret, even when the external regret
may be sublinear, we ask if no policy regret implies no external regret. One could
expect this to be the case since policy regret seems to be a stronger notion than
external regret. However, we show that this in fact is not the case and that the two
notions of regret are incompatible: there exist adversaries (or sequence of utilities) on
which action sequences with sublinear external regret admit linear policy regret and
action sequences with sublinear policy regret incur linear external regret.
Theorem 4.1.1. There exists a sequence of m-memory bounded utility functions
(ut)Tt=1, where ut : A → R, such that for any constant m ≥ 2 (independent of T ), any
action sequence with sublinear policy regret will have linear external regret and any
action sequence with sublinear external regret will have linear policy regret.
Proof sketch. The proof of the above theorem constructs a sequence for which no
reasonable play can attain sublinear external regret. In particular, the only way the
learner can have sublinear external regret is if they choose to have very small utility.
To achieve this, the utility functions chosen by the adversary are the following. At
time t, if the player chose to play the same action as their past 2 actions then they
get utility 12 . If the player’s past two actions were equal but their current action is
different, then they get utility 1, and if their past two actions differ then no matter
what their current action is they receive utility 0. It is easy to see that the maximum
utility play for this sequence (and the lowest 2-memory bounded policy regret strategy)
is choosing the same action at every round. However, such an action sequence admits
linear external regret. Moreover, every sublinear external regret strategy must then
admit sublinear utility and thus linear policy regret.
141
4.2 Policy regret in strategic environments
The incompatibility result rests on the fact that the player is facing a completely
malicious adversary. In many realistic environments we can instead think of the
adversary as a self-interested agent trying to maximize their own utility, rather than
trying to maximize the regret of the player. This more strategic environment is better
captured by the game theory setting, in particular a 2-player game where both players
are trying to maximize their utility. Even though we have argued that external regret
is not a good measure, our next result shows that minimizing policy regret in games
can be done if both players choose their strategies according to certain no external
regret algorithms. More generally, we adapt a classical notion of stability from the
statistical machine learning setting and argue that if the players use no external regret
algorithms that are stable, then the players will have no policy regret in expectation.
To state the result formally we first need to introduce some notation.
Definition 4.2.1 (Game definition). We consider a 2-player game G, with players
1 and 2. The action set of player i is denoted by Ai, which we think of as being
embedded into R|Ai| in the obvious way where each action corresponds to a standard
basis vector. The corresponding probability simplex is ∆Ai. The action of player 1 at
time t is at and of player 2 is bt. The observed utility for player i at time t is ui(at, bt)
and this is a bi-linear form with corresponding matrix Pi. We assume that the utilities
are bounded in [0, 1].
Algorithm of the player. When discussing algorithms, we take the view of
player 1. Specifically, at time t, player 1 plays according to an algorithm which can
be described as Algt : (A1 × A2)t → ∆A1. We distinguish between two settings:
full information, in which the player observes the full utility function at time t (i.e.,
u1(·, bt)), and the bandit setting, in which the player only observes u1(at, bt). In the
full information setting, algorithms like multiplicative weight updates (MWU Arora
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et al. (2012b)) depend only on the past t− 1 utility functions (u1(·, bℓ))t−1ℓ=1, and thus
we can think of Algt as a function ft : At2 → ∆A1. In the bandit setting, though, the
output at time t of the algorithm depends both on the previous t− 1 actions (aℓ)t−1ℓ=1
and on the utility functions (i.e., the actions picked by the other player).
But even in the bandit setting, we would like to think of the player’s algorithm
as a function ft : At2 → ∆A1. We cannot quite do this, however we can think of
the player’s algorithm as a distribution over such functions. So how do we remove
the dependence on At1? Intuitively, if we fix the sequence of actions played by player
2, we want to take the expectation of Algt over possible choices of the t actions
played by player 1. In order to do this more formally, consider the distribution µ over
At−11 ×At−12 generated by simulating the play of the players for t rounds. Then let µb0:t
be the distribution obtained by conditioning µ on the actions of player 2 being b0:t.
Now we let ft(b0:t−1) be the distribution obtained by sampling a0:t−1 from µb1:t−1 and
using Alg(a0:t−1, b0:t−1). When taking expectations over ft, the expectation is taken
with respect to the above distribution. We also refer to the output pt = ft(b0:t−1)
as the strategy of the player at time t. Now that we can refer to algorithms simply
as functions (or distributions over functions), we introduce the notion of a stable
algorithm.
Definition 4.2.2. Let ft : At2 → ∆A1 be a sample from Algt (as described above),
mapping the past t actions in A2 to a distribution over the action set A1. Let the
distribution returned at time t be p1t = ft(b1, . . . , bt). We call this algorithm on
average (m,S(T )) stable with respect to the norm ∥·∥, if for any b′t−m+1, . . . , b′t ∈ A2
such that p̃1t = ft(b1, . . . , bt−m, b′t−m+1, . . . , b′t) ∈ ∆A1, it holds that E[
∑︁T
t=1∥p1t − p̃1t∥] ≤
S(T ), where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomization in the
algorithm.
Even though this definition of stability is given with respect to the game setting, it
is not hard to see that it can be extended to the general online learning setting, and in
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fact this definition is similar in spirit to the one given in Saha et al. (2012). It turns
out that most natural no external regret algorithms are stable. In particular we show,
in the supplementary, that both Exp3 (Auer et al., 2002b) and MWU are on average
(m,m
√
T ) stable with respect to ℓ1 norm for any m < o(
√
T ). It is now possible
to show that if each of the players are facing stable no external regret algorithms,
they will also have bounded policy regret (so the incompatibility from Theorem 4.1.1
cannot occur in this case).
Theorem 4.2.1. Let (at)Tt=1 and (bt)Tt=1 be the action sequences of player 1 and 2 and
suppose that they are coming from no external regret algorithms modeled by functions
ft and gt, with regrets R1(T ) and R2(T ) respectively. Assume that the algorithms are





u1(a, gt(a0:t−m, a, . . . , a)) − u1(at, gt(a0:t−1))
]︄





u2(ft(b0:t−m, b, . . . , b), b) − u2(ft(b0:t−1), bt)
]︄
≤ ∥P2∥S(T ) +R2(T ),
The above holds for any fixed actions b ∈ A2 and a ∈ A1. Here the matrix norm ∥ · ∥




u2(ft(b0, · · · , bt−m+1, b, · · · , b), b) −
T∑︂
t=1




u2(ft(b0, · · · , bt−m+1, b, · · · , b), b) −
T∑︂
t=1




u2(ft(b0, · · · , bt−1), b) −
T∑︂
t=1





∥b⊤P2∥2∥ft(b0, · · · , bt−m+1, b, · · · , b) − ft(b0, · · · , bt−2, bt−1)∥2 +R2(T )
≤ ∥b∥1∥P2∥S(T ) +R2(T ) = ∥P2∥S(T ) +R2(T )
1We would like to thank Mengxiao Zhang (USC) for suggesting how to improve on the above
theorem and discovering a small error in one of our proofs, which has been corrected.
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where the first inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz, the second inequality holds by
using the m-stability of the algorithm, together with the inequality between l1 and l2
norms.
In Theorem 4.2.1 the quantity E
[︂∑︁T
t=1 u1(a, gt(a0:t−m, a, . . . , a)) − u1(at, gt(a0:t−1))
]︂
is precisely the m-memory bounded policy regret with respect to the fixed action
a ∈ A1. To see this, consider the m-memory bounded reward function rt(·) :=
u1(·, gt(a0:t−m, ·)) : Am1 → [0, 1].




Theorem 4.2.2. MWU is an on average (m,m
√
T ) stable algorithm with respect to
ℓ1, for any m < o(
√
T ). Further, Exp3 is an on average (m,m
√
T ) stable algorithm
with respect to ℓ1, for any m < o(
√
T ).
Proof sketch. The proof idea is to show that consecutive iterates pt, pt+1 of Exp3 and
MWU do not differ by more than 1√
T
in ℓ1 norm. This allows us to reason about
the drift in iterates induced by two different loss sequences which differed at time
t−m.
Combining the above results together, we can show that both players will also
have no-policy regret for any m < o(
√
T ).
Corollary 4.2.3. Let (at)Tt=1 and (bt)Tt=1, be the action sequences of players 1 and 2
respectively and suppose that the sequences are coming from MWU or Exp3. Then for
any fixed m, it holds:
E
[︄








for any fixed action b ∈ A2, where ft are the functions corresponding to the MWU
algorithm used by player 1.
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Proof. From Theorem 4.2.2 it follows that MWU and Exp3 are on average (m,m
√
T )
stable and have regret at most O(
√
T ).
4.3 Detailed proofs for Section 4.1 and Section 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.1.1. Define the following reward functions
rt(at−m+1, .., at) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 at−m+i = at−m+i+1 = 1 for i ∈ {1, ..,m− 2} ∧ at−1 ̸= at
1
2 at−m+i = at−m+i+1 = 1 for i ∈ {1, ..,m− 1}
0 otherwise
.
Let (at)Tt=1 be a sequence with sublinear policy regret. Then this sequence has
total reward at least T2 − o(T ) and so there are at most o(T ) actions in the sequence
which are not equal to 1. Let the subsequence consisting of all at = 0 be indexed
by I. Define Ĩ = {t, t + 1, · · · , t + m − 1 : t ∈ I} and consider the subsequence of
functions (rt)t̸∈Ĩ . This is precisely the sequence of functions which have reward 12 with
respect to the sequence of play (at)Tt=1. Notice that the length of this sequence is at
least T −mo(T ) = T − o(T ). The reward of this sequence is ∑︁t̸∈Ĩ rt(at−m+1, .., at) =∑︁
t̸∈Ĩ rt(1, .., 1) =
T−o(T )
2 , however, this subsequence has linear external regret, since∑︁
t̸∈Ĩ rt(at−m+1, .., at−1, 0) =
∑︁




[rt(at−m+1, .., 0) − rt(at−m+1, .., at)] =
∑︂
t̸∈Ĩ




[rt(at−m+1, .., 0) − rt(at−m+1, .., at)]
≥ T − o(T )2 +
∑︂
t∈Ĩ
[rt(at−m+1, .., 0) − rt(at−m+1, .., at)]
≥ T2 − o(T ),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the cardinality of Ĩ is at most
o(T ) and thus ∑︁t∈Ĩ [rt(at−m+1, .., 0) − rt(at−m+1, .., at)] ≥ −o(T ).
Assume that (at)Tt=1 has sublinear external regret. From the above argument, it
follows that the reward of the sequence is at most o(T ) (otherwise if the sequence has
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reward ω(T ), we can repeat the previous argument and get a contradiction with the
fact the sequence has no-external regret). This implies that the the policy regret of
the sequence is ∑︁Tt=1[rt(1, 1, · · · , 1) − rt(at−m+1, .., at)] = T2 − o(T ).
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2. We first show the result for MWU. We think of MWU as
Exponentiated Gradient (EG) where the loss vector has i-th entry equal to the negative
utility if the player decided to play action i. Let the observed loss vector at time j
be ˆ︁lj and the output distribution be pj, then the update of EG can be written as
pj+1 = arg minp∈C⟨ˆ︁lj, p⟩ + 1ηD(p, pj), where C is the simplex of the set of possible
actions and D is the KL-divergence. Using Lemma 3 in Saha et al. (2012), with
f(p) = ⟨ˆ︁lj, p⟩ + 1ηD(p, pj) and the fact that the KL-divergence is 1-strongly convex




1 ≤ f(pj) − f(pj+1) = ⟨pj − pj+1, ˆ︁lj⟩ − 1ηD(pj+1, pj)
≤ ∥pj − pj+1∥1∥ˆ︁lj∥∞ ≤ ∥pj − pj+1∥1,
where the second inequality follows from Hölder’s inequality and the fact that




, we have ∥pj − pj+1∥1 ≤ 12√T . Us-
ing triangle inequality, we can get ∥pj−1 − pj+1∥1 ≤ ∥pj−1 − pj∥1 + ∥pj − pj+1∥1 ≤ 22√T
and induction shows that ∥pj−m+1 − pj+1∥1 ≤ m2√T 1. Suppose for the last m iterations,
a fixed loss function la was played instead and the resulting output of the algorithm be-
comes p̃j+1. Then using the same argument as above we have ∥pj−m+1 − p̃j+1∥1 ≤ m2√T
and thus ∥pj+1 − p̃j+1∥1 ≤ m√T . Summing over all T rounds concludes the proof.
Now we show the result holds in expectation for Exp3. The update at time t,



































, where ut is the utility vector at time t, wt is the






, wjt+1 = wjt , and k is the number of
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actions. We have the following bound:



















































where the first inequality uses the fact that pit+1 ≥ pit and the second inequality uses



















































where we have used pjt+1 ≤ pjt and exp (−x) ≥ 1 − x for all x. We can now proceed to
bound Eit [∥pt+1 − pt∥1|i1:t−1], where it is the random variable denoting the draw at
time t:
Eit [∥pt+1 − pt∥1|i1:t−1] =
∑︂
i





















Recall that unlike external regret, policy regret captures how other players in a game
might react if a player decides to deviate from their strategy. The story is similar when
considering different notions of equilibria. In particular Nash equlibria, Correlated
equilibria and CCEs can be interpreted in the following way: if player i deviates
from the equilibrium play, their utility will not increase no matter how they decide
to switch, provided that all other players continue to play according to the
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equilibrium. This sentiment is a reflection of what no external and no swap regret
algorithms guarantee. Equipped with the knowledge that no policy regret sequences
are obtainable in the game setting under reasonable play from all parties, it is natural
to reason how other players would react if player i deviated and what would be the
cost of deviation when taking into account possible reactions.
Let us again consider the 2-player game setup through the view of player 1. The
player believes their opponent might be m-memory bounded and decides to proceed
by playing according to a no policy regret algorithm. After many rounds of the game,
player 1 has computed an empirical distribution of play ˆ︁σ over A := A1 × A2. The
player is familiar with the guarantees of the algorithm and knows that, if instead, they
changed to playing any fixed action a ∈ A1, then the resulting empirical distribution
of play ˆ︁σa, where player 2 has responded accordingly in a memory-bounded way, is
such that E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σ [u1(a, b)] ≥ E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σa [u1(a, b)] − ϵ. This thought experiment suggests
that if no policy regret play converges to an equilibrium, then the equilibrium is not
only described by the deviations of player 1, but also through the change in player 2’s
behavior, which is encoded in the distribution ˆ︁σa. Thus, any equilibrium induced by no
policy regret play, can be described by tuples of distributions {(σ, σa, σb) : (a, b) ∈ A},
where σa is the distribution corresponding to player 1’s deviation to the fixed action
a ∈ A1 and σb captures player 2’s deviation to the fixed action b ∈ A2. Clearly σa
and σb are not arbitrary but we still need a formal way to describe how they arise.
For convenience, lets restrict the memory of player 2 to be 1. Thus, what player 1
believes is that at each round t of the game, they play an action at and player 2 plays
a function ft : A1 → A2, mapping at−1 to bt = ft(at−1). Finally, the observed utility
is u1(at, ft(at−1)). The empirical distribution of play, ˆ︁σ, from the perspective of player
1, is formed from the observed play (at, ft(at−1))Tt=1. Moreover, the distribution, ˆ︁σa,
that would have occurred if player 1 chose to play action a on every round is formed
from the play (a, ft(a))Tt=1. In the view of the world of player 1, the actions taken
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by player 2 are actually functions rather than actions in A2. This suggests that the
equilibrium induced by a no-policy regret play, is a distribution over the functional
space defined below.
Definition 4.4.1. Let F1 := {f : Am12 → A1} and F2 := {g : Am21 → A2} denote the
functional spaces of play of players 1 and 2, respectively. Denote the product
space by F := F1 × F2.
Note that when m1 = m2 = 0, F is in a one-to-one correspondence with A,
i.e. when players believe their opponents are oblivious, we recover the action set
studied in standard equilibria. For simplicity, for the remainder of the paper we
assume that m1 = m2 = 1. However, all of the definitions and results that follow can
be extended to the fully general setting of arbitrary m1 and m2; see the supplementary
for details.
Let us now investigate how a distribution π over F can give rise to a tuple of
distributions (ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa, ˆ︁σb).
We begin by defining the utility of π such that it equals the utility of a distribution
σ over A i.e., we want E(f,g)∼π [u1(f, g)] = E(a,b)∼σ [u1(a, b)]. Since utilities are not
defined for functions, we need an interpretation of E(f,g)∼π [u1(f, g)] which makes sense.
We notice that π induces a Markov chain with state space A in the following way.
Definition 4.4.2. Let π be any distribution over F . Then π induces a Markov pro-
cess with transition probabilities P [(a2, b2)|(a1, b1)] =
∑︁
(f,g)∈F1×F2:f(b1)=a2,g(a1)=b2 π(f, g).
We associate with this Markov process the transition matrix M ∈ R|A|×|A|, with
Mx1,x2 = P [x2|x1] where xi = (ai, bi).
Since every Markov chain with a finite state space has a stationary distribution, we
think of utility of π as the utility of a particular stationary distribution σ of M. How
we choose σ among all stationary distributions is going to become clear later, but for
now we can think about σ as the distribution which maximizes the utilities of both
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players. Next, we need to construct σa and σb, which capture the deviation in play,
when player 1 switches to action a and player 2 switches to action b. The no-policy
regret guarantee can be interpreted as E(f,g)∼π [u1(f, g)] ≥ E(f,g)∼π [u1(a, g(a))] i.e.,
if player 1 chose to switch to a fixed action (or equivalently, the constant function
which maps everything to the action a ∈ A1), then their utility should not increase.
Switching to a fixed action a, changes π to a new distribution πa over F . This turns
out to be a product distribution which also induces a Markov chain.
Definition 4.4.3. Let π be any distribution over F . Let δa be the distribution
over F1 putting all mass on the constant function mapping all actions b ∈ A2 to
the fixed action a ∈ A1. Let πF2 be the marginal of π over F2. The distribution
resulting from player 1 switching to playing a fixed action a ∈ A, is
denoted as πa = δa × πF2 . This distribution induces a Markov chain with transition
probabilities P [(a, b2)|(a1, b1)] =
∑︁
(f,g):g(a1)=b2 π(f, g) and the transition matrix of
this Markov process is denoted by Ma. The distribution πb and matrix Mb are
defined similarly for player 2.
Since the no policy regret algorithms we work with do not directly induce distribu-
tions over the functional space F but rather only distributions over the action space
A, we would like to state all of our utility inequalities in terms of distributions over
A. Thus, we would like to check if there is a stationary distribution σa of Ma such
that E(f,g)∼π [u1(a, g(a))] = E(a,b)∼σa [u1(a, b)]. This is indeed the case as verified by
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let π be a distribution over the product of function spaces F1 × F2.
There exists a stationary distribution σa of the Markov chain Ma for any fixed a ∈ A1
such that E(a,b)∼σa [u1(a, b)] = E(f,g)∼π [u1(a, g(a))]. Similarly, for every fixed action
b ∈ A2, there exists a stationary distribution σb of Mb such that E(a,b)∼σb [u2(a, b)] =
E(f,g)∼π [u2(f(b), b)].
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Proof. The proof is constructive and we include it below.
Note that, by definition (Ma)(ã,b̃),(ˆ︁a,ˆ︁b) = 0 if ˆ︁a ̸= a and M(ã,b̃),(ˆ︁a,ˆ︁b) = ∑︁f,g:g(ã)=ˆ︁b π(f, g)
if ˆ︁a = a. Consider the distribution σ̃ over A, where σ̃(ã,b̃) = 0 if ã ̸= a and σ̃(ã,b̃) =∑︁































π(f, g) = σ̃(a,b̃).
Finally, notice that:
E(f,g)∼π [u1(a, g(a))] =
∑︂
b∈A2







With all of this notation we are ready to formally describe what no-policy regret
play promises in the game setting in terms of an equilibrium.
Definition 4.4.4. A distribution π over F1 × F2 is a policy equilibrium if for
all fixed actions a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2, which generate Markov chains Ma and Mb
respectively, with stationary distributions σa and σb from Theorem 4.4.1, there exists
a stationary distribution σ of the Markov chain M induced by π such that:
E(a,b)∼σ [u1(a, b)] ≥ E(a,b)∼σa [u1(a, b)]
E(a,b)∼σ [u2(a, b)] ≥ E(a,b)∼σb [u2(a, b)] .
(4.1)
In other words, π is a policy equilibrium if there exists a stationary distribution σ
of the Markov chain corresponding to π, such that, when actions are drawn according
to σ, no player has incentive to change their action. We present a simple example of a
policy equilibrium see Section 4.4.4.
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4.4.1 Convergence to the set of policy equilibria
We have tried to formally capture the notion of equilibria in which player 1’s deviation
would lead to a reaction from player 2 and vice versa in Definition 4.4.4. This definition
is inspired by the counter-factual guarantees of no policy regret play and we would like
to check that if players’ strategies yield sublinear policy regret then the play converges
to a policy equilibrium. Since the definition of sublinear policy regret does not include
a distribution over functional spaces but only works with empirical distributions of
play, we would like to present our result in terms of distributions over the action space
A. Thus we begin by defining the set of all product distributions σ× σa × σb, induced
by policy equilibria π as described in the previous subsection. Here σa and σb represent
the deviation in strategy if player 1 changed to playing the fixed action a ∈ A1 and
player 2 changed to playing the fixed action b ∈ A2 respectively as constructed in
Theorem 4.4.1.
Definition 4.4.5. For a policy equilibrium π, let Sπ be the set of all stationary
distributions which satisfy the equilibrium inequalities (4.1), Sπ := {σ × σa × σb :
(a, b) ∈ A} . Define S = ⋃︁π∈Π Sπ, where Π is the set of all policy equilibria.
Our main result states that the sequence of empirical product distributions formed
after T rounds of the game ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb is going to converge to S. Here ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb
denote the distributions of deviation in play, when player 1 switches to the fixed action
a ∈ A1 and player 2 switches to the fixed action b ∈ A2 respectively. We now define
these distributions formally.
Definition 4.4.6. Suppose player 1 is playing an algorithm with output at time t
given by ft : At2 → ∆A1 i.e. p1t = ft(b0:t−1). Similarly, suppose player 2 is playing an
algorithm with output at time t given by p2t = gt(a0:t−1). The empirical distribution
at time T is ˆ︁σ := 1
T
∑︁T
t=1 pt, where pt = p1t × p2t is the product distribution over A
at time t. Further let (p2a)t = gt(a0:t−m, a, . . . , a) denote the distribution at time t,
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provided that player 1 switched their strategy to the constant action a ∈ A1. Let δa
denote the distribution over A1 which puts all the probability mass on action a. Let
(pa)t = δa × (p2a)t be the product distribution over A, corresponding to the change of
play at time t. Denote by ˆ︁σa = 1T ∑︁Tt=1(pa)t the empirical distribution corresponding
to the change of play. The distribution ˆ︁σb is defined similarly.
Suppose that ft and gt are no-policy regret algorithms, then our main result states
that the sequence (ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb)T converges to the set S.
Theorem 4.4.2. If the algorithms played by player 1 in the form of ft and player 2
in the form of gt give sub-linear policy regret sequences, then the sequence of product
distributions (ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb)∞T=1 converges weakly to the set S.
In particular if both players are playing MWU or Exp3, we know that they
will have sublinear policy regret. Not surprisingly, we can show something slightly
stronger as well. Let σ̃, σ̃a and σ̃b denote the empirical distributions of observed play
corresponding to ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb, i.e. σ̃ = 1T δt, where δt denotes the Dirac distribution,
putting all weight on the played actions at time t. Then these empirical distributions
also converge to S almost surely.
Corollary 4.4.3. The sequence of product distributions (σ̃ × σ̃a × σ̃b)∞T=1 converges
weakly to the set S almost surely.
We would like to emphasize that the convergence guarantee of Theorem 4.4.2 does
not rely on there being a unique stationary distribution of the empirical Markov chains
ˆ︂M, ˆ︂Ma and ˆ︂Mb or their respective limits M,Ma,Mb. Indeed, Theorem 4.4.2 shows
that any limit point of {(ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa, ˆ︁σb)T}∞T=1 satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.4.4.
The proof does not require that any of the respective Markov chains have a unique
stationary distribution, but rather requires only that ˆ︁σ has sublinear policy regret.
We would also like to remark that {(ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa, ˆ︁σb)T}∞T=1 need not have a unique limit and
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our convergence result only guarantees that the sequence is going to the set S. This
is standard when showing that any type of no regret play converges to an equilibrium,
see for example Stoltz and Lugosi (2007).
4.4.2 Proof sketch for Theorem 4.4.2
The proof of Theorem 4.4.2 has three main steps. The first step defines the natural
empirical Markov chains ˆ︂M, ˆ︂Ma and ˆ︂Mb from the empirical play (pt)tt=1 and shows that
the empirical distributions ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb are stationary distributions of the respective
Markov chains. The next step is to show that the empirical Markov chains converge
to Markov chains M, Ma and Mb induced by some distribution π over F . The final
step is to show that π is a policy equilibrium.
We begin with the definition of the empirical Markov chains.







t=1 pt(xi) ̸= 0 and 0 otherwise, where pt is defined in 4.4.6. For any fixed a ∈ A1,
let the empirical Markov chain corresponding to the deviation in play of player 1 be







t=1(pa)t(xi) ̸= 0 and 0 otherwise, where
(pa)t is defined in 4.4.6. The Markov chain ˆ︂Mb is defined similarly for any b ∈ A2.
The intuition behind constructing these Markov chains is as follows – if we were
only provided with the observed empirical play (xt)Tt=1 = (at, bt)Tt=1 and someone told
us that the xt’s were coming from a Markov chain, we could try to build an estimator of
the Markov chain by approximating each of the transition probabilities. In particular










where δt(xi) = 1 if xi occurred at time t and 0 otherwise. When the players are
playing according to a no-regret algorithm i.e. at time t, xt is sampled from pt, it is
possible to show that M̃i,j concentrates to ˆ︂Mi,j (see section 4.5.1). Not only does ˆ︂M
arise naturally, but it turns out that the empirical distribution ˆ︁σ defined in 4.4.6 is
also a stationary distribution of ˆ︂M.
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Lemma 4.4.4. The distribution of play ˆ︁σ = 1
T
∑︁T
t=1 pt is a stationary distribution ofˆ︂M. Similarly the distributions σ̃, ˆ︁σa, σ̃a, ˆ︁σb and σ̃b are stationary distributions of the
Markov chains M̃,ˆ︂Ma, M̃a,ˆ︂Mb and M̃b respectively.








































last equality holds because pt is a distribution over actions so
∑︁|A|
i=1 pt(xi) = 1.
Suppose that both players are playing MWU for T rounds. Then Lemma 4.4.4
together with Theorems 4.2.1 and the stability of MWU imply that E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σ [u1(a, b)] ≥
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σa [u1(a, b)] − O(m/√T ). A similar inequality holds for player 2 and ˆ︁σb. As
T → ∞, the inequality above becomes similar to (4.1). This will play a crucial role in
the proof of our convergence result, which shows that ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb converge to the set
of policy equilibria. We would also like to guarantee that the empirical distributions
of observed play σ̃, σ̃a and σ̃b also converge to this set. To show this second result, we
are going to proof that σ̃ approaches ˆ︁σ almost surely as T goes to infinity.
Lemma 4.4.5. Let ˆ︁σ = 1
T
∑︁T
t=1 pt be the empirical distribution after T rounds of
the game and let σ̃ = 1
T
∑︁T
t=1 δt be the empirical distribution of observed play. Then
lim supT→∞∥σ̃ − ˆ︁σ∥1 = 0 almost surely. Similarly, for the distributions corresponding
to deviation in play we have lim supT→∞∥σ̃a− ˆ︁σa∥1 = 0 and lim supT→∞∥σ̃b− ˆ︁σb∥1 = 0
almost surely.
Our next step is to show that the empirical Markov chains ˆ︂M converge to a Markov
chain M induced by some distribution π over the functional space F . We do so by
constructing a sequence of empirical distributions ˆ︁π over F , based on the players’
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strategies, which induce ˆ︂M. We can then consider every convergent subsequence
of (ˆ︁π)∞Tℓ=1 with limit point π and argue that the corresponding sequence (ˆ︂M)∞Tℓ=1 of
Markov chains converges to the Markov chain induced by π.
Definition 4.4.8. Let ˆ︁π be the distribution over F , such that the probability to
sample any fixed f : A2 → A1 and g : A1 → A2 is ˆ︁π(f, g) = ∏︁i∈|A| ∑︁t pt(xi)pt(yi)∑︁
t=1 pt(xi)
,
where xi = (ai, bi) and yi = (f(bi), g(ai)). Similarly, let ˆ︁πa and ˆ︁πb be the distributions
over F constructed as above but by using the empirical distribution of deviated play
induced by player 1 deviating to action a ∈ A1 and player 2 deviating to action b ∈ A2.
The next lemma checks that ˆ︁π is really a probability distribution.
Lemma 4.4.6. The functionals ˆ︁π, ˆ︁πa and ˆ︁πb are all probability distributions.
Proof. Consider the space of all transition events for a fixed (a, b) pair i.e. S(a,b) =
{((a′, b′) × (a, b)) : (a′, b′) ∈ A}. There is an inherent probability measure on this set,






. It is easy to see that this is a probability













The set of all F can exactly be thought of as ×(a,b)∈AS(a,b) and the function ˆ︁π defined
in 4.4.8 is precisely the product measure on that set. Similar arguments show that ˆ︁πa
and ˆ︁πb are probability distributions.
The proof of the above lemma reveals something interesting about the construction
of ˆ︁π. Fix the actions (a, b) ∈ A. Then the probability to sample a function pair
(f, g) which map (a, b) to (a′, b′) i.e. a′ = f(a) and b′ = f(b) is precisely equal to the
entry ˆ︂M(a,b),(a′,b′) of the empirical Markov chain. Since every function pair (f, g) ∈ F
is determined by the way A is mapped, and we have already have a probability
distribution for a fixed mapping (a, b) to (a′, b′), we can just extend this to ˆ︁π by taking
157
the product distribution over all pairs (a, b) ∈ A. This construction gives us exactly
that ˆ︂M is induced by ˆ︁π.
Lemma 4.4.7. Let ˆ︂M, ˆ︂Ma and ˆ︂Mb be the empirical Markov chains defined in 4.4.7,
then the induced Markov chain from ˆ︁π is exactly ˆ︂M and the induced Markov chains
from ˆ︁πa and ˆ︁πb are exactly ˆ︂Ma and ˆ︂Mb.
Proof sketch. The proof is by direct computation.
The last step of the proof is to show that any limit point π of (ˆ︁π)T is necessarily a
policy equilibrium. This is done through an argument by contradiction. In particular
we assume that a limit point π is not a policy equilibrium. The limit point π
induces a Markov chain M, which we can show is the limit point of the corresponding
subsequence of (ˆ︂M)T by using lemma 4.4.7. Since π is not a policy equilibrium, no
stationary distribution of M can satisfy the inequalities (4.1). We can now show that
the subsequence of (ˆ︁σ)T which are stationary distributions of the corresponding ˆ︂M’s,
converges to a stationary distribution of M. This, however, is a contradiction because
of the next theorem.
Theorem 4.4.8. Let P be the set of all product distributions σ×σa ×σb which satisfy
the inequalities in Equation 4.1:
E(a,b)∼σ [u1(a, b)] ≥ E(a,b)∼σa [u1(a, b)]
E(a,b)∼σ [u2(a, b)] ≥ E(a,b)∼σb [u2(a, b)] .
Let ˆ︁σT be the empirical distribution of play after T rounds and let ˆ︁σTa be the empirical
distribution when player 1 switches to playing action a and define ˆ︁σTb similarly for
player 2. Then the product distribution ˆ︁σT × ˆ︁σTa × ˆ︁σTb converges to weakly to the set P .
Proof sketch. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that there is a convergent
subsequence of (ˆ︁σT × ˆ︁σTa × ˆ︁σTb ). The existence of such a subsequence implies that one
of the inequalities in Equation 4.1 is violated which is a contradiction.
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We now sketch how the rest of proof of Theorem 4.4.2. The proof again goes by
contradiction. Assume π is not a policy equilibrium, this implies that no stationary
distribution of M and corresponding stationary distributions of Ma and Mb can satisfy
inequalities (4.1). Since the empirical distributions ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb of the play satisfies
inequalities (4.1) up to an o(1) additive factor, we can show, in Theorem 4.4.8, that
in the limit, the policy equilibrium inequalities are exactly satisfied. Combined
with the convergence of ˆ︂M, ˆ︂Ma and ˆ︂Mb to M, Ma and Mb, respectively, this implies
that stationary distributions of M, Ma and Mb, satisfying Equation 4.1, giving a
contradiction.
4.4.3 Relation of policy equlibria to CCEs
So far we have defined a new class of equilibria and shown that they correspond to no
policy regret play. Furthermore, we know that if both players in a 2-player game play
stable no external regret algorithms, then their play also has sublinear policy regret.
It is natural to ask if every CCE is also a policy equilibrium: if σ is a CCE, is there a
corresponding policy equilibrium π which induces a Markov chain M for which σ is a
stationary distribution satisfying (4.1)? We show that the answer to this question is
positive:
Theorem 4.4.9. For any CCE σ of a 2-player game G, there exists a policy-equilibrium
π which induces a Markov chain M with stationary distribution σ.
Proof sketch. To prove this, we show that for any CCE we can construct stable no-
external regret algorithm which converge to it, and so since stable no-external regret
algorithms always converge to policy equilibria (Theorem 4.2.1), this implies the CCE
is also a policy equilibrium.
However, we show the converse is not true: policy equilibria can give rise to
behavior which is not a CCE. Our proof appeals to a utility sequence which is similar
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in spirit to the one in Theorem 4.1.1, but is adapted to the game setting.
Theorem 4.4.10. There exists a 2-player game G and product distributions σ × σa ×
σb ∈ S (where S is defined in Definition 4.4.5 as the possible distributions of play
from policy equilibria), such that σ is not a CCE of G.
In the next section, Section 4.4.4, we give a simple example of a policy equilibrium
which is not a CCE.
4.4.4 Simple example of a policy equilibrium
We now present a simple 2-player game with strategies of the players which lead to
a policy equilibrium, which in fact is not a CCE. Further these strategies give the
asymptotically maximum utility for both row and column players over repeated play
of the game. The idea behind the construction is very similar to the one showing
incompatibility of policy regret and external regret. The utility matrix for the game is
Table 4-I: Utility matrix
Player 1\Player 2 c d
a (3/4,1) (0,1)
b (1,1) (0,1)
given in Table 4-I. Since the column player has the same payoff for all his actions they
will always have no policy and no external regret. The strategy the column player
chooses is to always play the function f : A1 → A2:
f(x) =
⎧⎨⎩c x = ad x = b.
In the view of the row player, this strategy corresponds to playing against an adversary
which plays the familiar utility functions:
ut(at−1, at) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 at−1 = a, at = b
3
4 at−1 = at = a
0 otherwise.
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We have already observed that on these utilities, the row player can have either no
policy regret or no external regret but not both. What is more the utility of no policy
regret play is higher than the utility of any of the no external regret strategies. This
already implies that the row player is better off playing according to the no policy
regret strategy which consists of always playing the fixed function g : A2 → A1 given
by g(x) = a. Below we present the policy equilibrium π ∈ ∆F , corresponding Markov
chain M ∈ R|A|×|A| and its stationary distribution σ ∈ ∆A satisfying the no policy
regret requirement.
π(f̃ , g̃) = δ(f,g),M =
(a, c) (a, d) (b, c) (b, d)⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
(a, c) 1 0 0 0
(a, d) 1 0 0 0
(b, c) 0 1 0 0
(b, d) 0 1 0 0
, σ(x, y) = δ(a,c).
Suppose the row player was playing any no policy regret strategy, for example one
coming from a no policy regret algorithm, as a response to the observed utilities ut(·, ·).
Since the only sublinear policy regret play for these utilities is to only deviate from
playing a a sublinear number of times we see that the empirical distribution of play
for the row player converges to the dirac distribution δa. Together with the strategy of
the column player, this implies the column player chooses the action d only a sublinear
number of times and thus their empirical distribution of play converges to δc. It now
follows that the empirical distribution of play converges to δa × δc = δ(a,c) ∈ ∆A.
We can similarly verify that the empirical Markov chain will converge to M and the
empirical functional distribution ˆ︁π converges to π. Theorem 4.4.2 guarantees that
because both players incur only sublinear regret π is a policy equilibrium. It should
also be intuitively clear why this is the case without the theorem – suppose that the
row player switches to playing the fixed action b. The resulting functional distribution,
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Markov chain and stationary distributions become:
πb(f̃ , g̃) = δ(f,ˆ︁g≡b),Mb =
(a, c) (a, d) (b, c) (b, d)⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
(a, c) 0 0 1 0
(a, d) 0 0 1 0
(b, c) 0 0 0 1
(b, d) 0 0 0 1
, σb(x, y) = δ(b,d).
The resulting utility for the row player is now 0, compared to the utility gained from
playing according to π, which is 3/4.
4.5 Detailed proofs from Section 4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.7. Consider ˆ︂M(a,b),(a′,b′) = ∑︁Tt=1 pt(a′,b′)pt(a,b)∑︁T
t=1 pt(a,b)
. The transition prob-
ability induced by ˆ︁π is exactly
P [(a′, b′)|(a, b)] =
∑︂
(f,g):(f(b),g(a))=(a′,b′)































t pt(a, b)pt(a′, b′)∑︁
t=1 pt(a, b)
,
where the last equality holds, because for fixed (f, g) with xi = (ai, bi) and yi =







is exactly the conditional
probability ˆ︁π((f, g)|(f(b), g(a)) = (a′, b′)). The result for ˆ︁πa and ˆ︁πb is shown similarly.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.8. Theorem 4.4.8 follows from the fact that convergence in the
Prokhorov metric implies weak convergence. First notice that by Prokhorov’s Theorem
P(A) is a compact metric space with the Prokhorov metric. Thus by Tychonoff’s
Theorem the product space P(A)3 is compact in the maximum metric. Suppose for
a contradiction that the sequence (ˆ︁σT × ˆ︁σTa × ˆ︁σTb )T does not converge to the set S.
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This implies that there exists some subsequence (ˆ︁σk × ˆ︁σka × ˆ︁σkb )k, converging to some
ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb ̸∈ S. If ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb ̸∈ S, then either E(a,b)∼σ [u1(a, b)] < E(a,b)∼σa [u1(a, b)]
or E(a,b)∼σ [u2(a, b)] < E(a,b)∼σb [u2(a, b)]. WLOG suppose the first inequality holds.
From our assumption, the continuity of u1 and the definition of the maximum metric
we have limk→∞ E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σk [u1(a, b)] = E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σ [u1(a, b)] and limk→∞ E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σka [u1(a, b)] =
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σa [u1(a, b)]. Notice that by the fact ˆ︁σka is the average empirical distribution
if player 1 changed its play to the fixed action a ∈ A1 and ˆ︁σk being the average
empirical distribution it holds that E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σk [u1(a, b)] −E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σka [u1(a, b)] ≥ −o(1) and
thus limk→∞
[︂




E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σk [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σka [u1(a, b)]]︂
= lim
k→∞
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σk [u1(a, b)] − lim
k→∞
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σka [u1(a, b)]
= E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σ [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σa [u1(a, b)] < 0,
which is a contradiction. Since A × A × A is separable then convergence in the
Prokhorov metric in P(A × A × A) is equivalent to weak convergence. Again we can
argue by contradiction – if we assume that (ˆ︁σT × ˆ︁σTa × ˆ︁σTb )T doesn’t converge to the
set S in the Prokhorov metric, then there exists some subsequence (ˆ︁σk × ˆ︁σka × ˆ︁σkb )k
which converges to some µ ∈ P(A3) such that µ ̸∈ S. First we argue that µ must
be a product measure i.e. µ = (ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb). Let (ˆ︁σj × ˆ︁σja × ˆ︁σjb)j be a convergence
subsequence of (ˆ︁σk × ˆ︁σka × ˆ︁σkb )k in P(A)3, with limit (ˆ︁σ× ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb), then each of ˆ︁σj , ˆ︁σja
and ˆ︁σjb converge weakly to ˆ︁σ, ˆ︁σa and ˆ︁σb respectively and thus (ˆ︁σj × ˆ︁σja× ˆ︁σjb)j converges
weakly to ˆ︁σ × ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb and thus it converges in the Prokhorov metric of P(A3). This
implies that (ˆ︁σk × ˆ︁σka × ˆ︁σkb )k also converges weakly to ˆ︁σ× ˆ︁σa × ˆ︁σb and so µ is a product
measure. Again since µ ̸∈ S, assume WLOG E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σ [u1(a, b)] < E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σa [u1(a, b)].
Define f : A3 → R, f(a, b, c, d, e, f) = u1(a, b) − u1(c, d). f is continuous and from the
no-policy regret of the pair ˆ︁σk, ˆ︁σka we have:
0 ≤ lim
k→∞
E(a,b,c,d,e,f)∼(ˆ︁σk×ˆ︁σka×ˆ︁σkb )k [f(a, b, c, d, e, f)] = E(a,b,c,d,e,f)∼µ [f(a, b, c, d, e, f)] < 0,
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which is again a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.2. We consider the sequence of empirical distributions ˆ︁πT de-
fined in 4.4.8, over the functional space F1 × F2 and show that this sequence must
converge to the set of all policy equilibria Π in the Prokhorov metric on P(F1 × F2).
First, notice that since the functions f : A2 → A1 are from finite sets of actions to
finite sets of actions, we can consider the set F1 as a subset of a finite dimensional
vector space, with the underlying field of real numbers and the metric induced by
the l1 norm. Similarly, we can also equip F2 with the l1 norm. Since both F1 and
F2 are closed sets with respect to this metric and they are clearly bounded, they
are compact. Thus the set F1 × F2 is a compact set with the underlying metric d
being the maximum metric. By Prokhorov’s Theorem we know that P(F1 × F2) is a
compact metric space with the Prokhorov metric. Suppose that the sequence (ˆ︁πT )T
does not converge to Π. This implies that there is some convergent subsequence (ˆ︁πt)t
with a limit π outside of Π. Let M be the Markov chain induced by π and let ˆ︂MT be
the Markov chain induced by ˆ︁πT .
First we show that limt→∞ ∥ˆ︂Mt−M∥1 = 0. Recall that M(a,b),(a′,b′) = ∑︁(f,g):f(b)=a′,g(a)=b′ π(f, g)
and that by lemma 4.4.7 ˆ︂Mt(a,b),(a′,b′) = ∑︁(f,g):f(b)=a′,g(a)=b′ ˆ︁πt(f, g). Notice that f, g
are continuous functions on F1 and F2, since the topology induced by the l1 met-
ric on both sets is exactly the the discrete topology and every function from a
topological space equipped with the discrete topology is continuous. Since con-
vergence in the Prokhorov metric implies weak convergence, we have that for any
fixed f, g, limt→∞ ˆ︁πt(f, g) = π(f, g). Since the sum ∑︁(f,g):f(b)=a′,g(a)=b′ ˆ︁πt(f, g) is finite
this implies that limt→∞
∑︁
(f,g):f(b)=a′,g(a)=b′ ˆ︁πt(f, g) = ∑︁(f,g):f(b)=a′,g(a)=b′ π(f, g) and so
limt→∞ ∥ˆ︂Mt − M∥1 = 0.
Next we show that any convergent subsequence (ˆ︁σk)k of (ˆ︁σt)t in the Prokhorov
metric, converges to a stationary distribution σ of M. First notice that (ˆ︁σk)k exists,
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since P(A) is compact. Next, suppose σ is the limit of (ˆ︁σk)k in the Prokhorov metric.
This implies that limk→∞ ˆ︁σk(a, b) = σ(a, b), in particular if we consider A ⊂ R|A| and
ˆ︁σk, σ ∈ R|A| as vectors, then the above implies that limk→∞ ∥σ − ˆ︁σk∥1 = 0. Next we
construct the following sequence (σkn)kn of stationary distributions of M – choose
kn large enough, so that ∥M − ˆ︂Mkn∥ ≤ 1n . Such a kn exists, because (ˆ︂Mk)k is a
subsequence of (ˆ︂Mt)t which converges to M. By lemma 4.4.4, there exists a stationary
distribution σkn of M such that ∥ˆ︁σkn − σkn∥1 ≤ cn , for some constant c. We show
that σkn converges to σ. Fix some ϵ > 0, we find an N , such that for any n ≥ N
we have ∥σkn − σ∥1 < ϵ. Notice that ∥σkn − σ∥1 ≤ ∥σkn − ˆ︁σkn∥1 + ∥ˆ︁σkn − σ∥1. Since
∥σkn − ˆ︁σkn∥1 ≤ cn and by convergence, we know that for ϵ2 , there exists N ′ such
that for any n ≥ N ′, ∥ˆ︁σkn − σ∥1 < ϵ2 , we can set N = max (︂ 2cϵ , N1)︂. Suppose, for a
contradiction, that σ is not a stationary distribution of M. Then there exists some ϵ
such that ∥σ⊤M − σ∥2 > ϵ. This implies:
ϵ < ∥σ⊤M − σ∥2 ≤ ∥σ⊤M − σ⊤knM∥2 + ∥σ
⊤
knM − σ∥2 < 2∥σkn − σ∥2,
where the last inequality holds by the fact σ − σkn is not a stationary distribution of
M and thus M can only shrink the difference as a stochastic matrix. The inequality
2∥σkn − σ∥2 > ϵ is a contradiction since we know that σkn converges to σ and thus σ
is a stationary distribution of M. Since strong convergence, implies weak convergence,
which in hand implies convergence in the Prokhorov metric for separable metric spaces,
we have shown that every convergent subsequence of (ˆ︁σt)t converges to a stationary
distribution of M in the Prokhorov metric.
Next, we show that (ˆ︁πta)t converges to πa. By assumption (ˆ︁πt)t converges weakly
to π. Since we are are in a finite dimensional space, we also have strong convergence.













and so the sequence of marginal distribution also converges to the respective marginal
of π. Since ˆ︁πta is exactly the product distribution of the dirac distribution over F1
putting all weight on the constant function mapping everything to the fixed action
a and the marginal of ˆ︁πt over F2, by the convergence of marginals we conclude that
(ˆ︁πta)t converges to πa in the strong sense and thus in the Prokhorov metric. In the
same way we can show that (ˆ︁πtb)t converges to πb.
With a similar argument as for (ˆ︁σt) we show that every convergent subsequence of
(ˆ︁σta)t converges to a stationary distribution of Ma and any convergent subsequence
of (ˆ︁σtb)t converges to a stationary distribution of Mb. Because of the construction in















ˆ︁πta(f, g) = limt→∞ ˆ︁σta(a, b).
Similarly ˆ︁σtb converges to ˆ︁σb. However, we assumed that π is not a policy equilibrium
and thus no stationary distributions of M, Ma and Mb can satisfy the policy equilibrium
inequalities. We now arrive at a contradiction since by Theorem 4.4.8 and the above,
we have that any limit point of (ˆ︁σt)t and the corresponding distributions for fixed
actions a and b are stationary distributions of M, Ma and Mb, respectively, which
satisfy the policy equilibrium inequalities.
4.5.1 Concentration of the estimated Markov chain











t=1 δt−1(xi)δt(xj)| < ϵ and | 1T
∑︁T
t=1 pt(xi) − 1T
∑︁T
t=1 δt(xi)| < ϵ, simultaneously for
all i.
Proof. We consider the random variable Zt = δt(xi)−pt(xi), notice that E[Zt|p1, · · · , pt−1] =
0 so that {Zt}t is a bounded martingale sequence with |Zt| < 1 and thus by Azuma’s
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t=1 pt(xi). Let Rt = δt−1(xi)δt(xj) − pt−1(xi)pt(xj) and con-
sider the filtration {Ft}t, where F1 = ∅, Ft = Σ(δ1, · · · , δt) is the sigma algebra gener-
ated by the random variables δ1 to δt. Then |R2t| ≤ 1 and E[R2t|F1, · · · ,F2t−2] = 0,














. A similar argument allows us to bound the sum of the R2t+1’s and a













. A union bound over all i
finishes the proof.
Definition 4.5.1. Define the perturbed distribution of player i at time t to be






Lemma 4.5.2. The difference of expected utilities from playing according to (p̃it)Tt=1
instead of (pit)Tt=1 is at most 2T
√︂
|A|ϵ̃
Proof. From lemma 4.5.4 at each time step the difference of expected utility is bounded
by
√︂
|A|ϵ̃ in absolute value.
Theorem 4.5.3. If at time t player i plays according to p̃it , where ϵ̃ = T
−1/4
|A| and
pt = p̃1t (p̃2t )⊤, then the regret for playing according to p̃it is at most O(T 7/8). Further
lim supT→∞∥M̃ − ˆ︂M∥2 = 0, almost surely. Additionally if σ̃ = 1T ∑︁Tt=1 δt is the




the stationary distribution of ˆ︂M corresponding to the averaged empirical distribution,
then lim supT→∞∥σ̃ − ˆ︁σ∥1 = 0 almost surely.
Proof. Set ϵ̃ = T−1/4|A| . The regret bound of the no-external regret algorithms now
becomes O(T 7/8). We can, however, now guarantee that ∑︁Tt=1 pt(xi) ≥ T−1/4|A| and
thus, combining this with the high probability bound we obtain that with probability








t=1 pt−1(xi)pt(xj), ˆ︁x = 1T ∑︁Tt=1 δt−1(xi)δt(xj), y = 1T ∑︁Tt=1 pt(xi), ˆ︁y = 1T ∑︁Tt=1 δt(xi).
167
Then




⃓ ≤ |x− ˆ︁x||y| + |ˆ︁x||1/y − 1/ˆ︁y| ≤ ϵϵ̃ + |ˆ︁x||y − ˆ︁y||yˆ︁y| ≤ 2ϵϵ̃ ,
where the last inequality holds because ˆ︁x ≤ ˆ︁y. Setting ϵ = T−1/3 and a union bound
we arrive at P
[︂
∥M̃ − ˆ︂M∥2 > T−1/12]︂ < C exp (︂−T 1/34 )︂. By Borel-Cantelli lemma we
have lim supT→∞∥M̃ − ˆ︂M∥2 = 0 almost surely. From lemma 4.5.1 and a union bound
we know that with P [∥σ̃ − ˆ︁σ∥1 > ϵ] < 2|A| exp (︂−Tϵ24 )︂. Setting ϵ = T−1/3 and again
using Borel-Cantelli’s lemma we see that lim supT→∞∥σ̃ − ˆ︁σ∥1 = 0.
4.5.2 Auxiliary results
Lemma 4.5.4. Let σ and σ′ be two distributions supported on a finite set and let f
be a utility/loss function uniformly bounded by 1. If ∥σ − σ′∥1 ≤ ϵ then |Ea∼σ [f(a)] −
Ea∼σ′ [f(a)] | ≤ ϵ.
Proof.










f(s)(σ(s) − σ′(s))| ≤
∑︂
s∈S
|σ(s) − σ′(s)| = ∥σ − σ′∥1 ≤ ϵ.
Lemma 4.5.5. Let M ∈ Rd×d and ˆ︂M ∈ Rd×d be two row-stochastic matrices, such that
∥M − ˆ︂M∥ ≤ ϵ, then for any stationary distribution ˆ︁σ of ˆ︂M, there exists a stationary
distribution σ of M, such that ∥ˆ︁σ − σ∥1 ≤ 4d2ϵδ .
Proof. Let U ∈ Rd×k be the left singular vectors corresponding to the singular value 1
of M and let ˆ︁U ∈ Rd×l be the left singular vectors corresponding to the singular value
1 of ˆ︂M. First notice that
∥MM⊤ − ˆ︂Mˆ︂M⊤∥ ≤ ∥MM⊤ − Mˆ︂M⊤∥ + ∥Mˆ︂M⊤ − ˆ︂Mˆ︂M⊤∥ ≤ (∥M∥ + ∥ˆ︂M∥)∥M − ˆ︂M∥ ≤ 2ϵ
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Denote the eigen-gap of M by δ, then by Wedin’s theorem (see for example lemma
B.3 in Allen-Zhu and Li (2016)) we have





WLOG assume ˆ︁σ = (ˆ︁U)i
∥(ˆ︁U)i∥1 . This implies that ∥ˆ︁σ⊤U⊥∥2 ≤ 2dϵδ and thus:
∥UU⊤ˆ︁σ − ˆ︁σ∥2 = ∥(I − UU⊤)ˆ︁σ∥2 = ∥U⊥(U⊥)⊤ˆ︁σ∥2 ≤ ∥ˆ︁σ⊤U⊥∥2 ≤ 2dϵ
δ
.
Let σi = Ui∥Ui∥1 be the stationary distribution of M, corresponding to the i-th left
singular vector and let αi = (U⊤ˆ︁σ)i∥Ui∥1 ≥ 0. Then we have ∥∑︁i αiσi − ˆ︁σ∥1 ≤ 2d2ϵδ ,
where the inequality follows from the derivation above and the inequality between l1


















∥∑︁i αiσi∥1 = σ.
















∥σ − ˆ︁σ∥1 ≤ ∥∑︂
i
αiσi − ˆ︁σ∥1 + ∥σ −∑︂
i
αiσi − ˆ︁σ∥1 ≤ 2d2ϵ
δ











the empirical distribution of play if player 1 deviated to playing fixed action a ∈ A1
be σ̃Ta and the empirical distribution of play if player 2 to action b ∈ A2 be σ̃Tb . The
sequence (σ̃T , σ̃Ta , σ̃Tb )T converges to the set P almost surely.
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Proof. Lemma 4.5.4, together with Theorem 4.5.3 imply that
lim sup
T→∞












|E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] | ≥
lim inf
T→∞






|E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] | = 0]︃ = 1.





|E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] | = 0⋂︂
lim sup
T→∞








|E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] | = 0]︃ = 1.
In a similar way we can get limT→∞ |E(a,b)∼σ̃Ta [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] | = 0 a.s.
The above imply that limT→∞ E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] = 0 a.s. and
limT→∞ E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼σ̃Ta [u1(a, b)] = 0 a.s. and thus:
0 = lim
T→∞
E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] + lim
T→∞
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼σ̃Ta [u1(a, b)]
= lim
T→∞
E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼σ̃Ta [u1(a, b)] + limT→∞E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)]
a.s.. Since E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)] < o(1), this implies that
0 ≤ − lim
T→∞
E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σTa [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼ˆ︁σT [u1(a, b)]
= lim
T→∞
E(a,b)∼σ̃T [u1(a, b)] − E(a,b)∼σ̃Ta [u1(a, b)]
a.s.. Now we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4.4.8.
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Chapter 5
Limits of learning in Tabular
Reinforcement Learning
We provide improved gap-dependent regret bounds for reinforcement learning in finite
episodic Markov decision processes. Compared to prior work, our bounds depend
on alternative definitions of gaps. These definitions are based on the insight that,
in order to achieve a favorable regret, an algorithm does not need to learn how to
behave optimally in states that are not reached by an optimal policy. We prove
tighter upper regret bounds for optimistic algorithms and accompany them with new
information-theoretic lower bounds for a large class of MDPs. Our results show that
optimistic algorithms can not achieve the information-theoretic lower bounds even in
deterministic MDPs unless there is a unique optimal policy. The main contributions of
this chapter are based on work carried out during my internship at Google Research,
New York. This work was done in collaboration with Dr. Christoph Dann, Dr. Mehryar
Mohri, and Dr. Julian Zimmert.
5.1 Instance dependent bounds in prior work and
limitations
While the performance of RL algorithms in tabular Markov decision processes has
been the subject of many studies in the past (e.g. Fiechter, 1994; Kakade, 2003;
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Osband et al., 2013; Dann et al., 2017; Azar et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2018; Zanette
and Brunskill, 2019; Dann, 2019), the vast majority of existing analyses focuses on
worst-case problem-independent regret bounds, which only take into account the size
of the MDP, the horizon H and the number of episodes K.
Recently, however, some significant progress has been achieved towards deriving
more optimistic problem-dependent guarantees. This includes more refined regret
bounds for the tabular episodic setting that depend on structural properties of the
specific MDP considered (Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019; Lykouris et al., 2019; Jin
and Luo, 2020; Foster et al., 2020b; He et al., 2020). Motivated by instance-dependent
analyses in multi-armed bandits (Lai and Robbins, 1985), these analyses derive gap-






, where the sum is over
state-actions pairs (s, a) and where the gap notion is defined as the difference of the
optimal value function V ∗ of the Bellman optimal policy π∗ and the Q-function of
π∗ at a sub-optimal action: gap(s, a) = V ∗(s) − Q∗(s, a). We will refer to this gap
definition as value-function gap in the following. We note that a similar notion of
gap has been used in the infinite horizon setting to achieve instance-dependent bounds
(Auer and Ortner, 2007; Tewari and Bartlett, 2008; Auer et al., 2009; Filippi et al.,
2010; Ok et al., 2018), however, a strong assumption about irreducability of the MDP
is required. We discuss such bounds in Section 5.3.
While regret bounds based on these value function gaps generalize the bounds
available in the multi-armed bandit setting, we argue that they have a major limitation.
The bound at each state-action pair depends only on the gap at the pair and treats
all state-action pairs equally, ignoring their topological ordering in the MDP. This can
have a major impact on the derived bound. In this paper, we address this issue and
formalize the following key observation about the difficulty of RL in an episodic MDP
through improved instance-dependent regret bounds:
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gap(s1, a2) = c











Figure 5-1: Comparison of our contributions in MDPs with deterministic transitions.
Bounds only include the main terms and all sums over (s, a) are understood to only
include terms where the respective gap is nonzero. gap is a our alternative return
gap definition introduced later (Definition 5.4.1).
Learning a policy with optimal return does not require an RL
agent to distinguish between actions with similar outcomes (small
value-function gap) in states that can only be reached by taking
highly suboptimal actions (large value-function gap).
To illustrate this insight, consider autonomous driving, where each episode corre-
sponds to driving from a start to a destination. If the RL agent decides to run a red
light on a crowded intersection, then a car crash is inevitable. Even though the agent
could slightly affect the severity of the car crash by steering, this effect is small and,
hence, a good RL agent does not need to learn how to best steer after running a red
light. Instead, it would only need a few samples to learn to obey the traffic light in the
first place as the action of disregarding a red light has a very large value-function gap.
To understand how this observation translates into regret bounds, consider the
toy example in Figure 5-1. This MDP has deterministic transitions and only terminal
rewards with c ≫ ϵ > 0. There are two decision points, s1 and s2, with two actions
each, and all other states have a single action. There are three policies which govern
the regret bounds: π∗ (red path) which takes action a1 in state s1; π1 which takes
action a2 at s1 and a3 at s2 (blue path); and π2 which takes action a2 at s1 and a4 at
s2 (green path). Since π∗ follows the red path, it never reaches s2 and achieves optimal
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return c + ϵ, while π1 and π2 are both suboptimal with return ϵ and 0 respectively.
Existing value-function gaps evaluate to gap(s1, a2) = c and gap(s2, a4) = ϵ which
yields a regret bound of order H log (K) (1/c+ 1/ϵ). The idea behind these bounds is
to capture the necessary number of episodes to distinguish the value of the optimal
policy π∗ from the value of any other sub-optimal policy on all states. However,
since π∗ will never reach s2 it is not necessary to distinguish it from any other policy
at s2. A good algorithm only needs to determine that a2 is sub-optimal in s1, which
eliminates both π1 and π2 as optimal policies after only log (K) /c2 episodes. This
suggests a regret of order O(log (K) /c). The bounds presented in this paper achieve
this rate up to factors of H by replacing the gaps at every state-action pair with the
average of all gaps along certain paths containing the state action pair. We call these
averaged gaps return gaps. The return gap at (s, a) is denoted as gap(s, a). Our new
bounds replace gap(s2, a4) = ϵ by gap(s2, a4) ≈ 12 gap(s1, a2) +
1
2 gap(s2, a4) = Ω(c).
Notice that ϵ and c can be selected arbitrarily in this example. In particular, if we
take c = 0.5 and ϵ = 1/
√
K our bounds remain logarithmic O(log (K)), while prior
regret bounds scale as
√
K.
This work is motivated by the insight just discussed. First, we show that improved
regret bounds are indeed possible by proving a tighter regret bound for StrongEuler,
an existing algorithm based on the optimism-in-the-face-of-uncertainty (OFU) principle
(Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019). Our regret bound is stated in terms of our new
return gaps that capture the problem difficulty more accurately and avoid explicit
dependencies on the smallest value function gap gapmin. Our technique applies to
optimistic algorithms in general and as a by-product improves the dependency on
episode length H of prior results. Second, we investigate the difficulty of RL in episodic
MDPs from an information-theoretic perspective by deriving regret lower-bounds.
We show that existing value-function gaps are indeed sufficient to capture difficulty
of problems but only when each state is visited by an optimal policy with some
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probability. Finally, we prove a new lower bound when the transitions of the MDP
are deterministic that depends only on the difference in return of the optimal policy
and suboptimal policies, which is closely related to our notion of return gap.
5.2 Problem setting and notation
We now recall some of the notation and the RL setting introduced in Section 1.5.
We consider reinforcement learning in episodic tabular MDPs with a fixed horizon.
An MDP can be described as a tuple (S,A, P, R,H), where S and A are state- and
action-space of size S and A respectively, P is the state transition distribution with
P (·|s, a) ∈ ∆S−1 the next state probability distribution, given that action a was
taken in the current state s. R is the reward distribution defined over S × A and
r(s, a) = E[R(s, a)] ∈ [0, 1]. Episodes admit a fixed length or horizon H.
We consider layered MDPs: each state s ∈ S belongs to a layer κ(s) ∈ [H]
and the only non-zero transitions are between states s, s′ in consecutive layers, with
κ(s′) = κ(s) + 1. This common assumption (see e.g. Krishnamurthy et al., 2016)
corresponds to MDPs with time-dependent transitions, as in (Jin et al., 2018; Dann
et al., 2017), but allows us to omit an explicit time-index in value-functions and
policies. For ease of presentation, we assume there is a unique start state s1 with
κ(s1) = 1 but our results can be generalized to multiple (possibly adversarial) start
states. Similarly, for convenience, we assume that all states are reachable by some
policy with non-zero probability, but not necessarily all policies or the same policy.
We denote by K the number of episodes during which the MDP is visited. Before
each episode k ∈ [K], the agent selects a deterministic policy πk : S → A out of a
set of all policies Π and πk is then executed for all H time steps in episode k. For
each policy π, we denote by wπ(s, a) = P(Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a | Ah = π(Sh) ∀h ∈ [H])
and wπ(s) = ∑︁awπ(s, a) probability of reaching state-action pair (s, a) and state s
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respectively when executing π. For convenience, supp(π) = {s ∈ S : wπ(s) > 0} is the
set of states visited by π with non-zero probability. The Q- and value function of a
policy π are





⃓⃓ Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a
⎤⎦, and V π(s) = Qπ(s, π(s))




v∗ − vπk =
K∑︂
k=1
V ∗(s1) − V πk(s1), (5.1)
where vπ = V π(s1) is the expected total sum of rewards or return of π and V ∗ is the
optimal value function V ∗(s) = maxπ∈Π V π(s). Finally, the set of optimal policies is
denoted as Π∗ = {π ∈ Π : V π = V ∗}. Note that we only call a policy optimal if it
satisfies the Bellman equation in every state, as is common in literature, but there may
be policies outside of Π∗ that also achieve maximum return because they only take
suboptimal actions outside of their support. The variance of the Q function at a state-
action pair (s, a) of the optimal policy is V∗(s, a) = V[R(s, a)] + Vs′∼P (·|s,a)[V ∗(s′)],
where V[X] denotes the variance of the r.v. X. The maximum variance over all
state-action pairs is V∗ = max(s,a) V∗(s, a). Finally, our proofs will make use of the
following clipping operator clip[a|b] = χ(a ≥ b)a that sets a to zero if it is smaller
than b.
5.3 Related work
Instance dependent regret lower bounds for the MAB were first introduced in Lai and
Robbins (1985). Later Graves and Lai (1997) extend such instance dependent lower
bounds to the setting of controlled Markov chains, while assuming infinite horizon
and certain properties of the stationary distribution of each policy. Building on their
work, more recently Combes et al. (2017) establish instance dependent lower bounds
for the Structured Stochastic Bandit problem. Very recently, in the stochastic MAB,
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Garivier et al. (2019) generalize and simplify the techniques of Lai and Robbins (1985)
to completely characterize the behavior of uniformly good algorithms. The work of Ok
et al. (2018) builds on these ideas to provide an instance dependent lower bound for
infinite horizon MDPs, again under assumptions of how the stationary distributions
of each policy will behave and irreducibility of the Markov chain. The idea behind
deriving the above bounds is to use the uniform goodness of the studied algorithm to
argue that the algorithm must select a certain policy or action at least a fixed number
of times. This number is governed by a change of environment under which said
policy/action is now the best overall. The reasoning now is that unless the algorithm
is able to distinguish between these two environments it will have to incur linear regret
asymptotically. Since the algorithm is uniformly good this can not happen.
For infinite horizon MDPs with additional assumptions the works of Auer and Ort-
ner (2007); Tewari and Bartlett (2008); Auer et al. (2009); Filippi et al. (2010); Ok et al.
(2018) establish logarithmic in horizon regret bounds of the formO(D2S2A log (()T )/δ),
where δ is a gap-like quantity and D is a diameter measure. We now discuss the works
of (Tewari and Bartlett, 2008; Ok et al., 2018), which should give more intuition about
how the infinite horizon setting differs from our setting. Both works consider the
non-episodic problem and therefore make some assumptions about the MDP M. The
main assumption, which allows for computationally tractable algorithms is that of
irreducibility. Formally both works require that under any policy the induced Markov
chain is irreducible. Intuitively, the notion of irreducibility allows for coming up with
exploration strategies, which are close to min-max optimal and are easy to compute.
In (Ok et al., 2018) this is done by considering the same semi-infinite LP 5.27 as in
our work. Unlike our work, however, assuming that the Markov chain induced by the
optimal policy π∗ is irreducible allows for a nice characterization of the set Λ(θ) of
"confusing" environments. In particular the authors manage to show that at every
state s it is enough to consider the change of environment which makes the reward
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of any action a : (s, a) ̸∈ π∗ equal to the reward of a′ : (s, a′) ∈ π∗. Because of the
irreducability assumption we know that the support of P (·|s, a) is the same as the
support of P (·|s, a′) and this implies that the above change of environment makes
the policy π which plays (s, a) and then coincides with π∗ optimal. Some more work
shows that considering only such changes of environment is sufficient for an equivalent
formulation to the LP5.27. Since this is an LP with at most S × A constraints it is
solvable in polynomial time and hence a version of the algorithm in (Combes et al.,
2017) results in asymptotic min-max rates for the problem. The exploration in (Tewari
and Bartlett, 2008) is also based on a similar LP, however, slightly more sophisticated.
Very recently there has been a renewed interest in proposing instance dependent
regret bounds for finite horizon tabular MDPs (Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019; Lyk-
ouris et al., 2019; Jin and Luo, 2020). The works of (Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019;
Lykouris et al., 2019) are based on the OFU principle and the proposed regret bounds
scale as O(∑︁(s,a) ̸∈π∗ H log (()T )/ gap(s, a) + SH log (()T )/ gapmin), disregarding vari-
ance terms and terms depending only poli-logarithmically on the gaps. The setting in
(Lykouris et al., 2019) also considers adversarial corruptions to the MDP, unknown to
the algorithm, and their bound scales with the amount of corruption. Jin and Luo
(2020) derive similar upper bounds, however, the authors assume a known transition
kernel and take the approach of modelling the problem as an instance of Online Linear
Optimization, through using occupancy measures (Zimin and Neu, 2013). For the
problem of Q-learning, Yang et al. (2020); Du et al. (2020), also propose algorithms
with regret scaling as O(SAH6 log (()T )/ gapmin). All of these bounds scale at least
as Ω(SH log (()T )/ gapmin). Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) show an MDP instance
on which no optimistic algorithm can hope to do better.
5.4 Novel upper bounds for optimistic algorithms
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5.4.1 Optimistic algorithms and StrongEuler
We begin this section by describing one approach to solving the RL problem in the
above setting which is through optimistic algorithms. Optimistic algorithms maintain
estimators of the Q-functions at every state-action pair such that there exists at least
one policy π for which the estimator, Q̄π, overestimates the Q-function of the optimal
policy, that is Q̄π(s, a) ≥ Q∗(s, a),∀(s, a) ∈ S × A. During episode k ∈ [K], the
optimistic algorithm selects the policy πk with highest optimistic value function V̄ k.
By definition, it holds that V̄ k(s) ≥ V ∗(s). The optimistic value and Q-functions
are constructed through finite-sample estimators of the true rewards r(s, a) and the
transition kernel P(·|s, a) plus bias terms, similar to estimators for the UCB MAB
algorithm. Careful construction of these bias terms is crucial for deriving min-max
optimal regret bounds in S,A and H (Azar et al., 2017). Bias terms which yield
the tightest known bounds come from concentration of martingales results such as
Freedman’s inequality (Freedman, 1975) and empirical Bernstein’s inequality for
martingales (Maurer and Pontil, 2009).
StrongEuler is the optimistic algorithm proposed by Simchowitz and Jamieson
(2019). The algorithm satisfies a stronger notion of optimism called strong optimism.
To define strong optimism we need the notion of surplus which roughly measures the
optimism at a fixed state-action pair. Formally the surplus at (s, a) during episode k
is defined as
Ek(s, a) = Q̄k(s, a) − r(s, a) − ⟨P (·|s, a), V̄ k⟩ . (5.2)
We say that an algorithm is strongly optimistic if Ek(s, a) ≥ 0,∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A, k ∈ [K].
Surpluses are also central to our new regret bounds and we will carefully discuss their
use in Section 5.4.3.
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5.4.2 Prior optimistic regret bounds and opportunities for
improvement
As hinted to in the introduction, the way prior regret bounds treat value-function
gaps independently at each state-action pair can lead to excessively loose guarantees.
Bounds that use value-function gaps (Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019; Lykouris et al.,










where state-action pairs with zero gap appear, with gapmin = mins,a : gap(s,a)>0 gap(s, a),
the smallest positive gap. To illustrate where these bounds are loose, let us revisit the







where the first two terms come from state-action pairs with positive value-function
gaps and the last term comes from all the state-action pairs with zero gaps. There
are several opportunities for improvement:
O.1 State-action pairs that can only be visited by taking optimal actions:
We should not pay the 1/ gapmin factor for such (s, a) as there are no other
suboptimal policies π to distinguish from π∗ in such states.
O.2 State-action pairs that can only be visited by taking at least one
suboptimal action: We should not pay the 1/ gap(s2, a3) factor for state-
action pair (s2, a3) and the 1/ gapmin factor for (s2, a4) because no optimal policy
visits s2. Such state-action pairs should only be accounted for with the price to
learn that a2 is not optimal in state s1. After all, learning to distinguish between
π1 and π2 is unnecessary for optimal return.
Both opportunities suggest that the price 1gap(s,a) or
1
gapmin
that each state-action pair
(s, a) contributes to the regret bound can be reduced by taking into account the regret
incurred by the time (s, a) is reached. Opportunity O.1 postulates that if no regret can
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be incurred up to (and including) the time step (s, a) is reached, then this state-action
pair should not appear in the regret bound. Similarly, if this regret is necessarily large,
then the agent can learn this with few observations and stop reaching (s, a) earlier than
gap(s, a) may suggest. To illustrate Opportunity O.2 better we consider an additional
example. Our example can be found in Figure 5-2. The MDP is an extension of the
Figure 5-2: Example for Opportunity O.2
one presented in Figure 5-1 with the new addition of actions a5 and a6 in state s3
and the new state following action a6. Again there is only a single action available at
all other states than s1, s2, s3. The reward of the state following action a6 is set as
r = c + ϵ/2. This defines a new sub-optimal policy π3 and the gap gap(s3, a6) = ϵ2 .
Information theoretically it is impossible to distinguish π3 as sub-optimal in less than
Ω(log (K) /ϵ2) rounds and so any uniformly good algorithm would have to pay at
least O(log (K) /ϵ) regret. However, what we observed previously still holds true,
i.e., we should not have to play more than log (K) /c2 rounds to eliminate both π1
and π2 as sub-optimal policies. Prior work now suffers Opportunity O.2 as it would
pay log (K) /ϵ regret for all zero gap state-action pairs belonging to either π1 or π2,
essentially evaluating to SA log (K) /ϵ. On the other hand our bounds will only pay
log (K) /ϵ regret for zero gap state-action pairs belonging to π3.
Since the total regret incurred during one episode by a policy π is simply the
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expected sum of value-function gaps visited (Lemma 5.5.1 in Section 5.5),







we can measure the regret incurred up to reaching (St, At) by the sum of value function
gaps ∑︁th=1 gap(Sh, Ah) up to this point t. We are interested in the regret incurred
up to visiting a certain state-action pair (s, a) which π may visit only with some
probability. We therefore need to take the expectation of such gaps conditioned on
the event that (s, a) is actually visited. We further condition on the event that this
regret is nonzero, which is exactly the case when the agent encounters a positive






⃓ Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a,B ≤ κ(s)
⎤⎦ ,
where B = min{h ∈ [H + 1] : gap(Sh, Ah) > 0} is the first time a non-zero gap
is visited. This quantity measures the regret incurred up to visiting (s, a) through
suboptimal actions. If this quantity is large for all policies π, then a learner will stop
visiting this state-action pair after few observations because it can rule out all actions
that lead to (s, a) quickly. Conversely, if the event that we condition on has zero
probability under any policy, then (s, a) can only be reached through optimal action
choices (including a in s) and incurs no regret. This motivates our new definition of
gaps that combines value function gaps with the regret incurred up to visiting the
state-action pair:
Definition 5.4.1 (Return gap). For any state-action pair (s, a) ∈ S × A define
B(s, a) ≡ {B ≤ κ(s), Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a}, where B is the first time a non-zero gap is
encountered. B(s, a) denotes the event that state-action pair (s, a) is visited and that
a suboptimal action was played at any time up to visiting (s, a). We define the return
gap as













if there is a policy π ∈ Π with Pπ(B(s, a)) > 0 and gap(s, a) ≡ 0 otherwise.
The additional 1/H factor in the second term is a required normalization suggesting
that it is the average gap rather than their sum that matters. Equipped with
this definition, we are ready to state our main upper bound which pertains to the
StrongEuler algorithm proposed by Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019).
Theorem 5.4.1 (Main Result (Informal)). The regret R(K) of StrongEuler is






gap(s, a) log (K) .
In the above, we have restricted the bound to only those terms that have inverse
polynomial dependence on the gaps.
Comparison with existing gap-dependent bounds. We now compare our
bound to the existing gap-dependent bound for StrongEuler by Simchowitz and












log (K) . (5.4)
We here focus only on terms that admit a dependency on K and an inverse-polynomial
dependency on gaps as all other terms are comparable. Most notable is the absence
of the second term of Equation 5.4 in our bound in Theorem 5.4.1. Thus, while
state-action pairs with gap(s, a) = 0 do not contribute to our regret bound, they
appear with a 1/ gapmin factor in existing bounds. Therefore, our bound addresses
Opportunity O.1 because it does not pay for state-action pairs that can only be
visited through optimal actions. Further, state-action pairs that do contribute to our





and thus never contribute more than in the
existing bound in Equation 5.4. Therefore, our regret bound is never worse. In fact, it
is significantly tighter when there are states that are only reachable by taking severely
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suboptimal actions, i.e., when the average value-function gaps are much larger than
gap(s, a) or gapmin. By our definition of return gaps, we only pay the inverse of these
larger gaps instead of gapmin. Thus, our bound also addresses O.2 and achieves the
desired log (K) /c regret bound in the motivating example of Figure 5-1 as opposed
to the log (K) /ϵ bound of prior work.
Regret bound when transitions are deterministic. We now interpret Defini-
tion 5.4.1 for MDPs with deterministic transitions and derive an alternative form of
our bound in this case. Let Πs,a be the set of all policies that visit (s, a) and have
taken a suboptimal action up to that visit, that is,
Πs,a ≡
{︂
π ∈ Π : sπκ(s) = s, aπκ(s) = a,∃ h ≤ κ(s), gap(sπh, aπh) > 0
}︂
.
where (sπ1 , aπ1 , sπ2 , . . . , sπH , aπH) are the state-action pairs visited (deterministically) by
π. Further, let v∗s,a = maxπ∈Πs,a vπ be the best return of such policies. Definition 5.4.1
now evaluates to gap(s, a) = gap(s, a) ∨ 1
H
(v∗ − v∗s,a) and the bound in Theorem 5.4.1
can be written as
R(K) ⪅
∑︂




We show in Section 5.4.6, that it is possible to further improve this bound when the
optimal policy is unique by only summing over state-action pairs which are not visited
by the optimal policy.
5.4.3 Regret analysis with improved clipping: from minimum
gap to average gap
In this section, we present the main technical innovations of our tighter regret analysis.
Our framework applies to optimistic algorithms that maintain a Q-function estimate,
Q̄k(s, a), which overestimates the optimal Q-function Q∗(s, a) with high probability
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in all states s, actions a and episodes k. We first give an overview of gap-dependent
analyses and then describe our approach.
Overview of gap-dependent analyses. As already alluded to in Sec-
tion 5.4.1 the central quantity in regret analyses of optimistic algorithms are the
surpluses Ek(s, a). Worst-case regret analyses bound the regret in episode k as∑︁
(s,a)∈S×A wπk(s, a)Ek(s, a), the expected surpluses under the optimistic policy πk
executed in that episode. Instead, gap-dependent analyses rely on a tighter version
and bound the instantaneous regret by the clipped surpluses (e.g. Proposition 3.1
Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019)







⃓ 14H gap(s, a) ∨ gapmin2H
]︄
. (5.6)











visits to (s, a), the surplus falls below the threshold
and does not contribute any more to the regret. Since each visit incurs at most
gap(s,a)∨gapmin
H
regret, this leads to a Hgap(s,a)∨gapmin dependency on gaps for each state-
action pair.
Sharper clipping with general thresholds. Our main technical contribution
for achieving a regret bound in terms of return gaps gap(s, a) is the following improved
surplus clipping bound:
Proposition 5.4.2 (Improved surplus clipping bound). Let the surpluses Ek(s, a) be
generated by an optimistic algorithm. Then the instantaneous regret of πk is bounded
as follows:







⃓ 14 gap(s, a) ∨ ϵk(s, a)
]︄
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Compared to previous surplus clipping bounds in Equation 5.6, there are several
notable differences. First, instead of gapmin /2H, we can now pair gap(s, a) with more
general clipping thresholds ϵk(s, a), as long as their expected sum over time steps
after the first non-zero gap was encountered is at most half the expected sum of gaps.
We will provide some intuition for this condition below. Note that ϵk(s, a) ≡ gapmin2H
satisfies the condition because the LHS evaluates to gapmin2H Pπk(B ≤ H) and there
must be at least one positive gap in the sum ∑︁Hh=1 gap(Sh, Ah) on the RHS in event
{B ≤ H}. Thus our bound recovers existing results. In addition, the first term in our
clipping thresholds is 14 gap(s, a) instead of
1
4H gap(s, a). Simchowitz and Jamieson
(2019) are able to remove this spurious H factor only if the problem instance happens
to be a bandit instance and the algorithm satisfies strong optimism where surpluses
have to be non-negative. Our analysis does not require such conditions and therefore
generalizes these existing results.1
Intuition for threshold condition in Proposition 5.4.2. The key to proving
Proposition 5.4.2 is the following self-bounding trick for the instantaneous regret
V ∗(s1) − V πk(s1). The self-bounding trick works in the following way. If we have a
ρ > 0 which is upper bounded by γ ≥ ρ and lower bounded by 0 < β ≤ ρ, we can
further bound (1 − c)ρ ≤ γ − cβ for any constant c ∈ [0, 1]. We can now use this trick
twice with ρ = V ∗(s1) − V πk(s1), γ = Eπk [
∑︁H
h=1 Ek(Sh, Ah)], c = 1/4 and β equal to
either the expected sum of gaps or the assumed lower bound with clipping functions,
that is β = Eπk [
∑︁H
h=1 gap(Sh, Ah)] or β = Eπk [
∑︁H
h=1 ϵk(Sh, Ah)]. This implies that one
half of the instantaneous regret is bounded as
1
2(V










Using the fact that the clip operator satisfies a − b ≤ clip[a|b] gives the desired
statement. This implies that, in order to achieve the tightest regret bound, we should
1Our layered state space assumption affects the H dependencies in lower-order terms in our final
regret compared to Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019). However, Proposition 5.4.2 directly applies to
their setting without any penalty in H.
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clip Ek(Sh, Ah) to the largest possible value. Thus, the goal is to lower bound the
expected sum of gaps as tightly as possible by the clipping function. Besides this
insight, introducing the stopping time B in the condition is key to addressing O.1
and requires a careful treatment laid out in the full proof in Section 5.5.
Choice of clipping thresholds for return gaps. The condition in Propo-
sition 5.4.2 suggests that one can set ϵk(Sh, Ah) to be proportional to the average












if Pπk(B(s, a)) > 0 and ϵk(s, a) = ∞ otherwise. Lemma 5.5.5 in Section 5.5 shows
that this choice indeed satisfies the condition in Proposition 5.4.2. If we now take the
minimum over all policies for πk, then we can proceed with the standard analysis and
derive our main result in Theorem 5.4.1. However, by avoiding the minimum over
policies, we can derive a stronger regret bound that depends on the actual policies
executed by the algorithm. We present this bound in the next section.
5.4.4 Policy-dependent regret bound
We will now show how our results from the previous sections translate into a stronger
regret bound on the concrete example of StrongEuler. Ignoring lower-order terms,
Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) showed that the surpluses of this algorithm are




where n̄k(s, a) =
∑︁k−1
j=1 w
πj(s, a) are the
expected number of samples for (s, a) up to episode k and V∗(s, a) = V[R(s, a)] +
Vs′∼P (·|s,a)[V ∗(s′)] is the one-step variance term w.r.t. the optimal value function. In








⌜⃓⃓⎷V∗(s, a) log (n̄k(s, a))
n̄k(s, a)
⃓⃓⃓⃓




An existing analysis now translates such a clipping bound into a log (K) regret bound
using an integration argument (e.g. Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019). However, we
cannot rely on these arguments since our clipping thresholds may not be constant
across episodes. To address this technical challenge, we derive the following lemma
based on an optimization view on such terms
Lemma 5.4.3. For any sequence of thresholds γ1, . . . γK > 0, consider the problem


























(K − t) log (K).
Applying this lemma for each (s, a) with xk = wπk(s, a) and appropriate clipping
thresholds γk ≈ (gap(s, a) ∨ ϵk(s, a))/
√︂
V∗(s, a) we can derive our main result:
Theorem 5.4.4. When StrongEuler is run with confidence parameter δ, then with

















gap(s, a) ∨ ϵt(s, a)
+
√︂













where M ≤ (SAH)3, gapmin = min(s,a) gap(s, a) and K(s,a) is the last episode during
which a policy that may visit (s, a) was played.
A slightly more refined version of this bound is stated Theorem 5.5.11 in Section 5.5.
Note that our regret bound depends through ϵt(s, a), the average gap encountered by
πt, on the policies that the algorithm played. We can smoothly interpolate between
the worst-case rate of
√
K achieved for t ≪ K when all gaps and average gaps are
O(
√︂
V∗(s, a)K) and the gap-dependent regret rate achieved when t ≈ K that scales
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inversely with gaps. Our bound depends on the gaps in all episodes and can benefit
from choices for t that yields a large gap or average gap in late episodes.
Comparing with the bound in Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019). We now
proceed to compare our bound directly to the one stated in Corollary B.1 (Simchowitz
and Jamieson, 2019). We will ignore the factors with only poly-logarithmic dependence
on gaps as they are are common between both bounds. We now recall the regret










where V∗ = max(s,a) V(s, a), Zopt is the set on which gap(s, π∗(s)) = 0, i.e., the set of
state-action pairs assigned to π∗ according to the Bellman optimality condition, and
Zsub is the complement of Zopt, and
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where Sopt is the set of all states for s ∈ S for which gap(s, π∗(s)) = 0 and there exists
at least one state s′ with κ(s′) < s for which gap(s′, π∗(s)) > 0. We note that this set
is no larger than the set Zopt and further that even the smallest ϵk(s, a) can still be
much larger than gapmin, as it is the conditional average of the gaps. In particular, this
leads to an arbitrary improvement in our example in Figure 5-1 and an improvement
of SA in the example in Figure 5-2.
5.4.5 Nearly tight bounds for deterministic transition MDPs
We recall that for deterministic MDPs, ϵk(s, a) = V
∗(s1)−V πk (s1)
2H ,∀a and the definition
of the set Πs,a:
Πs,a ≡ {π ∈ Π : sπκ(s) = s, aπκ(s) = a,∃ h ≤ κ(s), gap(sπh, aπh) > 0}.
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We note that V(s, a) ≤ 1 as this is just the variance of the reward at (s, a). Theo-
rem 5.5.11 immediately yields the following regret bound by taking t = K.
Corollary 5.4.5 (Explicit bound from Equation 5.5). Suppose the transition kernel
of the MDP consists only of point-masses. Then with probability 1 − δ, StrongEuler’s































where v∗s,a = maxπ∈Πs,a vπ.
We now compare the above bound with the one in (Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019)
again. For simplicity we are going to take K to be the smaller of the two quantities






. Recall that α ∈ [0, 1] is defined as the smallest value
such that for all (s, a, s′) ∈ S × A × S it holds that
P (s′|s, a) − P (s′|s, π∗(s)) ≤ αP (s′|s, a).
For any deterministic transition MDP with more than one layer and one sub-optimal
action it holds that α = 1. We will compare V ∗(s1) − V π
∗
(s,a)(s1) to gap(s, a) =
Q∗(s, π∗(s)) −Q∗(s, a). This comparison is easy as by Lemma 5.5.1 we can write









gap(s′, a′) ≥ gap(s, a).
Hence, our bound in the worst case matches the one in Simchowitz and Jamieson
(2019) and can actually be significantly better. We would further like to remark that
we have essentially solved all of the issues presented in the example MDP in Figure 5-1.
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In particular we do not pay any gap-dependent factors for states which are only visited
by π∗, we do not pay a gapmin factor for any state and we never pay any factors for
distinguishing between two suboptimal policies. Finally, we compare this bound to
the lower bound derived Theorem 5.6.4 only with respect to number of episodes and













The difference between the two bounds, outside of an extra H2 factor, is in the sets
S∗ and the set {s, a : Πs,a = ∅}. We note that {s, a : Πs,a = ∅} ⊆ S∗. Unfortunately
there are examples in which {s, a : Πs,a = ∅} is O(1) and S∗ = Ω(S) leading to a
discrepancy between the upper and lower bounds of the order Ω(S). As we show in
Theorem 5.6.7 this discrepancy can not really be avoided by optimistic algorithms.
5.4.6 Tighter bounds for unique optimal policy.
If we further assume that the optimal policy is unique on its support, then we can
show StrongEuler will only incur regret on sub-optimal state-action pairs. This
matches the information theoretic lower bound up to horizon factors. The formal
regret bound is found below:
Corollary 5.4.6. Suppose the transition kernel of the MDP consists only of point-
masses and there exists a unique optimal π∗. Then with probability 1−δ, StrongEuler’s
































Comparing terms which depend polynomially on 1/gap to the information theoretic
lower bound in Theorem 5.6.4 we observe only a multiplicative difference of H2.
5.5 Detailed proofs for Section 5.4
5.5.1 Useful decomposition lemmas
We start by providing the following lemma that establishes that the instantaneous
regret can be decomposed into gaps defined w.r.t. any optimal (and not necessarily
Bellman optimal) policy.
Lemma 5.5.1 (General policy gap decomposition). Let gapˆ︁π(s, a) = V ˆ︁π(s) −Qˆ︁π(s, a)
for any optimal policy ˆ︁π ∈ Π∗. Then the difference in values of ˆ︁π and any policy
π ∈ Π is





⃓ Sκ(s) = s
⎤⎦ (5.9)
and, further, the instantaneous regret of π is
v∗ − vπ =
∑︂
s,a
wπ(s, a) gapˆ︁π(s, a). (5.10)
Proof. We start by establishing a recursive bound for the value difference of π and ˆ︁π
for any s
V ˆ︁π(s) − V π(s) = V ˆ︁π(s) −Qˆ︁π(s, π(s)) +Qˆ︁π(s, π(s)) − V π(s)
= gapˆ︁π(s, π(s)) +Qˆ︁π(s, π(s)) −Qπ(s, π(s))
= gapˆ︁π(s, π(s)) +∑︂
s′
Pθ(s′|s, π(s))[V ˆ︁π(s′) − V π(s′)].
Unrolling this recursion for all layers gives





⃓ Sκ(s) = s
⎤⎦ .
To show the second identity, consider s = s1 and note that vπ = V π(s1) and v∗ =
vˆ︁π = V ˆ︁π(s1) because ˆ︁π is an optimal policy.
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For the rest of the paper we are going to focus only on the Bellman optimal policy
from each state and hence only consider gapˆ︁π(s, a) = gap(s, a). All of our analysis
will also go through for arbitrary gapˆ︁π, ˆ︁π ∈ Π∗, however, this did not provide us with
improved regret bounds.
We now show the following technical lemma which generalizes the decomposition
of value function differences and will be useful in the surplus clipping analysis.
Lemma 5.5.2. Let Ψ : S → R, ∆ : S × A → R be functions satisfying Ψ(s) = 0 for
any s with κ(s) = H + 1 and π : S → A a deterministic policy. Further, assume that
the following relation holds
Ψ(s) = ∆(s, π(s)) + ⟨P (·|s, π(s)),Ψ⟩,
and let A be any event that is Hh-measurable where Hh = σ(S1, A1, R1, . . . , Sh) is the
sigma-field induced by the episode up to the state at time h. Then, for any h ∈ [H]
and h′ ∈ N with h ≤ h′ ≤ H + 1, it holds that

















∆(St, At) + Ψ(Sh′)
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓⃓ Sκ(s) = s
⎤⎦ .
Plugging this identity into Eπ[χ (A) Ψ(Sh))] yields




























∆(St, At) + Ψ(Sh′)
⎞⎠⎤⎦
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where Hh = σ(S1, A1, R1, . . . , Sh) is the sigma-field induced by the episode up to the
state at time h. Identity (i) holds because of the Markov-property and (ii) holds
because A is Hh-measurable. The final identity (iii) uses the tower-property of
conditional expectations.
5.5.2 General surplus clipping for strongly optimistic algo-
rithms
Clipped operators. One of the main arguments to derive instance dependent bounds
is to write the instantaneous regret in terms of the surpluses which are clipped to the
minimum positive gap. We now define the clipping threshold ϵk : S × A → R+0 and
associated clipped surpluses
Ëk(s, a) = clip [Ek(s, a) | ϵk(s, a)] = χ (Ek(s, a) ≥ ϵk(s, a))Ek(s, a). (5.11)
Next, define the clipped Q- and value-function as
Q̈k(s, a) = Ëk(s, a) + r(s, a) + ⟨P (·|s, a), V̈ k, ⟩ and V̈ k(s) = Q̈k(s, πk(s)).
(5.12)
The random variable which is the state visited by πk at time h throughout episode
k is denoted by Sh and Ah is the action at time h.
Events about encountered gaps Define the event Eh = {gap(Sh, Ah) > 0} that
at time h an action with a positive gap played, the P1:h =
⋂︁h−1
h′=1 Ech′ that only actions
with zero gap have been played until h and the event Ah = Eh ∩ P1:h that the first
positive gap was encountered at time h. Let AH+1 = P1:H be the event that only zero
gaps were encountered. Further, let
B = min{h ∈ [H + 1] : gap(Sh, Ah) > 0}
be the first time a non-zero gap is encountered. Note that B is a stopping time w.r.t.
the filtration Fh = σ(S1, A1, . . . , Sh, Ah).
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The proof of Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) consists of two main steps. First show
that for their definition of clipped value functions one can bound V̈ k(s1) − V πk(s1) ≥
1
2(V̄ k(s1) − V
πk(s1)). Next, using optimism together with the fact that πk has highest
value function at episode k it follows that V̄ k(s1) − V πk(s1) ≥ V ∗(s1) − V πk(s1). The
second main step is to use a high-probability bound on the clipped surpluses to relate
them to the probability to visit the respective state-action pair and the proof is finished
via an integration lemma. We now show that the first step can be carried out in greater
generality by defining a less restrictive clipping operator. This operator is independent
of the details in the definition of gap at each state-action pair but rather only uses a
certain property which allows us to decompose the episodic regret as a sum over gaps.
We will also further show that one does not need to use an integration lemma for the
second step but can rather reformulate the regret bound as an optimization problem.
This will allow us to clip surpluses at state-action pairs with zero gaps beyond the
gapmin rate.
5.5.2.1 Clipping with an arbitrary threshold and proof of Proposition 5.4.2
Recall the definition of the clipped surpluses and clipped value function in Equation 5.11
and Equation 5.12. We begin by showing a general relation between the clipped value
function difference and the non-clipped surpluses for any clipping threshold ϵk : S → R.
This will help in establishing V̈ k(s1) − V πk(s1) ≥ 12(V̄ k(s1) − V
πk(s1)).
Lemma 5.5.3. Let ϵk : S × A → R+0 be arbitrary. Then for any strongly optimistic
algorithm it holds that




(gap(Sh, Ah) − ϵk(Sh, Ah))
]︄
. (5.13)
Proof. We use Wk(s) = V̈ k(s) − V πk(s) in the following and first show that W (s1) ≥
Eπk [Wk(SB)]. As a precursor, we prove
Eπk [χ (P1:h)Wk(Sh)] ≥ Eπk [χ (Ah+1)Wk(Sh+1)] + Eπk [χ (P1:h+1)Wk(Sh+1)] . (5.14)
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To see this, plug the definitions into Wk(s) which gives Wk(s) = V̈ k(s) − V πk(s) =
Ëk(s, πk(s)) + ⟨P (·|s, πk(s)),Wk⟩ and use this in the LHS of Equation 5.14 as
Eπk [χ (P1:h)Wk(Sh)] = Eπk
[︂
χ (P1:h) Ëk(Sh, Ah)⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
]︂
≥0
+ Eπk [χ (P1:h)E[Wk(Sh+1) | Sh]]
(i)
≥ Eπk [χ (P1:h)Eπk [Wk(Sh+1) | Hh]]
(ii)= Eπk [Eπk [χ (P1:h)Wk(Sh+1) | Hh]] = Eπk [χ (P1:h)Wk(Sh+1)]
where Hh = σ(S1, A1, R1, . . . , Sh) is the sigma-field induced by the episode up to the
state at time h. Step (i) follows from strong optimism and the Markov property and
(ii) holds because P1:h is Hh-measurable. We now rewrite the RHS by splitting the
expectation based on whether event Eh+1 occurred as
Eπk [χ (P1:h)Wk(Sh+1)] = Eπk [χ (P1:h+1)Wk(Sh+1)] + Eπk [χ (Ah+1)Wk(Sh+1)] .
We have now shown Equation 5.14, which we will now use to lower-bound Wk(s1) as
Wk(s1) = Eπk [χ (E1)W1(S1)] + Eπk [χ (Ec1)W1(S1)]
= Eπk [χ (A1)W1(S1)] + Eπk [χ (P1:1)W1(S1)]







Eπk [χ (Ah)Wk(Sh)] = Eπk [Wk(SB)].
































where we applied the definition clipped surpluses which gives Ëk(s, a) = clip[Ek(s, a) |

















To do so, we apply Lemma 5.5.2 twice, first with A = Ah, Ψ = V̄ k − V πk and ∆ = Ek










χ (Ah) (V̄ k(Sh) − V πk(Sh))
]︂









Thus, we have shown that



































(gap(Sh, Ah) − ϵk(Sh, Ah))
]︄
where the last equality uses the definition of B, the first time step at which a non-zero
gap was encountered.
Lemma 5.5.4 (Optimism of clipped value function). Let the clipping thresholds













for some optimal policy ˆ︁π. Then scaled optimism holds for the clipped value function,
i.e.,
V̈ k(s1) − V πk(s1) ≥
1
2(V
∗(s1) − V πk(s1)).
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Proof. The proof works by establishing the following chain of inequalities:




























(gap(Sh, Ah)) − ϵk(Sh, Ah)))
]︄
(e)
≤ V̈ k(s1) − V πk(s1).
Here, (a) uses Lemma 5.5.1 and (b) uses the definition of B. Step (c) is just algebra
and step (d) uses the assumption on the threshold function. The last step (e) follows
from Lemma 5.5.3.
We are now ready to present Proposition 5.4.2.
Proof of Proposition 5.4.2. Applying Lemma 5.5.4 which ensures scaled optimism of
the clipped value function gives




where the equality follows from the definition of V̈ k(s1) and Lemma 5.5.2. Subtracting
1
2(V
∗(s1) − V πk(s1)) from both sides gives
1
2(V









because Lemma 5.5.1 ensures that 12(V
∗(s1) − V πk(s1)) = 12
∑︁
s,aw
πk(s, a) gap(s, a).
Reordering terms yields

































where the final inequality follows from the general properties of the clipping operator,
which satisfies
clip[a|b] − c =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
a− c ≤ a for a ≥ b ∨ c
0 − c ≤ 0 for a ≤ b
a− c ≤ 0 for a ≤ c
≤ clip[a|b ∨ c].
5.5.3 Definition of valid clipping thresholds ϵk
Proposition 5.4.2 establishes a sufficient condition on the clipping thresholds ϵk that
ensures that the penalized surplus clipping bounds holds. We now discuss several
choices for this threshold that satisfy this condition.
Minimum positive gap gapmin: We now make the quick observation that taking
ϵk ≡ gapmin2H will satisfy the condition of Proposition 5.4.2, because on the event
B ≡ AcH+1 there exists at least one positive gap in the sum
∑︁H
h=1 gap(Sh, Ah), which,
by definition, is at least gapmin. This shows that our results already can recover the
bounds in prior work, with significantly less effort.
Average gaps: Instead of the minimum gap which was used in existing analyses,
we now show that we can also use the marginalized average gap which we will define
now. Recall that B = min{h ∈ [H + 1] : gap(Sh, Ah) > 0} is the first time a
non-zero gap is encountered. Note that B is a stopping time w.r.t. the filtration
Fh = σ(S1, A1, . . . , Sh, Ah). Further let
B(s, a) ≡ {B ≤ κ(s), Sκ(s) = s, Aκ(s) = a} (5.15)















As the following lemma shows, this is a valid choice which satisfies the condition of
Proposition 5.4.2.
Lemma 5.5.5. The expected sum of clipping thresholds in Equation (5.16) over all
state-action pairs encountered after a positive gap is at most half the expected total














Proof. We rewrite the LHS of the inequality to show as Eπk
[︂∑︁H
h=1 χ (B ≤ h) ϵk(Sh, Ah)
]︂
and from now on consider the random variable fh(B, Sh, Ah) = χ (B ≤ h) ϵk(Sh, Ah)
where fh(b, s, a) = χ (b ≤ h) ϵk(s, a) is a deterministic function2. We will show below






































To bound the expected value of fh(B, Sh, Ah), we first write fh for all triples b, s, a
such that Pπk(B = b, Ah = a, Sh = s) > 0 as
fh(b, s, a)






⃓ B ≤ h, Sh = s, Ah = a
]︄






⃓ B ≤ h, Sh = s, Ah = a
]︄





⃓Sh = s, Ah = a
⎤⎦ ,
where (i) expands the definition of ϵk and (ii) decomposes the sum inside the conditional
expectation and uses the Markov-property to simplify the conditioning for terms after
2It may still depend on the current policy πk which is determined by observations in episodes 1
to k − 1. But, crucially, fh does not depend on any realization in the k-th episode
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h. Before taking the expectation of fh(B, Sh, Ah), we first rewrite the conditional












h′=B gap(Sh′ , Ah′)χ (Ah = a, Sh = s)χ (B ≤ h)
]︂




h′=B gap(Sh′ , Ah′)χ (Ah = a, Sh = s)
]︂




h′=B gap(Sh′ , Ah′)
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓ Sh = s, Ah = a
]︄
Pπk [B ≤ h | Sh = s, Ah = a]
.
Here, step (i) uses the property of conditional expectations with respect to an event
with nonzero probability and (ii) follows from the definition of B: When B > h, the
sum of gaps until h is zero. Consider now the expectation of fh(B, Sh, Ah)
Eπk [fh(B, Sh, Ah)]
= 12HEπk
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣χ (B ≤ h)
Eπk
[︄∑︁h




Pπk [B ≤ h | Sh, Ah]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (5.17)
+ 12HEπk







The term in (5.18) can be bounded using the tower-property of expectations as
1
2HEπk




















For the term in (5.17), we also use the tower-property to rewrite it as
1
2HEπk
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣χ (B ≤ h)
Eπk
[︄∑︁h








⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣χ (B ≤ h)
Eπk
[︄∑︁h













































the expectation Eπk [fh(B, Sh, Ah)].
5.5.4 Policy-dependent regret bound for StrongEuler
We now show how to derive a regret bound for StrongEuler algorithm in Simchowitz
and Jamieson (2019) that depends on the gaps of the played policies throughout the
K episodes.
To build on parts of the analysis in Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019), we first







Vπ(s, a) = V[R(s, a)] + Vs′∼P (·|s,a)[V π(s′)],
Vk(s, a) = Vπk(s, a) ∧ V∗(s, a)
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We will use their following results:
Proposition 5.5.6 (Proposition F.1, F.9 and B.4 in Simchowitz and Jamieson
(2019)). There is a good event Aconc that holds with probability 1 − δ/2. In this event,
StrongEuler is strongly optimistic (as well as optimistic). Further, there is a









Bfutk (Sh, Ah) | (Sκ(s), Aκ(s)) = (s, a)
]︂
,
where Blead, Bfut are defined as
Bleadk (s, a) = H ∧
⌜⃓⃓⎷Vk(s, a) log (Mnk(s, a)/δ)
nk(s, a)
,
Bfutk (s, a) = H3 ∧H3
⎛⎝
⌜⃓⃓⎷S log (Mnk(s, a)/δ)
nk(s, a)
+ S log (Mnk(s, a)/δ)
nk(s, a)
⎞⎠2 .
Lemma 5.5.7 (Lemma B.3 in Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019)). Let m ≥ 2,






≤ 2∑︁mi=1 clip [︂ai| ϵ2m]︂.
Equipped with these results and our improved surplus clipping proposition in Propo-
sition 5.5.6, we can now derive the following bound on the regret of StrongEuler






















⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)8SA
]︄
,
with a universal constant c ≥ 1 and gap̆ k(s, a) =
gap(s,a)
4 ∨ ϵk(s, a).
Proof. We now use our improved surplus clipping result from Proposition 5.4.2 as a
starting point to bound the instantaneous regret of StrongEuler in the kth episode
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as







⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)
]︄
. (5.19)
Next, we write the bound on the surpluses from Proposition 5.5.6 as




χ (κ(s′) ≥ κ(s))Pπk
[︂
Sκ(s′) = s′, Aκ(s′) = a′ | (Sκ(s), Aκ(s)) = (s, a)
]︂
Bfutk (s′, a′)
and plugging it in Equation 5.19 and applying Lemma 5.5.7 gives
















⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)8SA
]︄
.
The statement to show follows now by summing over k ∈ [K]. The form of the second
term in the previous display follows from the inequality
∑︂
s,a
wπk(s, a)χ (κ(s′) ≥ κ(s))Pπk
[︂







Sκ(s′) = s′, Aκ(s′) = a′ | (Sκ(s), Aκ(s)) = (s, a)
]︂
= wπk(s′, a′).
We note that if πk ≡ ˆ︁π for any ˆ︁π ∈ Π∗ then V ∗(s1) − V πk(s1) = 0, and WLOG we
can disregard such terms in the total regret.
The next step is to relate n̄k(s, a) to nk(s, a) via the following lemma.









where τ(s, a) = inf{k : n̄k(s, a) ≥ Hsamp} and Hsamp = c′ log (M/δ) for a universal
constant c′. Then event Asamp holds with probability 1 − δ/2.
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Proof. This can be proved analogously to Lemma B.7 in Simchowitz and Jamieson
(2019) and Lemma 6 in Dann et al. (2019) with the difference that in our case, there
can only be at most one observation of (s, a) per episode for each (s, a) due to our
layered assumption. Thus, there is no need to sum over observations accumulated for
each h ∈ [H] and our Hsamp = O(log (H)) as opposed to O(H log (H)).
Lemma 5.5.10. Let fs,a : N → R be non-increasing with supu fs,a(u) ≤ ˆ︁f < ∞ for



















































Theorem 5.5.11 (Regret Bound for StrongEuler). With probability at least 1 − δ,






⎧⎨⎩V∗(s, a)LOG(M/δ, t, gap̆ t(s, a))gap̆ t(s, a)
+
√︂





























Here, K(s,a) is the last round during which a policy π was played such that wπ(s, a) > 0,
gap̆ t(s, a) = gap(s, a) ∨ ϵt(s, a), gap̆ min(s, a) = mink∈[K] : gap̆ k(s,a)>0 gap̆ k(s, a) is the
smallest gap encountered for each (s, a), and







t ∧ 1 + 16V




Proof. We here consider the event Aconc ∩ Asamp which has probability at least 1 − δ
by Proposition 5.5.6 and Lemma 5.5.9. We now start with the regret bound in
Lemma 5.5.8 and bound the two terms individually in the following:



















⌜⃓⃓⎷4Vk(s, a) log (Mn̄k(s, a)/4δ)
n̄k(s, a)
⃓⃓⃓⃓















)︃⌜⃓⃓⎷ log (n̄k(s, a))
n̄k(s, a)
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)4
⎤⎦ ,
(5.20)
where step (i) applies Lemma 5.5.10 and (ii) follows from the definition of Vk(s, a),


























log (n̄k(s, a)) ≤ log (M/δ) log (n̄k(s, a)) .
We now apply our optimization lemma (Lemma 5.5.14) with xk = wπk(s, a), vk =
2c
√︂
V∗(s, a) log (M/δ), and ϵk = gap̆ k(s,a)4vk to bound each (s, a)-term in Equation 5.20
































K ∧ 1 + 16V









⎡⎣2c√︂V∗(s, a) log (M/4δ)
⌜⃓⃓⎷ log (n̄k(s, a))
n̄k(s, a)
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)4
⎤⎦
≤32c




(K − t)LOG(M/δ,K, gap̆K(s, a)).





















⎧⎨⎩V∗(s, a)LOG(M/δ, t, gap̆ t(s, a))gap̆ t(s, a) +
√︂
(K(s,a) − t)LOG(M/δ,K, gap̆K(s,a)(s, a))
⎫⎬⎭
where ≲ only ignores absolute constant factors.
Bounding the Bfut term. Consider the second term in Lemma 5.5.8 and event






















⌜⃓⃓⎷S log (Mn̄k(s, a)/δ)
n̄k(s, a)
+ S log (Mn̄k(s, a)/δ)
n̄k(s, a)
⎞⎠2 ⃓⃓⃓⃓⃓ gap̆ k(s, a)4
⎤⎥⎦ .



























The remaining integral term is bounded with Lemma B.9 (b) by Simchowitz and





































































5.5.5 Proof of Corollary 5.4.6
We begin by showing a different type of upper bound on the expected gaps by the
surpluses. Define the set βk = range(B) where B is the r.v. which is the stopping




{(s, a) ∈ S × A :Pπ∗((Sh, Ah) = (s, a)|Sκ(sb) = sb)
≥ Pπk((Sh, Ah) = (s, a)|Sκ(sb) = sb)}.
This set has the following intuitive definition – whenever AB occurs we restrict our
attention to the MDP with initial state SB. On this restricted MDP, Ok is the set of
state-action pairs which have greater probability to be visited by the optimal π∗ than
by πk.
Lemma 5.5.12. Assume strong optimism and greedy V̄ k, i.e., V̄ k(s) ≥ maxa Q̄k(s, a)
























= Ek(s, π(s)) + r(s, π(s)) + ⟨P (·|s, π(s)), V̄
π⟩.
By backwards induction on H we show that for any s, κ(s) ≤ H V̄ π ≤ V̄ k. The base
case holds from the fact that on all s : κ(s) = H, V̄ k(s) is just the largest optimistic
reward over all actions at s. For the induction step it holds that
V̄
π(s) = Ek(s, π(s)) + r(s, π(s)) + ⟨P (·|s, π(s)), V̄
π⟩
≤ Ek(s, π(s)) + r(s, π(s)) + ⟨P (·|s, π(s)), V̄ k⟩
= Q̄k(s, π(s)) ≤ V̄ k(s),
where the first inequality holds from the induction hypothesis and the second inequality







= Eπk [V ∗(SB) − Vk(SB)]
≤ Eπk
[︂





∗(SB) − V ∗(SB)
]︂
.
Let us focus on the term Eπk
[︂
V̄
































We can similarly expand the term Eπk
[︂
V̄ k(SB) − Vk(SB)
]︂
. By the definition of Ok(π∗)
it holds that for any h ≥ κ(s)
Eπk
[︂
































χ(Sh, Ah ̸∈ Ok(π∗))Ek(Sh, Ah)
]︄
.
We next show a version of Lemma 5.5.3 which takes into account the set Ok(π∗).
Lemma 5.5.13. With the same assumptions as in Lemma 5.5.12, there exists an
optimal π∗ for which







χ(Sh, Ah ̸∈ Ok(π∗))ϵk(Sh, Ah)
]︄
,
where ϵk is arbitrary.
Proof. Since Ëk is non-negative on all state-action pairs we have








































χ((Sh, Ah) ̸∈ Ok)ϵk(Sh, Ah)
]︄
,
where the second to last inequality follows from the definition of Ëk and the last
inequality follows from Lemma 5.5.12.
Next, we define ϵ̄k in the following way. Let
ϵ̄k(s, a) ≡
⎧⎨⎩ϵk(s, a) if (s, a) ̸∈ Ok(π∗)∞ otherwise, (5.21)
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where ϵk is the clipping function defined in Equation 5.16. Lemma 5.5.13 now implies
that










This is sufficient to argue Lemma 5.5.8 with gap̆ k(s, a) =
gap(s,a)
4 ∨ ϵ̄k(s, a) and hence
arrive at a version of Corollary 5.4.5 which uses ϵ̄k as the clipping thresholds. Let
us now argue that ϵ̄k(s, a) = ∞ for all (s, a) ∈ π∗ whenever π∗ is the unique optimal
policy for the deterministic MDP. To do so consider (s, a) ∈ π∗ and πk ̸= π∗. Since the
MDP is deterministic, βk is a singleton and is the the first state sb at which πk differs
from π∗. We now observe that if κ(s) < κ(sb), this implies ϵk(s, a) = ∞ as B(s, a)
does not occur. Further, the conditional probabilities Pπ∗((Sh, Ah) = (s, a)|Sκ(sb) = sb)
and Pπk((Sh, Ah) = (s, a)|Sκ(sb) = sb) are both equal to 1 if κ(s) > κ(sb) and so
(s, a) ∈ Ok(π∗) which implies ϵ̄k(s, a) = ∞. Thus we can clip all gaps at (s, a) ∈ π∗ to
infinity and they will never appear in the regret bound.
5.5.6 Alternative to integration lemmas
Lemma 5.4.3 is a simplified version of the following stronger result:





















≥ ϵk ∀ k ∈ [K],
(5.22)
with (vi)i∈[K] ∈ RK+ and (ϵi)i∈[K] ∈ RK+ . Then the optimal value of Problem 5.22 is









⌜⃓⃓⎷log(︄K ∧ 1 + 1
ϵ2K
)︄
(K − t), (5.23)
where v̄t = maxk∈[t] vk and v∗t = maxK≥k≥t vk.
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Proof. Denote by Xk =
∑︁k
t=1 xt the cumulative sum of xt. The proof consists of















and bounding each by the corresponding one in Equation 5.23 respectively.






















where the inequality is due to Xk being non-decreasing.
Consider now each term in the objective in Equation 5.24 separately.
























where (i) follows from Equation 5.25 using the convention X0 = 0 and (ii) from
the optimization constraint
√︂
log (Xt) ≥ ϵt
√
Xt. It remains to bound log (Xt) by
2 log
(︂
t ∧ 1 + 1
ϵ2t
)︂
. Since all increments xj are at most 1, the bound log (Xt) ≤ log (t)
holds.
We claim the following:
Claim 5.5.15. For any x s.t. log (x) ≤ log (log (x) /a) it holds that log (x) ≤
2 log (1 + 1/a).
Proof. First, we note that if 0 < x ≤ e, then log (log (x)) < 0 and thus the assumption
of the claim implies log (x) ≤ log (1/a). Next, assume that x > e. Then we have
log(log(x))
log(x) ≤ 1/e, which together with the assumption of the claim implies log (x) ≤
1/e log (x)+log (1/a) or equivalently log (x) ≤ e
e−1 log (1/a). Noting that e/(e−1) ≤ 2
completes the proof.
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, which implies after squar-
ing and taking the logarithm: log (Xk) ≤ log (log (Xk) /ϵ2k). Thus, using Claim 5.5.15
yields:
log (Xk) ≤ 2 log
(︂
k ∧ 1 + 1/ϵ2k
)︂
. (5.26)






























log (K ∧ 1 + 1/ϵ2K)(
√
K − t),
where we first bounded log (Xk) ≤ log (XK), because Xk is non-decreasing, and used
the upper bound on log (XK). Then we applied Equation 5.25 and finally used
0 ≤ xk ≤ 1.
5.6 Instance-dependent lower bounds
We here shed light on what properties on an episodic MDP determine the statistical
difficulty of RL by deriving information-theoretic lower bounds on the asymptotic
expected regret of any (good) algorithm. To that end, we first derive a general result
that expresses a lower bound as the optimal value of a certain optimization problem
and then derive closed-form lower-bounds from this optimization problem that depend
on certain notions of gaps for two special cases of episodic MDPs.
Specifically, in those special cases, we assume that the rewards follow a Gaussian
distribution with variance 1/2. We further assume that the optimal value function is
bounded in the same range as individual rewards, e.g. as 0 ≤ V ∗(s) < 1 for all s ∈ S.
This assumption is common in the literature (e.g. Krishnamurthy et al., 2016; Jiang
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et al., 2017; Dann et al., 2018) and can be considered harder than a normalization of
V ∗(s) ∈ [0, H] (see Jiang and Agarwal (2018)).
5.6.1 General instance-dependent lower bound as an opti-
mization problem
The idea behind deriving instance-dependent lower bounds for the stochastic MAB
problem (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Combes et al., 2017; Garivier et al., 2019) and infinite
horizon MDPs (Graves and Lai, 1997; Ok et al., 2018) are based on first assuming that
the algorithm studied is uniformly good, that is, on any instance of the problem
and for any α > 0, the algorithm incurs regret at most o(Tα), and then argue that, to
achieve that guarantee, the algorithm must select a certain policy or action at least
some number of times as it would otherwise not be able to distinguish the current
MDP from another MDP that requires a different optimal strategy.
Since comparison between different MDPs is central to lower-bound constructions,
it is convenient to make the problem-instance explicit in the notation. To that end,
let Θ be the problem class of possible MDPs and we use subscripts θ and λ for value
functions, return, MDP parameters etc., to denote specific problem instances θ, λ ∈ Θ
of those quantities. Further, for a policy π and MDP θ, Pπθ denotes the law of one
episode, i.e., the distribution of (S1, A1, R1, S2, A2, R2, . . . , SH+1). To state the general
regret lower-bound we need to introduce the set of confusing MDPs. This set consists
of all MDPs λ in which there is at least one optimal policy π such that π ̸∈ Π∗θ, i.e., π
is not optimal for the original MDP and no policy in Π∗θ has been changed.
Definition 5.6.1. For any problem instance θ ∈ Θ we define the set of confusing
MDPs Λ(θ) as
Λ(θ) := {λ ∈ Θ: Π∗λ \ Π∗θ ̸= ∅ and KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = 0 ∀π ∈ Π∗θ}.
We are now ready to state our general regret lower-bound for episodic MDPs:
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Theorem 5.6.1 (General instance-dependent lower bound for episodic MDPs). Let ψ
be a uniformly good RL algorithm for Θ, that is, for all problem instances θ ∈ Θ and
exponents α > 0, the regret of ψ is bounded as E[Rθ(K)] ≤ o(Kα), and assume that




log (K) ≥ C(θ),









η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ Λ(θ)
. (5.27)
The optimization problem in Theorem 5.6.1 can be interpreted as follows. The
variables η(π) are the (expected) number of times the algorithm chooses to play policy
π which makes the objective the total expected regret incurred by the algorithm. The
constraints encode that any uniformly good algorithm needs to be able to distinguish
the true instance θ from all confusing instances λ ∈ Λ(θ), because otherwise it would
incur linear regret. To do so, a uniformly good algorithm needs to play policies π that
induce different behavior in λ and θ which is precisely captured by the constraints∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1.
Although Theorem 5.6.1 has the flavor of results in the bandit and RL literature,
there are a few notable differences. Compared to lower-bounds in the infinite-horizon
MDP setting (Graves and Lai, 1997; Tewari and Bartlett, 2008; Ok et al., 2018), we
for example do not assume that the Markov chain induced by an optimal policy π∗
is irreducible. That irreducability plays a key role in converting the semi-infinite
linear program Equation 5.27, which typically has uncountably many constraints,
into a linear program with only O(SA) constraints. While for infinite horizon MDPs,
irreducibility is somewhat necessary to facilitate exploration, this is not the case for
the finite horizon setting and in general we cannot obtain a convenient reduction of
the set of constraints Λ(θ). See Section 5.7.2 for a more in-depth discussion.
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5.6.2 Gap-dependent lower bound when optimal policies visit
all states
To derive closed-form gap-dependent bounds from the general optimization problem
Equation 5.27, we need to identify a finite subset of confusing MDPs Λ(θ) that each
require the RL agent to play a distinct set of policies that do not help to distinguish
the other confusing MDPs. To do so, we restrict our attention to the special case of
MDPs where every state is visited with non-zero probability by some optimal policy,
similar to the irreducibility assumptions in the infinite-horizon setting (Tewari and
Bartlett, 2008; Ok et al., 2018). In this case, it is sufficient to raise the expected
immediate reward of a suboptimal (s, a) by gapθ(s, a) in order to create a confusing
MDP, as proven in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6.2. Let Θ be the set of all episodic MDPs with Gaussian immediate
rewards and optimal value function uniformly bounded by 1 and let θ ∈ Θ be an MDP
in this class. Then for any suboptimal state-action pair (s, a) with gapθ(s, a) > 0 that
is visited by some optimal policy with non-zero probability, there exists a confusing
MDP λ ∈ Λ(θ) with
• λ and θ only differ in the immediate reward at (s, a)
• KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≤ gapθ(s, a)2 for all π ∈ Π.
By relaxing the problem in Equation 5.27 to only consider constraints from the
confusing MDPs in Lemma 5.6.2 with KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≤ gapθ(s, a)2, for every (s, a), we
can derive the following closed-form bound:
Theorem 5.6.3 (Gap-dependent lower bound when optimal policies visit all states).
Let Θ be the set of all episodic MDPs with Gaussian immediate rewards and optimal
value function uniformly bounded by 1. Let θ ∈ Θ be an instance where every state
is visited by some optimal policy with non-zero probability. Then any uniformly good
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Theorem 5.6.3 can be viewed as a generalization of Proposition 2.2 in Simchowitz
and Jamieson (2019), which gives a lower bound of order ∑︁s,a : gapθ(s,a)>0 Hgapθ(s,a) for a
certain set of MDPs.3 While our lower bound is a factor of H worse, it is significantly
more general and holds in any MDP where optimal policies visit all states and with
appropriate normalization of the value function. Theorem 5.6.3 indicates that value-
function gaps characterize the instance-optimal regret when optimal policies cover the
entire state space.
5.6.3 Gap-dependent lower bound for deterministic-transition
MDPs
We expect that optimal policies do not visit all states in most MDPs of practical
interest (e.g. because certain parts of the state space can only be reached by making an
egregious error). We therefore now consider the general case where ⋃︁π∈Π∗
θ
supp(π) ⊊ S
but restrict our attention to MDPs with deterministic transitions where we are able to
give an intuitive closed-form lower bound. Note that deterministic transitions imply
∀π, s, a : wπ(s, a) ∈ {0, 1}. Here, a confusing MDP can be created by simply raising






the regret of the best policy that visits (s, a), as long as it is positive and (s, a)
is not visited by any optimal policy. Equation 5.28 is positive when no optimal
policy visits (s, a) in which case suboptimal actions have to be taken to reach (s, a)
and gapθ(s, a) > 0. Let π∗(s,a) be any maximizer in Equation 5.28, which has to act
3We translated their bound and construction to our setting where V ∗ ≤ 1 which reduces the
bound by a factor of H.
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optimally after visiting (s, a). From the regret decomposition in Equation 5.3 and the
fact that π∗(s,a) visits (s, a) with probability 1, it follows that v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ ≥ gapθ(s, a).
We further have v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ ≤ Hgapθ(s, a). Equipped with the subset of confusing
MDPs λ that each raise the reward of a single (s, a) as rλ(s, a) = rθ(s, a) + v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ ,
we can derive the following gap-dependent lower bound:
Theorem 5.6.4. Let Θ be the set of all episodic MDPs with Gaussian immediate
rewards and optimal value function uniformly bounded by 1. Let θ ∈ Θ be an instance
with deterministic transitions. Then any uniformly good algorithm on Θ has expected















H2 · gapθ(s, a)
,
where Zθ = {(s, a) ∈ S × A : ∀π∗ ∈ Π∗θ wπ
∗
θ (s, a) = 0} is the set of state-action pairs
that no optimal policy in θ visits.
We now compare the above lower bound to the upper bound guaranteed by












The difference between the two bounds, besides the extra H2 factor, is the fact that
(s, a) pairs that are visited by any optimal policy (s, a ̸= Zθ) do not appear in the
lower-bound while the upper-bound pays for such pairs if they can also be visited after
playing a suboptimal action. This could result in cases where the number of terms
in the lower bound is O(1) but the number of terms in the upper bound is Ω(SA)
leading to a large discrepancy.
4We carry out the comparison in expectation, since our lower bounds do not apply with high
probability.
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Figure 5-3: Deterministic MDP instance for optimistic lower bound
5.6.4 Lower bounds for optimistic algorithms in MDPs with
deterministic transitions
In this section we show a lower bound on the regret of optimistic algorithms, demon-
strating that optimistic algorithms can not hope to achieve the information-theoretic
lower bounds even if the MDPs have deterministic transitions. While the result might
seem similar to the one proposed by Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) (Theorem 2.3)
we would like to emphasize that the construction of Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019)
does not apply to MDPs with deterministic transitions, and that the idea behind our
construction is significantly different.
Consider the MDP in Figure 5-3. This MDP has 2n+ 9 states and 4n+ 8 actions.
The rewards for each action are either 1/12 or 1/12 + ϵ/2 and can be found next to
the transitions from the respective states. We are going to label the states according
to their layer and their position in the layer so that the first state is s1,1 the state
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which is to the left of s1,1 in layer 2 is s2,1 and to the right s2,2. In general the i-th
state in layer h is denoted as sh,i. The rewards in all states are deterministic, with a
single exception of a Bernoulli reward from state s4,1 to s5,2 with mean 1/12. From the
construction it is clear that V ∗(s1,1) = 1/2 + ϵ. Further there are two sets of optimal
policies with the above value function – the n optimal policies which visit state s2,2
and the n optimal policies which visit s5,1. Notice that the information-theoretic lower
bound for this MDP is in O(log (K) /ϵ) as only the transition from state s4,1 to s5,2
does not belong to an optimal policy. In particular, there is no dependence on n.
Next we try to show that the class of optimistic algorithms will incur regret at least
Ω(n log (δ−1) /ϵ).
Class of algorithms. We adopt the class of algorithms from Section G.2 in
(Simchowitz and Jamieson, 2019) with an additional assumption which we clarify
momentarily. Recall that the class of algorithms assumes access to an optimistic
value function V̄ k(s) ≥ V ∗(s) and optimistic Q-functions. In particular the algorithms
construct optimistic Q and value functions as
V̄ k(s) = max
a∈A
Q̄k(s, a)
Qk(s, a) = ˆ︁rk(s, a) + brwk (s, a) + ˆ︁pk(s, a)⊤V̄ k + bk(s, a).
We assume that there exists a c ≥ 1 such that
c
2
⌜⃓⃓⎷ log (M(1 ∨ nk(s, a))) /δ
(1 ∨ nk(s, a))
≤ brwk (s, a) ≤ c
⌜⃓⃓⎷ log (M(1 ∨ nk(s, a)))/δ
(1 ∨ nk(s, a))
,
where M = θ(n) and bk(s, a) ∼
√
Sfk(s, a)brwk (s, a), where fk is a decreasing function
in the number of visits to (s, a) given by nk(s, a). For nk(s, a) = Ω(n log (n)), we
assume bk(s, a) ≤ brwk (s, a). One can verify that this is true for the the Q and value
functions of StrongEuler.






Lemma 5.6.5. There exists n0, ϵ0 such that for any pair of n ≥ n0 and ϵ ≤ ϵ0 and
any k ≤ N , with probability at least 1 − δ, it holds that either nk(s5,1) < N/4, or
Q̄k(s4,1, 1) < Q̄k(s4,1, 2).
We can show the same for the upper part of the MDP.
Lemma 5.6.6. There exists n0, ϵ0 such that for any pair of n ≥ n0 and ϵ ≤ ϵ0 and
any k ≤ N , with probability at least 1 − δ, it holds that either nk(s1,2) < N/4, or
Q̄k(s1,1, 2) < Q̄k(s1,1, 1).
Theorem 5.6.7. There exists an MDP instance with deterministic transitions on
which any optimistic algorithm with confidence parameter δ will incur expected regret
of at least Ω(S log (δ−1) /ϵ)) while it is asymptotically possible to achieve Ω(log (K) /ϵ)
regret.
Proof of Theorem 5.6.7. Taking the MDP from Figure 5-3. Applying Lemma 5.6.5
and 5.6.6 shows that after N episodes with probability at least 1 − 2δ, the visitation
count of s2,2 and s5,1 each do not exceed N/4. Hence there are at least N/2 episodes in
which neither of them is visited, which means an ϵ-suboptimal policy is taken. Hence
the expected regret after N episodes is at least






Theorem 5.6.7 has two implications for optimistic algorithms in MDPs with
deterministic transitions.
• It is impossible to be asymptotically optimal if the confidence parameter δ is
tuned to the time horizon K.
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Figure 5-4: Issue with restricting LP to Π∗
• It is impossible to have an anytime bound matching the information-theoretic
lower bound.
5.6.4.1 Issue with deriving a general bound
We now try to give some intuition regarding why we could not derive a generic
lower bound for deterministic transition MDPs. We have already outlined our general
approach of restricting the set Π and Λ(θ) to finite subsets of manageable size and then
showing that the value of the LP on these restricted sets is not much smaller than the
value of the original LP. One natural restriction of Π is the set Π∗ from Theorem 5.6.4.
Suppose we restrict ourselves to the same set and consider only environments making
policies in Π∗ optimal as the restriction for Λ(θ). We now give an example of an
MDP for which such a restriction will lead to an Ω(SA) multiplicative discrepancy
between the value of the original semi-infinite LP and the restricted LP. The MDP
can be found in Figure 5-4. The rewards for each action for a fixed state s are equal
and are shown in the vertices corresponding to the states. The number of states in
the second and last layer of the MDP are equal to (SA− 3)/2. The optimal policy
takes the red path and has value V π∗ = 3. The set Π∗ consists of all policies πj,i
which visit one of the states in green. The policies π1,i, in blue, visit the green state
in the second layer of the MDP and one of the states in the final layer, following
the paths in blue. Similarly the policies π2,i, in orange, visit one of the state in the
second layer and the green state in the last layer, following the orange paths. The
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value function of πj,i is V πj,i = 3 − 3SA − iϵ, where 0 ≤ i ≤ (SA − 4)/2. We claim
that playing each πj,i η(πj,i) = Ω(SA) times is a feasible solution to the LP restricted
to Π∗. Fix i, the λπ1,i must put weight at least 1/SA on the green state in layer 2.
Coupling with the fact that for all i′ the rewards π1,i′ are also changed under this
environment we know that the constraint of the restricted LP with respect to λπ1,i
is lower bounded by ∑︁i′ η(π1,i′)/(SA)2. Since there are Ω(SA) policies {π1,i′}i′ , this
implies that η(π1,i) = Ω(SA) is feasible. A similar argument holds for any π2,i. Thus
the value of the restricted LP is at most O(SA), for any ϵ ≪ SA.
However, we claim that the value of the semi-infinite LP which actually characterizes
the regret is at least Ω(S2A2). First, to see that the above assignment of η is not
feasible for the semi-infinite LP, consider any policy π ̸∈ Π∗, e.g. take the policy
which visits the state in layer 2 with reward 1 − 1/SA − ϵ and the state in layer
4 with reward 1 − 2/SA − ϵ. Each of these states have been visited O(SA) times













≈ 1/SA. In general each of the states in black in
the second layer and the fourth layer have been visited 1/SA times less than what
is necessary to distinguish any π ̸∈ Π∗ as sub-optimal. If we define the i-th column
of the MDP as the pair consisting of the states with rewards 1 − 1/SA − iϵ and
1−2/SA− iϵ then to distinguish the policy visiting both of these states as sub-optimal
we need to visit at least one of these Ω(S2A2) times. This implies we need to visit







= Ω(S2A2), leading to the promised multiplicative gap of Ω(SA)
between the values of the two LPs.
Why does such a gap arise and how can we hope to fix it this issue? Any feasible
solution to the LP restricted to Π∗ essentially needs to visit the states in green Θ(S2A2)
times. This is sufficient to distinguish the green states as sub-optimal to visit and
hence any strategy visiting these states would be also deemed sub-optimal. This is
223
achievable by playing each strategy in Π∗ in the order of Θ(SA) times as already
discussed. Now, even though Π∗ covers all other states, from our argument above
we see that we need to play each π ∈ Π∗ in the order of Θ(S2A2) times to be able
to determine all sub-optimal states. To solve this issue, we either have to increase
the size of Π∗ to include for example all policies visiting each column of the MDP
or at the very least include changes of environments in the constraint set which
make such policies optimal. This is clearly computationally feasible for the MDP
in Figure 5-4, however, it is not clear how to proceed for general MDPs, without
having to include exponentially many constraints. The following interesting questions
arises: is it possible to come up with a relaxation of the LP, computable in polynomial
time, with solution which is at most o(SA) multiplicative constant away from what is
optimal. We show in Section 5.7.3.2 that this is indeed possible for the special case of
deterministic transition, tree-structured MDPs.
5.7 Proofs from Section 5.6
Let Nψ,π(k) be the random variable denoting the number of times policy π has been
chosen by the strategy ψ. Let Nψ,(s,a)(k) be the number of times the state-action pair
has been visited up to time k by the strategy ψ.
5.7.1 Proof of Theorem 5.6.1
We begin by formulating an LP characterizing the minimum regret incurred by any
uniformly good algorithm ψ.
Theorem 5.7.1. Let ψ be a uniformly good RL algorithm for Θ, that is, for all problem
instances θ ∈ Θ and exponents α > 0, the regret of ψ is bounded as E[Rθ(K)] ≤ o(Kα).




log (K) ≥ C(θ),
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η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ Λ(θ)
, (5.29)




λ ) = 0} are all environments that
share no optimal policy with θ and do not change the rewards or transition kernel on
π∗.
Proof. We can write the expected regret as E[Rθ(K)] =
∑︁
π∈Π Eθ[Nψ,π(K)](v∗θ − vπθ ).
We will show that η(π) = Eθ[Nψ,π(K)]/ log (K) is feasible for the optimization problem
in Equation 5.27. This is sufficient to prove the theorem. To do so we follow the
techniques of Garivier et al. (2019). With slight abuse of notation, let PIkθ be the law
of all trajectories up to episode k. We have
KL(PIk+1θ ,P
Ik+1

















λ ) + E
⎡⎣∑︂
π∈Π
χ(ψ(Ik) = π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ)
⎤⎦ .
(5.30)
Iterating the argument we arrive at ∑︁π∈Π Eθ[Nψ,π(K)]KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = KL(PIKθ ,PIKλ )
where Eθ denotes expectation in problem instance θ. Next one shows that for any
measurable Z ∈ [0, 1], it holds that KL(PIKθ ,P
IK
λ ) ≥ kl(Eθ[Z],Eλ[Z]) where kl(p, q) =
p log (p/q) + (1 − p) log ((1 − p)/(1 − q)) denotes the KL-divergence between two
Bernoulli random variables p and q. This follows directly from Lemma 1 by Garivier
et al. (2019). Finally we choose Z = Nψ,Π∗
λ
(K)/K as the fraction of episodes where

































− log (2) .
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Since ψ is a uniformly good it follows that for any α > 0, K −Eλ[Nψ,Π∗
λ
(K)] = o(Kα).
By assuming that Π∗θ ∩ Π∗λ = ∅, we get Eθ[Nψ,Π∗λ(K)] = o(K). This implies that for













≥ log (K) − log (Kα) = (1 − α) log (K) α→0−−→ log (K) .
The set Λ′(θ) is uncountably infinite for any reasonable Θ we consider. What is
worse the constraints of LP 5.27 will not form a closed set and thus the value of the
optimization problem will actually be obtained on the boundary of the constraints.
To deal with this issue it is possible to show the following.
Proof of Theorem 5.6.1. For the rest of this proof we identify Λ′(θ) = {λ ∈ Θ :




λ ) = 0,∀π∗θ ∈ Π∗θ} as the set from Theorem 5.7.1 and











λ ) = 0}. From the proof of
Theorem 5.7.1 it is clear that we can rewrite Λ′(θ) as the union ⋃︁π∈Π Λπ(θ), where










λ = π} is the set of all environments











η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1 for all π′ ∈ Π
. (5.31)
The above formulation now minimizes a linear function over a finite intersection of
sets, however, these sets are still slightly inconvenient to work with. We are now going
to try to make these sets more amenable to the proof techniques we would like to
use for deriving specific lower bounds. We begin by noting that Λπ(θ) is bounded
in the following sense. We identify each λ with a vector in [0, 1]S2A × [0, 1]SA where
the first S2A coordinates are transition probabilities and the last SA coordinates
are the expected rewards. From now on we work with the natural topology on
[0, 1]S2A× [0, 1]SA, induced by the ℓ1 norm. Further, we claim that we can assume that
226
KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) is a continuous function over Λπ′(θ). The only points of discontinuity are
at λ for which the support of the transition kernel induced by λ does not match the
support of the transition kernel induced by θ. At such points the KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = ∞.
This implies that such λ does not achieve the infimum in the set of constraints so
we can just restrict Λπ′(θ) to contain only λ for which KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) < ∞. With this
restriction in hand the KL-divergence is continuous in λ.
Fix a π′ and consider the set {η : infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1} correspond-





















continuous in λ. To see the statement for vπ
∗
λ
λ , notice that this is the maximum over the
continuous functions vπλ over π ∈ Π. Take any η ∈ Λπ′(θ) and let {λj}∞j=1, λj ∈ Λπ′(θ)
be a sequence of environments such that ∑︁π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλj) ≥ 1 + 2−j. If
there is no convergent subsequence of {λj}∞j=1 in Λπ′(θ) we claim it is because





θ . Take the limit λ of any convergent subsequence of
{λj}∞j=1 in the closure of Λπ′(θ). Then by continuity of the divergence we have















This shows that Λ̃π′(θ) is a subset of the closure of Λπ′(θ) which implies it is the
closure of Λπ′(θ), i.e., Λ̄π′(θ) = Λ̃π′(θ).
Next, take η ∈ {η : minλ∈Λ̄π′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1} and let λπ′,η be the
environment on which the minimum is achieved. Such λπ′,η exists because we just
showed that Λ̄π′(θ) is closed and bounded and hence compact and the sum con-
sists of a finite number of continuous functions. If λπ′,η ∈ Λπ′(θ) then η ∈ {η :
infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1}. If λπ′,η ̸∈ Λπ′(θ) then λπ′,η must be a limit point
of Λπ′(θ). By definition we can construct a convergent sequence of {λj}∞j=1, λj ∈ Λπ′(θ)
to λπ′,η such that
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλj) ≥ 1. This implies
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλj) ≥
infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ). Using the continuity of the KL term and taking
limits, the above implies that the minimum upper bounds the infimum. Since we
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argued that Λπ′(θ) is bounded and
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλj) is also bounded from be-
low this implies Λ̄π′(θ) contains the infimum infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ). This
implies infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ minλ∈Λ̄π′ (θ)
∑︁
π∈Π η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) , and so
the infimum over Λπ(θ) equals the minimum over Λ̄π(θ). Which finally implies that
η ∈ {η : infλ∈Λπ′ (θ)
∑︁











η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1 for all π′ ∈ Π
,












λ ) = 0} i.e. the set of environments which makes
any π optimal without changing the environment on state-action pairs in π∗θ .
5.7.2 Proof of Theorem 5.6.3
Proof of Lemma 5.6.2. Let λ be the environment that is identical to θ except for the
immediate reward for state-action pair for (s, a). Specifically, let Rλ(s, a) so that
rλ(s, a) = rθ(s, a) + ∆ with ∆ = gapθ(s, a) . Since we assume that rewards are
Gaussian, it follows that
KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = wπλ(s, a)KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) ≤ KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a))
≤ gapθ(s, a)2
for any policy π ∈ Π. We now show that the optimal value function (and thus return)
of λ is uniformly upper-bounded by the optimal value function of θ. To that end,
consider their difference in any state s′, which we will upper-bound by their difference
in s as
V ∗λ (s′) − V ∗θ (s′) ≤ χ(κ(s) > κ(s′))P
π∗λ
θ (sκ(s) = s|sκ(s′) = s′)[V ∗λ (s) − V ∗θ (s)]
≤ V ∗λ (s) − V ∗θ (s).
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Further, the difference in s is exactly
V ∗λ (s) − V ∗θ (s) = rλ(s, a) + ⟨Pθ(·|s, a), V ∗θ ⟩ − V ∗θ (s)
= rθ(s, a) + ⟨Pθ(·|s, a), V ∗θ ⟩ + gapθ(s, a) − V ∗θ (s) = 0.
Hence, V ∗λ = V ∗θ ≤ 1 and thus λ ∈ Θ. We will now show that there is a policy that is
optimal in λ but not in θ. Let π∗ ∈ Π∗θ be any optimal policy for θ that has non-zero
probability of visiting s and consider the policy
π̃(s̃) =
⎧⎨⎩π∗(s̃) if s ̸= s̃a if s = s̃
that matches π∗ on all states except s. We will now show that π̃ achieves the same




(i)= wπ̃λ(s, π̃(s))[rλ(s, π̃(s)) + ⟨Pλ(·|s, π̃(s)), V π̃λ ⟩]
− wπ∗λ (s, π∗(s))[rλ(s, π∗(s)) + ⟨Pλ(·|s, π∗(s)), V π
∗
λ ⟩]
(ii)= wπ∗λ (s, π∗(s))[rλ(s, π̃(s)) − rλ(s, π∗(s)) + ⟨Pλ(·|s, π̃(s)) − Pλ(·|s, π∗(s)), V π
∗
λ ⟩]
(iii)= wπ∗θ (s, π∗(s))[∆ + rθ(s, π̃(s)) − rθ(s, π∗(s)) + ⟨Pθ(·|s, π̃(s)) − Pθ(·|s, π∗(s)), V ∗θ ⟩]
(iv)= wπ∗θ (s, π∗(s))[∆ − gapθ(s, π̃(s))]
where (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that π̃ and π∗ only differ on s and hence, their
probability at arriving at s and their value for any successor state of s is identical. Step
(iii) follows from the fact that λ and θ only differ on (s, a) which is not visited by π∗.
Finally, step (iv) applies the definition of optimal value functions and value-function




θ = v∗θ . As we have seen
above, the optimal value function (and return) is identical in θ and λ and, hence, π̃ is
optimal in λ.
Note that the we can apply the chain of equalities above in the same manner to
vπ̃θ − vπ
∗





θ (s, π∗(s)) gapθ(s, a) < 0
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because wπ∗θ (s, π∗(s)) > 0 and gapθ(s, a) < 0 by assumption. Hence π̃ is not optimal
in θ, which completes the proof.
Lemma 5.7.2 (Optimization problem over S × A instead of Π). Let optimal value
C(θ) of the optimization problem Equation 5.27 in Theorem 5.6.1 is lower-bound by













η(s, a)KL(Pθ(·|s, a), Pλ(·|s, a)) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ Λ(θ)
(5.32)
Proof. First, we rewrite the objective of Equation 5.27 as
∑︂
π∈Π














where step (i) applies Lemma 5.5.1 proved in Section 5.5. Here, wπθ (s, a) is the
probability of reaching s and taking a when playing policy π in MDP θ. Similarly,

















⎤⎦ (KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) +KL(Pθ(·|s, a), Pλ(·|s, a)))
where the first equality follows from writing out the definition of the KL divergence.
Let now η(π) be a feasible solution to the original problem Equation 5.27. Then the two
equalities we just proved show that η(s, a) = ∑︁π∈Π η(π)wπθ (s, a) is a feasible solution
for the problem in Equation 5.32 with the same value. Hence, since Equation 5.32 is
a minimization problem, its optimal value cannot be larger than C(θ), the optimal
value of Equation 5.27.
Proof of Theorem 5.6.3. Let Λ̄(θ) be a set of all confusing MDPs from Lemma 5.6.2,
that is, for every suboptimal (s, a), Λ̄(θ) contains exactly one confusing MDP that
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differs with θ only in the immediate reward at (s, a). Consider now the relaxation of
Theorem 5.6.1 from Lemma 5.7.2 and further relax it by reducing the set of constraints









η(s, a)KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ Λ̄(θ)
Since all confusing MDPs only differ in rewards, we dropped the KL-term for the
transition probabilities. We can simplify the constraints by noting that for each λ,
only one KL-term is non-zero and it has value gapθ(s, a)2. Hence, we can write the





η(s, a) gapθ(s, a)
s.t. η(s, a) gapθ(s, a)2 ≥ 1 for all (s, a) ∈ S × A with gapθ(s, a) > 0




η(s, a) gapθ(s, a) ≥
∑︂
s,a : gapθ(s,a)>0






which completes the proof.
We note that because the relaxation in Lemma 5.7.2 essentially allows the algorithm
to choose which state-action pairs to play instead of just policies, the final lower bound
in Theorem 5.6.3 may be loose, especially in factors of H. However, it is unlikely that
the gapmin term arising in the upper bound of Simchowitz and Jamieson (2019) can
be recovered. We conjecture that such a term can be avoided by algorithms, which do
not construct optimistic estimators for the Q-function at each state-action pair but
rather just work with a class of policies and construct only optimistic estimators of
the return.
5.7.3 Lower bounds for deterministic MDPs
We will show that we can derive lower bounds in two cases:
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1. We show that if the graph induced by the MDP is a tree, then we can formulate
a finite LP which has value at most a polynomial factor of H away from the
value of LP 5.27.
2. We show that if we assume that the value function for any policy is at most 1
and the rewards of each state-action pair are at most 1, then we can derive a
closed form lower bound. This lower bound is also at most a polynomial factor
of H away from the solution to LP 5.27.
We begin by stating a helpful lemma, which upper and lower bounds the KL-
divergence between two environments on any policy π. Since we consider Gaussian re-
wards with σ = 1/
√
2 it holds that KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) = (rθ(s, a) − rλ(s, a))2. Fur-
ther for any π and λ it holds that KL(θ(π), λ(π)) = ∑︁(s,a)∈πKL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) =∑︁
(s,a)∈π(rθ(s, a)−rλ(s, a))2. We can now show the following lower bound onKL(θ(π), λ(π)).
Lemma 5.7.3. Fix π and suppose λ is such that π∗λ = π. Then (v∗ − vπ)2 ≥















rλ(s, a) − rθ(s, a) ≥ v∗ − vπ
,
admits a solution at θ, λ for which rλ(s, a) − rθ(s, a) = v
∗−vπ
H
,∀(s, a) ∈ π. The first











rλ(s, a) − rθ(s, a) ≥ v∗ − vπ,
and the fact that it admits a solution at θ, λ for which there exists a single state-action
pair (s, a) ∈ π such that rθ(s, a) − rλ(s, a) = v∗ − vπ and for all other (s, a) it holds
that rλ(s, a) = rθ(s, a).
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Using the above Lemma 5.7.3 we now show that we can restrict our attention
only to environments λ ∈ Λ(θ) which make one of π∗(s,a) optimal and derive an upper
bound on C(θ) which we will try to match, up to factors of H, later. Define the set
Λ̃(θ) = {λ ∈ Λ(θ) : ∃(s, a) ∈ S × A, π∗λ = π∗(s,a)} and Π∗ = {π ∈ Π, π ̸= π∗θ : ∃(s, a) ∈
S × A, π = π∗(s,a)}. We have









η(π)KL(θ(π), λ(π)) ≥ 1,∀λ ∈ Λ̃(θ)
. (5.33)
Then ∑︁π∈Π∗ Hv∗−vπ ≥ C(θ) ≥ C̃(θ)H .
Proof. We begin by showing C(θ) ≥ C̃(θ)
H
holds. Fix a π ̸∈ Π∗ s.t. the solution
of LP 5.27 implies η(π) > 0. Let λ ∈ Λ̃(θ) be a change of environment for which
KL(θ(π), λ(π)) > 0. We can now shift all of the weight of η(π) to η(π∗λ) while still
preserving the validity of the constraint. Further doing so to all π∗(s,a) for which







(s,a) . Thus, we have converted the solution to LP 5.27 to a feasible
solution to LP 5.33 which is only a factor of H larger.
Next we show that ∑︁π∈Π∗ Hv∗−vπ ≥ C(θ). Set η(π) = 0,∀π ∈ Π \ Π∗ and set
η(π) = H(v∗−vπ)2 ,∀π ∈ Π
∗. If π is s.t. η(π) > 0 then for any λ which makes π optimal
it holds that
1 ≤ H(v∗ − vπ∗λ)2 ×
(v∗ − vπ∗λ)2
H
≤ H(v∗ − vπ∗λ)2KL(θ(π
∗
λ), λ(π∗λ))




where the second inequality follows from Lemma 5.7.3. Next, if π is s.t. η(π) = 0 then
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KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a))
= H(v∗ − vπ∗λ)2KL(θ(π
∗
λ), λ(π∗λ)) ≥ 1,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that vπ∗λ ≤ vπ
∗
(s,a) , ∀(s, a) ∈ π∗λ.
5.7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 5.6.4
Lemma 5.7.5. Let Θ be the set of all episodic MDPs with Gaussian immediate
rewards and optimal value function uniformly bounded by 1. Consider an MDP θ ∈ Θ
with deterministic transitions. Then, for any reachable state-action pair (s, a) that is
not visited by any optimal policy, there exists a confusing MDP λ ∈ Λ(θ) with
• λ and θ only differ in the immediate reward at (s, a)
• KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = wπθ (s, a)(v∗θ−v
π∗(s,a)
θ )2 for all π ∈ Π where v
π∗(s,a)
θ = maxπ : wπ(s,a)>0 vπθ .
Proof. Let (s, a) ∈ S × A be any state-action pair that is not visited by any optimal
policy. Then v
π∗(s,a)
θ = maxπ : wπ(s,a)>0 vπθ ≤ v∗θ is strictly suboptimal in θ. Let π̃ be any
policy that visits (s, a) and achieves the highest return v
π∗(s,a)
θ in θ possible among such
policies.
Define λ to be the MDP that matches θ except in the immediate reward at (s, a),
which we set as Rλ(s, a) = N (rθ(s, a) + ∆, 1/2) with ∆ = v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ . That is, the
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expected reward of λ in (s, a) is raised by ∆. For any policy π, it then holds
KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = wπθ (s, a)KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a))
vπλ = wπθ (s, a)∆ + vπθ
due to the deterministic transitions. Hence, while v∗λ = v∗θ and all optimal policies of
θ are still optimal in λ, now policy π̃, which is not optimal in θ is optimal in λ.
By the choice of Gaussian rewards with variance 1/2, we haveKL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) =
(v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ )2 and thus KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) = wπθ (s, a)(v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ )2 for all π ∈ Π.
It only remains to show that λ ∈ Θ, i.e., that all immediate rewards and optimal
value function is bounded by 1. For rewards, we have
rλ(s, a) = rθ(s, a) + ∆ = rθ(s, a) + v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ = v∗θ − (v
π∗(s,a)
θ − rθ(s, a))⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
≥0
≤ v∗θ ≤ 1
for (s, a) and for all other (s′, a′), rλ(s′, a′) = rθ(s′, a′) ≤ 1. Finally, the value function
at any reachable state is bounded by the optimal return v∗λ = v∗θ ≤ 1 and for any
unreachable state, the optimal value function of λ is identical to the optimal value
function of θ. Hence, λ ∈ Θ.
Proof of Theorem 5.6.4. The proof works by first relaxing the general LP 5.27 and
then considering its dual. We now define the set Λ̌(θ) which consists of all changes
of environment which make π∗(s,a) optimal by only changing the distribution of the
reward at (s, a) by making it v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ larger. Formally, the set is defined as
Λ̌(θ) =
{︂
λ(s,a) : λ ∈ Λ(θ), KL(Rθ(s, a), Rλ(s, a)) = (v∗λ − v
π∗(s,a))2,
KL(Rθ(s′, a′), Rλ(s′, a′)) = 0, KL(Pθ(s′, a′), Pλ(s′, a′)) = 0,∀(s′, a′) ̸= (s, a)
}︂
.
This set is guaranteed to be non-empty (for any reasonable MDP) by Lemma 5.7.5.









η(π)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≥ 1 for all λ ∈ Λ̌(θ)
. (5.34)
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µ(λ)KL(Pπθ ,Pπλ) ≤ v∗θ − vπθ for all π ∈ Π.
(5.35)
By weak duality, the value of any feasible solution to Equation 5.35 produces a lower
bound on C(θ) in Theorem 5.6.1. Let
X = {(s, a) ∈ S × A : wπθ (s, a) = 0 for all π ∈ Π∗θ and wπθ (s, a) > 0 for some π ∈ Π \ Π∗θ}
be the set of state-action pairs that are reachable in θ but no optimal policy visits.
Then consider a dual solution µ that puts 0 on all confusing MDPs except on the |X |
many MDPs from Lemma 5.7.5. Since each such confusing MDP is associated with
an (s, a) ∈ X , we can rewrite µ as a mapping from X to R sending (s, a) → λ(s,a).
Specifically, we set







for all (s, a) ∈ X .
































wπθ (s, a)(v∗θ − v
π∗(s,a)
θ )
where the first equality applies our definition of µ and the second uses the expression
for the KL-divergence from Lemma 5.7.5. By definition of v
π∗(s,a)
θ , we have v
π∗(s,a)
θ ≥ vπθ












wπθ (s, a)(v∗θ − vπθ )
≤ v∗θ − vπθ
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where the second inequality holds because each policy visits at most H states. Thus













is a lower-bound for C(θ) from Theorem 5.6.1 which finishes the proof.
5.7.3.2 Tree-structured MDPs
Even though Lemma 5.7.4 restricts the set of confusing environments from Λ(θ) to
Λ̃(θ), this set could still have exponential or even infinite cardinality. In this section
we show that for a type of special MDPs we can restrict ourselves to a finite subset of
Λ̃(θ) of size at most SA.
Arrange π∗(s,a), (s, a) ∈ S × A according to the value functions v
π∗(s,a) . Under
this arrangement let π1 ⪰ π2 ⪰, . . . ,⪰ πm. Let π0 = π∗θ . We will now construct
m environments λ1, . . . , λm, which will constitute the finite subset. We begin by
constructing λ1 as follows. Let B1 be the set of all (sh, ah) ∈ π1 and (sh, ah) ̸∈ π0.
Arrange the elements in B1 in inverse dependence on horizon (sh1 , ah1) ⪯ (sh2 , ah2) ⪯
. . . ⪯ (shH1 , ahH1 ), where H1 = |B1|, so that h1 > h2 >, . . . , hH1 . Let λ1 be the
environment which sets
Rλ1(sh1 , ah1) = min(1, vπ0 − vπ1)
Rλ1(sh2 , ah2) = min(1,max(Rθ(sh2 , ah2), Rθ(sh2 , ah2) + vπ0 − (vπ1 −Rθ(sh1 , ah1)) − 1)))
...
Rλ1(shi , ahi) = min(1,max(Rθ(shi , ahi), Rθ(shi , ahi) + vπ0 − (vπ1 −
i∑︂
ℓ=1
Rθ(shℓ , ahℓ)) − i))
...
Clearly λ1 makes π1 optimal and also does not change the value of any state-action pair
which belongs to π0 so it agrees with θ on π0. Further π2, π3, . . . , πm are still suboptimal
policies under λ1. This follows from the fact that for any i > 1, vπ1 > vπi and there
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exists (s, a) such that (s, a) ∈ πi but (s, a) ̸∈ π1 so Rλ1(s, a) = Rθ(s, a). Further λ1 only
increases the rewards for state-action pairs in π1 and hence vπ1λ1 > v
πi
λ1 . Notice that there
exists an index H̃1 at which Rλ1(shH̃1 , ahH̃1 ) = v
π0 − (vπ1 −∑︁H̃1ℓ=1 Rθ(shℓ , ahℓ)) − H̃1) ≥
Rθ(aH̃1 , sH̃1). For this index it holds that for h < H̃1, Rλ1(sh, ah) = 1 and for h > H̃1,
Rλ1(sh, ah) = Rθ(sh, ah).
Let








We first define an environment λ̃i on (s, a) ∈ B̃i as follows. Rλi(s, a) = Rλℓ(s, a),
where ℓ < i is such that (s, a) ∈ Bℓ. Let vπiλ̃i be the value function of πi with respect
to λ̃i.
Lemma 5.7.6. It holds that vπi
λ̃i
≤ vπ0.
Proof. Let H̃ i be the index for which it holds that for ℓ ≤ H̃ i, (shℓ , ahℓ) ∈ πi ⇐⇒
(shℓ , ahℓ) ∈ Bi. Such a H̃ i exists as there is a unique sub-tree Mi, of maximal depth,
for which it holds that if πj
⋂︁Mi ̸= ∅ ⇐⇒ πi ⪰ πj . The root of this subtree is exactly
at depth H − hH̃i . Let πj be any policy such that πj ⪰ πi and ∃(shH̃i , ahH̃i ) ∈ πj. By
the maximality of Mi such a πj exists. Because of the tree structure it holds that for
any h′ > hH̃i if (sh′ , ah′) ∈ πi =⇒ (sh′ , ah′) ∈ πj and hence λ̃i = λj up to depth hH̃i .



























Since πj is optimal under λj the claim holds.
For all (shj , ahj) ∈ Bi we now set
Rλi(shj , ahj) = min(1,max(Rθ(shj , ahj), Rθ(shj , ahj) + vπ0 − (vπiλ̃i −
j∑︂
ℓ=1
Rλ̃i(shℓ , ahℓ)) − j)),
(5.36)
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and for all (sh, ah) ∈ B̃i we set Rλi(sh, ah) = Rλ̃i(sh, ah). From the definition of B̃i it
follows that λi agrees with all λj for j ≤ i on state-action pairs in πi. Finally we need
to show that the construction in Equation 5.36 yields an environment λi for which πi
is optimal.
Lemma 5.7.7. Under λi it holds that πi is optimal.







) ≤ ∑︁ℓ≤H̃i Rλi(sπihℓ , aπihℓ). We only need to show that∑︁ℓ≤H̃i Rλi(sπihℓ , aπihℓ) ≥
vπ0−vπi
λ̃i
. From Equation 5.36 we haveRλi(sh1 , ah1) = min(1, vπ0−vπiλ̃i ). IfRλi(sh1 , ah1) =
vπ0 − vπi
λ̃i
then the claim is complete. Suppose Rλi(sh1 , ah1) = 1. This implies
vπ0 − vπi
λ̃i
≥ 1 − Rθ(sh1 , ah1). Next the construction adds the remaining gap of
vπ0 − vπi
λ̃i
+ Rθ(sh1 , ah1) − 1 to Rθ(sh2 , ah2) and clips Rλi(sh2 , ah2) to 1 if necessary.
Continuing in this way we see that if ever Rλi(shj , ahj) = Rθ(shj , ahj) + vπ0 − (vπiλ̃i −∑︁j
ℓ=1 Rλ̃i(shℓ , ahℓ)) − j then v
π0 − V πi
λ̃i
≤ ∑︁ℓ≤H̃i Rλi(sπihℓ , aπihℓ). On the other hand if
this never occurs, we must have Rλi(sπihℓ , a
πi
hℓ






) which concludes the
claim.
Let ˆ︁Λ(θ) = {λ1, . . . , λm} be the set of the environments constructed above. We
now show that the value of the optimization problem is not too much smaller than
the value of Problem 5.27.









η(π)KL(θ(π), λ(π)) ≥ 1,∀λ ∈ ˆ︁Λ(θ),
satisfies ˆ︁C(θ) ≥ C(θ)
H2
and C(θ) ≥ ˆ︁C(θ)
H
.
Proof. The inequality C(θ) ≥ ˆ︁C(θ)
H
follows from Lemma 5.7.4 and the fact that the
above optimization problem is a relaxation to LP 5.33.
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η(π)KL(θ(π), λ(π)) ≥ 1, ∀λ ∈ ˆ︁Λ(θ).
Any solution to the LP in the statement of the theorem is feasible for the above LP and
thus the value of the above LP is no larger. We now show that the value of the above
LP is greater than or equal to C(θ)
H2
. Fix λ ∈ ˆ︁Λ(θ). We show that for any λ′ ∈ Λ(θ)
such that π∗λ = π∗λ′ it holds that KL(θ(π), λ(π)) ≤ H2KL(θ(π), λ′(π)),∀π ∈ Π. This
would imply that if η is a solution to the above LP, then H2η is feasible for LP 5.27
and therefore ˆ︁C(θ) ≥ C(θ)
H2
.
Arrange π ∈ Π : KL(θ(π), λ(π)) > 0 according to KL(θ(π), λ(π)) so that
πi ⪯ πj ⇐⇒ KL(θ(πi), λ(πi)) ≥ KL(θ(πj), λ(πj)).




subject to: π∗λ′ = π∗λ
.
If we let ∆λ′(sh, ah), (sh, ah) ∈ π∗λ denote the change of reward for (sh, ah) under









r(sh, ah) + ∆λ′(sh, ah) ≥ v∗
.
It is easy to see that the solution to the above optimization problem is to set r(sh, ah)+
∆λ′(sh, ah) = 1 for all h ∈ [hH̃i + 1, H] and spread the remaining mass of v
∗ −
H̃ i − (vπ
∗
λ − ∑︁H̃iℓ=1)Rθ(shℓ , ahℓ) as uniformly as possible on ∆λ′(sh, ah), h ∈ [1, hH̃i ].
Notice that under this construction the solution to the above optimization problem
and λ match for h ∈ [hH̃i + 1, H]. Since the remaining mass is now the same it
now holds that for any λ′, ∑︁hH̃ih=1 ∆λ′(sh, ah)2 ≥ 1h2
H̃i
∑︁hH̃i
h=1 ∆λ(sh, ah)2. This implies




KL(θ(π), λ(π)) and the result follows as H̃ i ≤ H,∀i ∈ [H].
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5.7.4 Omitted proofs for Theorem 5.6.7






brwk (si,1, 1) + bk(si,1)








where we assume ϵ is sufficiently small such that bk(s, a) ≤ brwk (s, a) for nk(s, a) ≥ N/4.
On the other hand, we have have with probability at least 1-δ, that ∀k : ˆ︁rk(s4,1, 2)+









brwk (si,j, 1) + bk(si,j, 1)
≥ 14 + c
⌜⃓⃓⎷ log (MN/(nδ))
N/n
≥ 14 + 4ϵ .
The proof is completed for n0 = 482.
Proof of Lemma 5.6.6. First we split Q̄k(s1,1, 2) into the observed sum of mean rewards
and bonuses from s1,1 to s5,2 and the value V̄ k(s5,2). Then we upper bound Q̄k(s1,1, 1)
by V̄ k(s5,2) and the maximum observed sum of mean rewards and bonuses along the
paths passing by s3,j for j ∈ [n]. Finally analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.6.5, it is
straightforward show that the latter is always larger as long as the visitation count




We now discuss several open problems which follow from the studied problems in this
work. The discussion is followed by concluding remarks.
6.1 Future directions
Chapter 2: While the primary goal of the work presented in Chapter 2 was to
improve on known policy regret bounds when side observations are present, at the core
of the main approach was solving the problem of online learning with side observations
and switching costs. We had assumed that the switching costs are constant and equal
to one throughout the game. A natural direction for future work is to investigate the
problem when switching costs can vary both throughout the rounds of the game and in
between different actions. Is it possible to come up with strategies with regret which
depends on the total sum of the switching costs, similarly to first or second order
regret bounds in online learning games? Further, we assumed that the feedback graph
is fixed and known before the start of the game. Can we give meaningful regret bounds
if the feedback evolves throughout the rounds of the game and we only observe the
additional losses but not the topology of the graph? Further, can we provide improved
regret guarantees if additional feedback is not determined by a graph but rather by
a metric space in which the accuracy of the feedback is dependent on the distance
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from the selected action. Finally, our lower bounds showed an instance of the online
learning game in which the presented strategy is essentially optimal. The instance,
however, was for a fixed feedback graph. Can we extend the lower bounds for arbitrary
feedback graphs, that is can we create a lower bound instance for any feedback graph
G such that any player strategy has to suffer regret at least Ω̃(γ(G)1/3T 2/3)?
Chapter 3: The recent work of Cutkosky et al. (2020) and our experiments
suggest that the upper regret bounds for both algorithms proposed in Chapter 3
are not tight. In particular we expect that there exists a strategy which obtains a






. It is unclear, however, if such a
regret bound is possible without a priori knowledge of the time horizon T . Further,
the question of min-max regret bounds for the corralling problem has not yet been
investigated. Therefore two natural directions are to derive instance dependent regret
lower bounds in the stochastic setting with gap and derive min-max regret bounds
in the general adversarial setting. Another fundamental question which our work
fails to address is what would happen in the stochastic setting if there are multiple
base algorithms containing the best arm. Is there a regret bound which interpolates
between gap-dependent regret and worst case
√
T regret in this setting? We also
ask if corralling can be extended to policy regret algorithms so to create a strategy
which enjoys a o(T ) regret bound for all memory bounded adversaries with m ∈ o(T )
simultaneously? Finally, recent work (Zhu and Nowak, 2021) has shown that model
selection for linear stochastic bandits is impossible in the worst case. On the other
hand the work of Foster et al. (2019) shows that under some mild assumptions
model selection is possible. Algorithm 10 in Chapter 3 can also be used to solve the
model selection problem under certain assumptions. A natural question is what other
assumptions allow for model selection.
Chapter 4: The definition of Policy Equilibrium that was presented in Chapter 4
only holds for two-player games and constant (independent of time horizon) memory
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m. It is non-trivial to extend the definition and the results beyond two-player games
as the interpretation of the view of each player becomes more involved. In particular,
it is not possible to reason that the opposing player is now choosing functions between
action sets as there are multiple opposing players. Having players with different
memory bounds complicates things further as there is no simple markovian structure
to the utilities. Can we extend our results for multiplayer games and m which is
sublinear in time horizon? It is possible to minimize policy regret against stronger
competitors, beyond the best fixed action for the history dependent losses, similar
to reductions between swap regret minimization and external regret minimization.
We know that when players decide their actions according to swap regret minimizing
algorithms then the average play converges to the set of Correlated Equilibrium. Can
we show similar results for players who are able to minimize notions of policy regret
induced by competing against a stronger type of memory bounded adversary? When
faced with a new extended class of equilibria it is natural to revisit some standard
questions in game theory pertaining to price of anarchy and price of stability. For
example there exist games in which the worse CCE is no worse than the worst Nash.
Is this also true about the worst PE? Further what is the social welfare of the best
PE compared to that of the best Nash? Are there natural algorithms which let us
achieve socially good PE?
Chapter 5: The results in Chapter 5 improve on prior work results about optimistic
algorithms, however, we know from Theorem 5.6.7 and the work of Simchowitz
and Jamieson (2019) that it is impossible for optimistic algorithms to achieve the
information theoretic optimal regret. The very recent work of Xu et al. (2021) makes a
step towards closing the gap to the information theoretic optimal bounds by proposing
a model-free, action-elimination type algorithm which can avoid the dependence on
SA
gapmin
. Unfortunately the proposed bounds suffer the same issues as described in
Figure 5-2. Our Definition 5.16 of the averaged clipping thresholds does not really rely
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on optimism. Can we use this or a similar definition to show an improved regret bound
for the algorithm proposed by Xu et al. (2021)? In general we were not able to show
closed form lower bounds for non-deterministic MDPs or even derive a computationally
tractable approach to approximating the solution of the semi-infinite LP governing
the information theoretic optimal rates. We pose the following question: is it possible
to find a constant or even a o(SA) factor approximation to Problem 5.27, computable
in polynomial time. Answering this question to the affirmative will result in a new
algorithm with a regret bound which avoids the SAgapmin term. On the other hand a
negative answer will show that, in general, there is no hope of improving on existing
bounds.
Other open problems: We have already discussed several natural open problems
following from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. We ask if it is possible to do corralling
in RL. One such example is the following. In Chapter 5 we discussed limitations of
current instance dependent bounds for the finite horizon tabular setting and proposed
a new notion of instance dependent bounds to tackle the problem. The new bounds
hold for most model-based optimistic algorithms. As we already discussed, the very
recent work of (Xu et al., 2021) tackles a slightly different problem with existing
regret bounds by proposing a model-free algorithm with an instance dependent regret
guarantee which has improved dependence on the size of the state-action space. Is it
possible to corral a model-free algorithm such as StrongEuler and the algorithm in
(Xu et al., 2021) to achieve a best of both worlds instance dependent guarantee, that
is a regret bound which has the improved dependence on the size of the state-action
space and only depends on the averaged gaps? While policy regret is the de facto
notion of regret which is minimized in RL, as the comparator is the best policy for
the MDP, it is natural to ask what would happen if the MDP evolves through time,
depending on the policies which the player selects. Can we define and minimize a
notion of policy regret in RL which captures the notion of an evolving MDP where
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the transition kernel and rewards at a given episode depend on prior policies selected
by the player?
6.2 Conclusion
This thesis investigated four different problems related to a counterfactual notion of
regret called policy regret. The problems span the topics of online learning with side
information, corralling and model selection, algorithmic game theory, and reinforcement
learning.
In Chapter 2 we presented an extensive analysis of policy regret minimization in
the presence of graph feedback, a scenario relevant to several applications in practice.
We gave a new algorithm whose regret guarantee only depends on the domination
number of the feedback graph. We also presented a matching lower bound for a
family of graphs that includes disjoint unions of star graphs. The technical tools
introduced in our proofs are likely to help derive a lower bound for all graph families.
Our algorithms were based on a reduction to the problem of online learning with
feedback graphs and switching costs in the adversarial setting.
In Chapter 3 we presented an extensive analysis of the problem of corralling
stochastic bandits. Our algorithms are applicable to a number of different contexts
where this problem arises. There are also several natural extensions and related
questions relevant to our study. One natural extension is the case where the set of
arms accessible to the base algorithms admit some overlap and where the reward
observed by one algorithm could serve as side-information to another algorithm.
Another extension is the scenario of corralling online learning algorithms with feedback
graphs. In addition to these and many other interesting extensions, our analysis was
shown to exhibit a connection with the problem of model selection for linear contextual
bandits (Foster et al., 2019; Cutkosky et al., 2020; Pacchiano et al., 2020b; Zhu and
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Nowak, 2021).
In Chapter 4 we gave a new twist on policy regret by examining it in the game
setting, where we introduced the notion of policy equilibrium and showed that it
captures the behavior of no policy regret players. While our characterization is precise,
we view this as only the first step towards truly understanding policy regret and its
variants in the game setting. Further, we showed that coarse correlated equilibria
are a strict subset of policy equilibria by showing that policy regret minimization
is incompatible with external regret minimization. Finally, we leveraged stability of
natural external regret minimization strategies to show that the average play of such
strategies will also converge to a policy equilibrium.
In Chapter 5 we prove that optimistic algorithms such as StrongEuler, can
suffer substantially less regret compared to what prior work had shown. We do
this by introducing a new notion of gap, while greatly simplifying and generalizing
existing analysis techniques. We further investigated the information-theoretic limits
of learning episodic layered MDPs. We provide two new closed-form lower bounds in
the special case where the MDP has either deterministic transitions or the optimal
policy is supported on all states. These lower bounds suggest that our notion of gap
better captures the difficulty of an episodic MDP for RL.
6.3 Other work
Outside of bandit algorithms and reinforcement learning which are the main focus of
this thesis, I have worked on several problems in the intersection of representation
learning and stochastic approximation. In (Arora et al., 2016, 2017), I investigate
the two related problems of Partial Least Squares (PLS) and Canonical Correlation
Analysis (CCA) from a learning perspective in which the observed data is coming
from some unknown distribution and the goal is to minimize the population risk. We
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propose streaming algorithms based on stochastic mirror descent which enjoy nice
convergence guarantees. In (Marinov et al., 2018), I investigate the problem of Online
Principcal Component Analysis (PCA) in the presence of corrupted or missing data
and propose two algorithms based on online mirror descent and Oja’s algorithm which
enjoy O(
√
T ) regret guarantees. In (Ullah et al., 2018), we propose an algorithm for
the problem of Kernel PCA with Random Fourier Features improving on all prior
bounds and achieving near optimal statistical rates. In (Arora and Marinov, 2019),
I investigate two convex relaxations for the streaming PCA problem and show that
SGD on one of the relaxations can indeed obtain comparable convergence rates to
Oja’s algorithm, which is considered min-max optimal. Finally, in (Arora et al., 2020),
we propose a simple differentially private algorithm which enjoys optimal rates both in
terms of statistical complexity and stochastic first-order oracle complexity whenever




A version of this appendix appeared in the lecture notes for the Optimization for
Machine Learning class (EN 601.481/681) in the Fall of 2018.
A.1 Convex sets
We begin by a review of basic terminology for convex sets.
Definition A.1.1 (Convex set). A set X ⊆ Rd is said to be convex if for all x, y ∈ X
the line segment [x, y] lies entirely in X , i.e., {αx + (1 − α)y : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1} ⊆ X .
Definition A.1.2 (Convex combination). Let X ⊆ Rd. Then the point ∑︁ki=1 αixi such
that αi ≥ 0 for all i, and
∑︁k
i=1 αi = 1 is called a convex combination of x1, . . . , xk.
If X is convex then ∑︁ki=1 αixi ∈ X .
Definition A.1.3 (Convex hull). The convex hull of a set of points X ⊆ Rd is the
minimal convex set containing X , i.e., it is the intersection of all convex sets containing
X . It can be equivalently defined as the set of all (finite) convex combinations of











Definition A.1.4 (Probability simplex). The d-dimensional probability simplex is
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denoted as ∆d−1 and is the convex set
∆d−1 = {x ∈ Rd :
d∑︂
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0∀i ∈ [d]}.
A.2 Convex Functions
Before we begin our discussion of convex function we need the following useful definition
of a Lipschitz function.
Definition A.2.1 (Lower semi-continuity). A function f : X → R is lower semi-
continous at a point x0 ∈ X if lim infx→x0 f(x) ≥ f(x0). A function f is said to be
lower semi-continuous if it is lower semi-continuous at every point in its domain.
Definition A.2.2 (Lipschitz continuity). A function f : X → R is L-Lipschitz
continuous with respect to a norm ∥ · ∥ on X if for all x, y ∈ X it holds that
|f(x) − f(y)| ≤ L∥x − y∥.
Next, we review the definition and basic properties of convex functions.
Definition A.2.3 (Convex function). Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex set. A function
f : X → R is said to be convex if for all x, y ∈ X and all α ∈ [0, 1],
f(αx + (1 − α)y) ≤ αf(x) + (1 − α)f(y).
We say that f is concave if −f is convex.
Definition A.2.4 (Proper function). A convex function f : X → R is proper if for
all x ∈ X , f(x) > −∞ and further there exists at least one y ∈ X s.t. f(y) < ∞.
Definition A.2.5 (Subgradient, subdifferential). Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex set, and
let f : X → R be a convex function. Then g ∈ Rd is a subgradient of f at x0 if and
only if
f(x) ≥ f(x0) + ⟨g, x − x0⟩ for all x ∈ X . (A.1)
The set of all subgradients is called a subdifferential: ∂f(x0) = {g | g is a subgradient of f at x0}.
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Theorem A.2.1 (Convexity: non-empty sub-differential). Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex
set. A function f : X → R is convex if and only if there exists a subgradient at each
x ∈ X .
Further we have the following characterization of convex Lipschitz functions.
Theorem A.2.2 (Convexity: Lipschitz continous functions). A convex function
f : X → R is L-Lipschitz continuous with respect to a norm ∥ · ∥ iff for all x0 ∈ X
and all subgradients g at x0 it holds that ∥g∥ ≤ L.
Definition A.2.6 (Epigraph). The epigraph of a function f : X → R is defined as
epi f = {(x, y) : x ∈ X , y ≥ f(x)}.
Claim A.2.3 (Convexity: epigraph). A function f : X → R is convex if and only if
its epigraph is a convex set.
Definition A.2.7 (Sublevel sets). The α-sublevel set of a function f : X → R is
defined as
Sα = {x | f(x) ≤ α}.
Claim A.2.4. If f : X → R is a convex function, then Sα is a convex set for all α.
Proof. Let (x, y) ∈ Sα. Then, f(x) ≤ α and f(y) ≤ α by definition. This implies, due
to convexity, f(λx + (1 − λ)y) ≤ λf(x) + (1 − λ)f(y) ≤ α for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Thus,
λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ Sα for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
A.2.1 Differentiable functions.
When a function f is differentiable we can characterize convexity in the following way.
Theorem A.2.5 (Convexity: first order condition). A differentiable function f : X →
R is convex if and only if X is convex and
f(x) ≥ f(x0) + ∇f(x0) · (x − x0) for all x, x0 ∈ X . (A.2)
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The first-order condition states that the linear approximation given by the first-
order Taylor approximation gives a global underestimator of the function. Put
differently, the local information, i.e., the function value and gradient at that point,
provide global information about a convex function.
The first-order condition gives the following characterization of the globally optimal
point: if the gradient of a convex function f vanishes at some point x0 ∈ X , then x0
must be a global minimizer of f :
∇f(x0) = 0 =⇒ x0 ∈ arg minx∈X f(x).
The first-order condition states that the linear approximation given by the first-
order Taylor approximation gives a global underestimator of the function. Put
differently, the local information, i.e., the function value and gradient at that point,
provide global information about a convex function.
Theorem A.2.6 (Convexity: second order condition). If f is a twice continuously
differentiable on X ⊆ Rd. Then, f is convex if and only if ∇2f(x) ⪰ 0 for all x ∈ X .
Next, we show that a gradient (equivalently, a subgradient if f is not differentiable)
defines a supporting hyperplane to sublevel sets.
Claim A.2.7. Let f(x0) = α. If ∇f(x0) ̸= 0, then Sα ⊆ {x | ⟨∇f(x0), x − x0⟩ ≤ 0}.
Proof. Let x ∈ Sα. Then, f(x) ≤ f(x0). Since f is convex, we have that f(x) ≥
f(x0) + ⟨▽f(x0), x − x0⟩. Rearranging the terms we get,
⟨▽f(x0), x⟩ ≤ ⟨▽f(x0), x0⟩ + (f(x) − f(x0))
≤ ⟨▽f(x0), x0⟩,
which implies that x ∈ {x | ⟨∇f(x0), x − x0⟩ ≤ 0}.
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This is a particularly important result, since if we are at x0 and want to minimize
f , then the gradient excludes the halfspace {x | ⟨∇f(x0), x − x0⟩ ≥ 0} from the search
space.
A.2.2 Strict convexity, strong convexity, and smoothness
We assume that the function f is differentiable. Strict convexity and strong convexity
can be defined for at points of non-differentiability through use of a sub-gradient.
Definition A.2.8 (Strict convexity). A function f : X → R is strictly convex iff
∀x, y ∈ X it holds that
f(y) > f(x) + ⟨∇f(x), y − x⟩.
Strict convexity is similar to convexity, however, requires that the inequality is
strict in the lower bound. Strong convexity further requires that the function is lower
bounded by a quadratic.
Definition A.2.9 (Strong convexity). A differentiable function f : X → R is α-
strongly convex if for some α > 0, and all x, y ∈ X ,
f(y) ≥ f(x) + ⟨∇f(x), y − x⟩ + α2 ∥y − x∥
2
2. (A.3)
For twice differentiable functions, we can characterize these different notions in
terms of a condition on the directional second derivatives, or equivalently as a condition
on the eigenvalues of the Hessian, ∇2f(x). Recall, that a twice differentiable function
is convex if and only if ∇2f(x) ⪰ 0 for all x ∈ X . A function is strictly convex if and
only if ∇2f(x) ≻ 0, and strongly convex if and only if ∇2f(x) ⪰ αI.
Next, we quickly review different equivalent conditions for strong convexity.
Proposition A.2.8 (Equivalent conditions for strong convexity). Let X ⊆ Rd be a
convex set. Then, a differentiable function f : X → R, is α-strongly convex, for some
α > 0, if any of the following holds.
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1. f(y) ≥ f(x) + ⟨∇f(x), y − x⟩ + α2 ∥y − x∥
2
2 ∀ x, y ∈ X .
2. h(x) = f(x) − α2 ∥x∥
2 is convex.
3. ⟨∇f(x) − f(y), x − y⟩ ≥ α∥x − y∥2, ∀ x, y ∈ X .
4. f(λx+(1−λ)y) ≤ λf(x)+(1−λ)f(y)− λ(1−λ)2 α∥x −y∥
2 ∀ x, y ∈ X , λ ∈ [0, 1].
Further if f is twice differentiable then it is α-strongly convex iff
6. ∇2f(x) ⪰ αI.
Next, we discuss properties of smooth convex functions. Smoothness is a dual
notion to strong convexity as we will shortly see. The notion intuitively states that
the function f is upper bounded by a quadratic.
Definition A.2.10 (Smoothness). A continuously differentiable function f : Rd → R
is β-smooth if the gradient map ∇f : Rd → Rd is β-Lipschitz, i.e, for all x, y ∈ Rd
∥∇f(x) − ∇f(y)∥ ≤ β∥x− y∥ . (A.4)
The following equivalence holds.
Theorem A.2.9 (Quadratic upper bound for smooth functions). A convex function
f : Rd → R is β-smooth iff for all x, y ∈ Rd it holds that
f(y) ≤ f(x) + ⟨∇f(x), y − x⟩ + β2 ∥x − y∥
2.
Further all convex β-smooth functions satisfy for all x, y ∈ Rd
f(y) ≥ f(x) + ⟨∇f(x), y − x⟩ + β2 ∥∇f(x) − ∇f(y)∥
2.
The second part of the above theorem is very similar to the strong convexity
definition. This inequality can actually be seen as a corollary of a result which
characterizes strong convexity and smoothness as dual properties. To state this result
formally we need to introduce the Fenchel conjugate of a convex function f , which
we do in Section A.3.3.
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A.2.3 Jensen’s Inequality
We now present a fundamental inequality for convex functions.
Theorem A.2.10 (Jensen’s Inequality). Let X be a random variable taking values in
a non-empty convex set X ⊆ Rd with a finite expectation E[X], and f a measurable
convex function defined over X . Then, E[X] is in X , E[f(X)] is finite, and the
following inequality holds:
f(E[X]) ≤ E[f(X)].
A.3 Potential functions and Bregman divergence
and Mirror descent
Mirror descent is a generalization of the popular gradient descent procedure for finding
an approximate minimizer of a convex function. The gradient descent update for a
function f at a point xt can be summarized as follows
xt+1 = xt − η∇f(xt),
where η is the step-size parameter. The motivation behind this update is that −∇f(xt)
is a descent direction for f if f is a convex function, thus selecting a sufficiently small
step size η would result in an iterate xt+1 s.t. f(xt) ≥ f(xt+1).
if we are working in a Banach space, i.e., with a geometry defined with respect
to a norm (or a distance function) that is not induced by an inner product, then we
cannot employ the gradient descent strategy. Instead, Nemirovsky and Yudin (1983)
propose the following method. We can first map the point x ∈ X to the dual space
X ∗, then perform the gradient update in the dual space and finally map the resulting
point back to the primal space. At each update, the new point in the primal space X
might be outside the constraint set C ⊂ X in which case it should be projected into
the constraint set C. We will define a new geometry using a function which we will
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refer to as the potential function Φ(x) and use Bregman projection based on Bregman
divergence to define this geometry.
A.3.1 The Geometry of ℓp Norms
We begin by recalling the definition of the gradient. Given a function f : X → R,
X ⊂ Rd, the gradient of f at x0 is the linear operator ∇f : Rd → R such that
lim
x→x0, x∈X
|f(x) − f(x0) − ∇f [x − x0]|
∥x − x0∥
= 0.
The gradient is a continuous linear functional on Rd, i.e., ∇f lives in the dual space X ∗
of X . A natural question to ask is how to identify elements of X with those in X ∗. The
canonical identification of X and X ∗ is given as follows. Let {ei}di=1 be the standard
basis for X . Construct a basis {e∗i }di=1 for X ∗ such that e∗i (ej) = ⟨e∗i , ej⟩ = δi,j . In fact,
this is the natural identification induced by the standard inner product on Rd (follows
from the Riesz Representation Theorem). Indeed, this is what motivated the gradient
descent update, i.e., identifying the descent direction with the negative gradient.
However, this also motivates the following question. If the standard inner product,
which induces the Euclidean geometry on X , gives us the canonical identification,
what identification would a different geometry yield? For example, what happens
if we consider the geometry induced by ℓp norms on X ? For simplicity, assume
that 1 < p < ∞, so that the derivative of the ℓp norm is continuously differentiable.





= 1. Consider ψ∗ : X ∗ → R that maps ϕ ∈ X ∗ to ψ∗(ϕ) = 12∥ϕ∥
2
∗. This map
is continuously differentiable and it induces the following identification ∇ψ∗ : X ∗ → X
that maps ϕ ∈ X ∗ to ∇ψ∗(ϕ) ∈ X . We next show that the map ∇ψ∗ is a one-to-one
correspondence. First, note that by convexity of ∥ · ∥∗,
0 ≥ ∥ϕ∥∗ + ⟨∇∥ϕ∥∗, 0 − ϕ⟩ ⇐⇒ ⟨∇∥ϕ∥∗, ϕ⟩ ≥ ∥ϕ∥∗
2∥ϕ∥∗ ≥ ∥ϕ∥∗ + ⟨∇∥ϕ∥∗, 2ϕ− ϕ⟩ =⇒ ⟨∇∥ϕ∥∗, ϕ⟩ ≤ ∥ϕ∥∗
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Then, by definition of the dual norm we know that ∇∥ϕ∥∗ is the maximizer of the
linear functional ϕ over the ∥ · ∥-unit ball. We can also show that ∇∥ϕ∥∗ is the
unique maximizer (Using Corollary 1.3 from Brezis (2010) and the remark that
follows). Using the chain rule, we get ∇ψ∗(ϕ) = ∥ϕ∥∗∇∥ϕ∥∗. So ϕ is mapped
to the element which maximizes the linear functional ϕ over the ball of size ∥ϕ∥∗.
It remains to be shown that this mapping is a bijection. Define ψ : X → R as
ψ(x) = 12∥x∥
2. By the exact same reasoning as for ψ∗ we have that ∇ψ(x) is the unique
maximizer of ⟨ϕ, x⟩ over ∥ϕ∥∗ ≤ ∥x∥. We only need to show that ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(x)) =
x. Well ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(x)) = arg max∥x̃∥=∥∇ψ(x)∥∗⟨x̃,∇ψ(x)⟩ = arg max∥x̃∥=∥x∥⟨x̃,∇ψ(x)⟩,
since∇ψ(x) = arg max∥ϕ∥∗=∥x∥⟨ϕ, x⟩. By corollary 1.4 from Brezis (2010) we know
that ⟨∇ψ(x), x⟩ = ∥x∥2. On the other hand ⟨x̃,∇ψ(x)⟩ ≤ ∥x̃∥∥∇ψ(x)∥ = ∥x∥2 for all
∥x̃∥ = ∥x∥. By the remark after Corollary 1.3 Brezis (2010) x is the unique maximizer
of max∥x̃∥=∥x∥⟨x̃,∇ψ(x)⟩.
We can now adapt our GD procedure to the identification induced by ϕ∗ and ϕ in
the following simple way:
xt+1 = ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(xt) − η∇f(xt)). (A.5)
How can we adapt the analysis? Well we need to choose the appropriate potential
function with which to track the progress of our algorithm. Let us try to see why we
chose ∥ · −x∗∥22 as our potential. Notice that by convexity we have that 2⟨∇f(x), x∗ −
x⟩ ≤ 0, however, this is also the derivative of ∥x − x∗∥2 in the direction of ∇f(x).
Thus −∇f(x) is a descent direction for the smooth function ∥x − x∗∥2. Can we come
up with a similar smooth function for ⟨∇f(x), x∗ − ∇ψ∗(ϕx)⟩, where x = ∇ψ∗(ϕx).
Well we can get the term x∗ − ∇ψ∗(ϕx) as the derivative of ⟨ϕx, x∗⟩ − ψ∗(ϕx). Being a
bit smarter we realize that
⟨∇f(x), x∗ − ∇ψ∗(ϕx)⟩ =






and thus a good candidate for a potential function becomes V (ϕ) = ψ∗(ϕ) − ⟨ϕ, x∗⟩.
257
Let us see how we can analyze the update in A.5. First we use the fact that ψ∗ is
L-smooth for some L. This follows from the fact ψ∗ is the Fenchel conjugate of ψ
and the fact that ψ is 1L strongly convex. Let ϕt = ∇ϕ(xt). The smoothness of ψ
∗
implies that V is also smooth with the same smoothness parameter L, since it is just
a translation of ψ∗. We now have the following derivation:





≤ V (ϕt) − η(f(xt) − f(x∗)) +
LLη2
2
=⇒ f(x̄) − f(x∗) ≤





Let us dissect the above reasoning – there are two key parts to the proof. First the
function ψ needs to be such that ∇ψ is a bijection between X and X ∗. Secondly we
needed that this function is smooth so we can construct a smooth potential function
with which to track the progress of our algorithm. We used properties of ℓp norms
heavily when deriving these two statements, however, many other functions posses the
required properties. We are going to call any function which posses the first property
i.e. invertible continuous gradient a mirror map. Any mirror map is now going to
induce an identification of the primal and dual spaces. In what follows the focus is
only going to be on mirror maps ψ, which are α-strongly convex functions. We note
that for the invertible property to hold we only need strict convexity, however, the
strong convexity is going to allow us to construct a 1
α
-smooth potential function with
which to track progress.
A.3.3 The Fenchel Dual
It the short exercise above we saw that when ψ ≡ 12∥ · ∥
2
p, then ∇−1ψ(ϕ) = ∇ψ∗(ϕ)





= 1. In particular the inverse of the gradient operator was
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given by the gradient of the dual norm. We are now going to show how to use duality
to get a similar result for general α-strongly convex functions ψ.
Definition A.3.1. The Fenchel dual of a proper function ψ : X → R⋃︁{∞} is
ψ∗ : X ∗ → R⋃︁{∞} such that:
ψ∗(ϕ) = sup
x∈X
⟨ϕ, x⟩ − ψ(x). (A.6)
By definition ψ∗ is convex and lower semi-continuous on X ∗. We now state two
results for completeness without proof.
Lemma A.3.1 (Proposition 1.10 Brezis (2010)). Assume ψ : X → R is convex and
lower semi-continuous and that ψ ̸≡ ∞. Then ψ∗ ̸≡ ∞. In particular ψ is bounded
from below by an affine continuous function.
Theorem A.3.2 (Fenchel–Moreau). Assume that ψ is convex, lower semi-continuous
and ψ ̸≡ ∞. Then ψ∗∗ = ψ.
In the example we saw in the beginning of this section ψ(x) = 12∥x∥




∗. We also saw that the inverse of the gradient mapping ∇ψ was ∇ψ∗. Next we
are going to show that this is true not only for norms but for general ψ, which are
α-strongly convex and continuously differentiable.
Lemma A.3.3. If ψ is continuously differentiable and α-strongly convex then ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(x)) =
x
Proof. The proof is not much different from what we did in the case when ψ was the
squared norm. First notice that since ψ is strongly convex then the maximizer of
supx∈X ⟨y, x⟩ − ψ(x) exists and is unique. Let this maximizer be x∗. From first order
optimality we know that ∇ψ(x∗) = y. Now by definition we know that ψ(x∗)+ψ∗(y) =
⟨y, x∗⟩. On the other hand, using Fenchel-Moreau we have that ψ∗∗(x∗)+ψ∗(y) = ⟨y, x∗⟩
and thus y is a maximizer of supy∈X ∗⟨y, x∗⟩ − ψ∗(y). This implies that ∇ψ∗(y) = x∗
and thus ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(x∗)) = x∗.
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We note that the above lemma also holds true if we do not assume that ψ is
continuously differentiable or differentiable at all. We only need to assume ψ is lower
semi-continuous, strictly convex and ψ ̸≡ ∞. Recall that in the convergence proof of
mirror descent we used the fact that ψ∗ is a smooth function. We now show that such
an assumption is justified, provided that ψ is α-strongly convex.




Proof. Let x1 and x2 be elements of the primal space which are maximizers of
supx∈X ⟨yi, x⟩ − ψ(x) for i = 1 and i = 2 respectively. By strong convexity we
have:
ψ(x2) − ψ(x1) − ⟨y1, x2 − x1⟩ ≥
α
2 ∥x2 − x1∥
2
ψ(x1) − ψ(x2) − ⟨y2, x1 − x2⟩ ≥
α
2 ∥x1 − x2∥
2.
Summing and using Holder’s inequality we have
∥y1 − y2∥∗∥x1 − x2∥ ≥ α∥x1 − x2∥2.
Plugging in the fact xi = ∇ψ∗(yi) we conclude the proof.
We note that the opposite relation between smoothness and strong-convexity also
holds, i.e., if ψ is β-smooth, then ψ∗ is 1/β-strongly convex (Kakade et al., 2009). We
now have all the ingredients to repeat the proof of convergence for mirror descent
when the identification is induced by an α-strongly convex ψ.
A.3.4 Analysis in the primal space and Bregman divergence
Recall the potential function which tracked the progress of MD: V (y) = ψ∗(y)−⟨y, x∗⟩.
This function tracks the progress of the algorithm in the dual space in the sense that
we bound V (∇ψ(xt+1)) − V (∇ψ(xt+1)). Can we carry out the same analysis in the
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primal space i.e. is there a potential function W : X → R such that we can track the
progress of the algorithm via W (xt+1) −W (xt)? We now show one such function as
follows. Let y = ∇ψ(x) so that ψ∗(y) + ψ(x) = ⟨y, x⟩. We have
V (y) = ⟨y, x⟩ − ψ(x) − ⟨y, x∗⟩ = ⟨∇ψ(x), x − x∗⟩ − ψ(x).
Let us "translate" the analysis from the dual to the primal space using this new
potential W (x) = ⟨∇ψ(x), x − x∗⟩ − ψ(x).
W (xt+1) −W (xt) = ψ(xt) − ψ(xt+1) + ⟨∇ψ(xt+1), xt+1 − x∗⟩ − ⟨∇ψ(xt), xt − x∗⟩
= ψ(xt) − ψ(xt+1) + ⟨∇ψ(xt) − η∇f(xt), xt+1 − x∗⟩ − ⟨∇ψ(xt), xt − x∗⟩
= −η⟨∇f(xt), xt+1 − x∗⟩ + ψ(xt) − ψ(xt+1) + ⟨∇ψ(xt), xt+1 − xt⟩
≤ −η⟨∇f(xt), xt+1 − x∗⟩ −
α
2 ∥xt+1 − xt∥
2
= η⟨∇f(xt), x∗ − xt⟩ − η⟨∇f(xt), xt+1 − xt⟩ −
α
2 ∥xt+1 − xt∥
2
≤ f(x∗) − f(xt) + η∥∇f(xt)∥∗∥xt − xt+1∥ −
α
2 ∥xt − xt+1∥
2





where in the first inequality we have used the strong convexity of ψ in the second
inequality we have used Holder’s inequality and the third inequality follows from the
fact that 2xy − y2 ≤ x2. To finish the analysis we only need to telescope the LHS and
take the average on the RHS.
Even though we now have an analysis in the primal space the potential function
we used seems a bit peculiar. If we didn’t have the potential in the dual space it is
very unlikely we come up with exactly W . Staring at the form of W we notice that
we are a single term away from the Bregman divergence induced by ψ. In particular
W (x) + ψ(x∗) = Dψ(x∗, x). Let us formally define the Bregman divergence induced
by ψ.
Definition A.3.2. Let ψ : X → R be a strictly convex function. The Bregman
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divergence associated with ψ is:
Dψ(x1, x2) := ψ(x1) − ψ(x2) − ⟨∂ψ(x2), x1 − x2⟩. (A.7)
We now list some useful properties of the Bregman divergence of a strictly/strongly
convex function ψ:
1. Dψ is strictly convex in its first argument.
2. Dψ(x, y) ≥ 0,∀x, y and Dψ(x, y) = 0 iff x = y.
3. In general Dψ(x, y) ̸= Dψ(y, x) e.g. consider ψ(x) =
∑︁
i xi log (xi).
4. In general Dψ(x, y) is non-convex in its second argument e.g. ψ(x) = − log (x).
5. Linearity in ψ i.e. Dψ+αϕ(x, y) = Dψ(x, y) + αDϕ(x, y).
6. ∂Dψ(x,y)
∂x = ∇ψ(x) − ∇ψ(y).
7. Dψ(x, y) +Dψ(y, z) = Dψ(x, z) + ⟨x − y,∇ψ(z) − ∇ψ(y)⟩.
8. If ψ is α-strongly convex with respect to ∥ · ∥ then Dψ(x, y) ≥ α2 ∥x − y∥
2.
9. Dψ(x, y) = Dψ∗(∇ψ(y),∇ψ(x)).
All of the above properties are easy to show by direct algebra and for the last property
using Lemma A.3.3. Let us look at 2 standard examples for Bregman divergences.
First consider the standard ℓ2 norm ∥ · ∥. The strongly convex function inducing the
Bregman divergence is given by ψ(x) = 12∥x∥






2 − ⟨y, x − y⟩
= 12∥x∥
2 + 12∥y∥
2 − ⟨y, x⟩ = 12∥x − y∥
2.
Since we begun our discussion with wanting a different geometry on X than the
Euclidean one, let us look at what happens when we choose ψ(x) = ∑︁di=1 xi log (xi).
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We are also going to constrain our space to the set C = {x ∈ Rn+ : ∥x∥1 = 1}. The





xi log (xi) −
d∑︂
i=1
yi log (yi) −
d∑︂
i=1




xi log (xi/yi) .
We now show a very useful property for analyzing proximal methods which use
Bregman divergence as the proximity map.
Lemma A.3.5. Let f be a convex function such that f ̸≡ ∞. Suppose f has domain
an open set containing the convex set C. Suppose ψ is α-strongly convex and let:
x∗ = arg min
x∈C
{f(x) +Dψ(x, x0)}.
For any y ∈ C we have:
f(y) +Dψ(y, x0) ≥ f(x∗) +Dψ(x∗, x0) +Dψ(y, x∗).
Proof. By optimality for constraint optimization we have that there exists a subgradient
d of f(x∗)+Dψ(x∗, x0) such that for all x ∈ C it holds that ⟨d, x−x∗⟩ ≥ 0 or equivalently
there exists a subgradient g of f(x∗) such that
⟨g + ∇ψ(x∗) − ∇ψ(x0), x − x∗⟩ ≥ 0,
for all x ∈ C. Using the fact that f is convex we have:
f(y) ≥ f(x∗) + ⟨g, y − x∗⟩ ≥ f(x∗) + ⟨∇ψ(x∗) − ∇ψ(x0), y − x∗⟩
= f(x∗) − ⟨∇ψ(x0), x∗ − x0⟩ + ψ(x∗) − ψ(x0) + ⟨ψ(x0), y − x0⟩ − ψ(y) + ψ(x0)
− ⟨∇ψ(x∗), y − x∗⟩ + ψ(y) − ψ(x∗)
= f(x∗) +Dψ(x∗, x0) −Dψ(y, x0) +Dψ(y, x∗).
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As a direct corollary we get the General Pythagorean Theorem:
Theorem A.3.6. If x∗ is the projection of x0 onto the convex set C with respect to
the Bregman divergence induced by ψ i.e.
x∗ = arg min
x∈C
Dψ(x, x0),
then Dψ(y, x0) ≥ Dψ(y, x∗) +Dψ(x∗, x0).
A.3.5 Mirror descent as proximal gradient descent
Recall that one motivation for the gradient descent update came from the following
observation. If f is convex then −∇f(xt) is the steepest direction of descent near an
infinitesimal region around xt. If we penalize moving away from xt via a term which
captures the geometry of the space, we are still likely to decrease the objective. This led
to choosing the next step xt+1 as the minimizer of minx∈X ⟨∇f(xt), x −xt⟩+ 1η∥x −xt∥
2.
Even though we now should be convinced that this is not really the correct reasoning
behind gradient descent, it is still natural to ask what would happen if we replaced
the Euclidean norm squared by the Bregman divergence of some strongly convex ψ.
After all from the properties we have seen so far Bregman divergence almost acts like
a norm on X . We now show what happens when xt+1 is chosen as the minimizer of
⟨∇f(xt), x − xt⟩ + 1ηDψ(x, xt). It turns out that this step exactly recovers the mirror
descent update.
Lemma A.3.7. Let xt+1 = arg minx∈X {⟨∇f(xt), x − xt⟩ + 1ηDψ(x, xt)}. Then xt+1 =
∇ψ∗(∇ψ(xt) − ∇f(xt)).
Proof. Since Dψ(x, xt) is strongly convex in x then ⟨∇f(xt), x − xt⟩ + 1ηDψ(x, xt) is
strongly convex in x and thus has a unique minimizer. Using first order optimality
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condition we have:
η∇f(xt) + (∇ψ(xt+1) − ∇ψ(xt)) = 0
⇐⇒ xt+1 = ∇ψ−1(∇ψ(xt) − η∇f(xt)) = ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(xt) − η∇f(xt)).
A.3.6 Online projected mirror descent
In this section we discuss how to obtain regret guarantees for the online convex
optimization problem. Suppose instead of wanting to minimize a convex function
f(xt) and observing its gradient ∇f(xt) we are given a sequence of convex functions
{ft(·)}Tt=1 with gradients ∇ft(·). We will further assume that our iterates xt are
constraint to be in a convex set C. First we need to determine how the projection step
looks like. It does not make sense to project with respect to Euclidean geometry any
longer after all we came up with a different identification of primal and dual spaces
exactly because we wanted to consider a different geometry on the primal space. We
already know that the Bregman divergence plays the role of distance function in this
new geometry and it is strongly convex with respect to the first argument so a good
candidate for the projection of a point x0 becomes ˆ︁x = arg minx∈C Dψ(x, x0). This
translates to the mirror descent update in the following way:
xt+1/2 = ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(xt) − η∇ft(xt))
xt+1 = arg minx∈C Dψ(x, xt+1/2).
Let us have a quick sanity check. From our discussion about how mirror descent can
be interpreted as a proximal method the above update needs to be equivalent to xt+1 =
arg minx∈C{ηgt(x) +Dψ(x, xt)}, where gt(x) = ⟨∇ft(xt), x − xt⟩. Using first order opti-
mality for constraint convex optimization we have that xt+1 = arg minx∈C Dψ(x, xt+1/2)
is equivalent to:
⟨∇ψ(xt+1) − ∇ψ(xt+1/2), y − xt+1⟩ = ⟨∇ψ(xt+1) − ∇ψ(xt) + η∇ft(xt), y − xt+1⟩ ≥ 0,∀y ∈ C.
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On the other hand ⟨∇ψ(xt+1)−∇ψ(xt)+η∇ft(xt), y−xt+1⟩ ≥ 0,∀y ∈ C is exactly the
optimality condition for minx∈C{ηgt(x) +Dψ(x, xt)}. We now present the stochastic
projected mirror descent update:
xt+1/2 = ∇ψ∗(∇ψ(xt) − η∇ft(xt))
xt+1 = arg minx∈C Dψ(x, xt+1/2).
(A.8)
The above algorithm comes equipped with the following regret guarantee.
Theorem A.3.8. After T iterations of A.8 with step size η we have:
T∑︂
t=1






where α is the strong convexity parameter of ψ and ∥∇ft(x)∥2∗ ≤ σ2,∀t ∈ [T ], x ∈ C,
and x∗ is any point in C.
Proof. Let us track the progress in the primal space using the Lyapunov function
Dψ(·, x∗). Using the equivalence of the update to the proximal step together with
lemma A.3.5 we have
η⟨∇ft(xt), x∗ − xt⟩ +Dψ(x∗, xt) ≥ η⟨∇ft(xt), xt+1 − xt⟩
+Dψ(xt+1, xt) +Dψ(x∗, xt+1).
Shuffling terms around this gives us:
Dψ(x∗, xt+1) −Dψ(x∗, xt) ≤ η⟨∇ft(xt), x∗ − xt+1⟩ −Dψ(xt+1, xt)
= η⟨∇ft(xt), x∗ − xt⟩ + η⟨∇ft(xt), xt − xt+1⟩ −Dψ(xt+1, xt)
≤ η⟨∇ft(xt), x∗ − xt⟩ + η∥∇ft(xt)∥∗∥xt − xt+1∥ −Dψ(xt+1, xt)





Telescoping and using convexity we arrive at the conclusion of the theorem.
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Appendix B
Tools for lower bounds in bandit
games
In this chapter we discuss two types of lower bounds for bandit problems. For both
types of lower bounds we will fix a class of problem instances Θ. An instance θ ∈ Θ
describes precisely how the losses or rewards are generated over the T rounds of the
bandit game. For example, in the stochastic MAB game θ can just be thought of as a
distribution over the rewards of the arms at each round.
The first type of lower bound we consider is a min-max lower bound. Every regret
bound depends both on the problem instance θ and the algorithm or policy which
the player follows. Let us denote the policy of the player by π and suppose that this
policy belongs to some fixed class of policies Π. This class, for example, could consist
of all deterministic algorithms mapping observed rewards (or losses) to a new action.





E[Rθ,π(T )] ≥ f(T ),
where f(T ) is some function of the time horizon. The interpretation of such bounds
is that there always exists a bandit problem θ such that no matter what strategy
the player chooses to follow, she would necessarily incur regret at least C(T ) (in
expectation).
The second type of lower bound is the so called instance dependent lower bounds.
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These bounds are the counter-parts of the instance dependent regret upper bounds
which we discussed for the stochastic MAB problem in Section 1.2.2.2. The instance
dependent bounds read in the following way – for a fixed bandit instance θ and any




f(T ) ≥ C(θ),
where again f(T ) is some function of the horizon ( most often f(T ) = log (T )), and
C(θ) is some instance dependent constant. We note that while instance-dependent
lower bounds might seem stronger than the min-max lower bounds, they are usually
asymptotic in nature, that is they only hold in the limit as T goes to infinity, and
further it is usually harder to derive such bounds.
B.1 Min-max lower bounds
The basic principle behind showing min-max lower bounds is to exhibit two instances
of the bandit problem θ and θ′ which are very close, in information theoretic terms,
however, have different best arms. On one hand if θ and θ′ are similar, information
theory tells us that we would need many observations from θ and θ′ to be able to tell
the two instances apart. Let us consider the following simple example. Suppose that
θ is the distribution N (0, 1) and θ′ is the distribution N (ϵ, 1). A sequence (Xt)Tt=1 is
sampled from either θ or θ′. How large does T need to be so that we can determine if
the sequence was sampled from θ or θ′? More formally we are trying come up with a
policy π which maps from the T samples to a binary space {0, 1}, where 0 denotes that
the samples came from θ and 1 denotes that the samples came from θ′. And so we are
interested in π such that w.p. at least 1 − δ determines correctly the distribution, that
is P(π(X1, . . . , XT ) = 0|θ) ≥ 1 − δ and P(π(X1, . . . , XT ) = 1|θ′) ≥ 1 − δ. For short,
let us denote P0(·) = P(·|θ) and P1(·) = P(·|θ′), and the event π(X1, . . . , XT ) = 0 as A.
Answering the above question also implies that P0(A) − P1(A) ≥ 1 − 2δ. Intuitively,
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however, the difference P1(A) − P2(A) should depend on ϵ and so a small ϵ would
require more samples to distinguish between θ and θ′. The min-max lower bounds for
multi-armed bandits will follow the same overall idea, that is to show that P1 and P2
are close for any event A.
To bound the difference between P1(A)−P2(A) we are going to need some tools from
information theory. We first give the definition of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Definition B.1.1 (KL-divergence). The KL-divergence for two (absolutely continuous)

















Further, we define the KL-divergence between two Bernoulli random variables with
parameters p1 and p2 respectively as











The KL-divergence enjoys two key properties which we will need. First, it decom-
poses over product distributions which follows from the chain rule, and second, it is
an upper bound on the difference |P1 − P2|, which is known as Pinsker’s inequality.
Theorem B.1.1 (Chain rule for relative entropy). Let P and Q be two probability
measures on Ω. Then
KL(P(X, Y ),Q(X, Y )) = KL(P(X),Q(X)) +KL(P(Y |X),Q(Y |X)).








Using the above two theorems we can finally derive a bound on the difference
between the distributions induced by θ and θ′ and determine the number of samples
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to distinguish the two. First we use Pinsker’s inequality to bound (P1(A) − P2(A))2 ≤
1




KL(N (0, 1),N (ϵ, 1)) = Tϵ
2
2 .
The above implies that there exists no policy which can distinguish θ from θ′ with




Standard MAB lower bound. We now show how to extend the above ideas to
the bandit game. For the K-armed bandit game we define K environments (θi)Ki=1
s.t. θi is N (µi, I) where µi ∈ RK is the vector with coordinate j ̸= i equal to 1/2
and j-th coordinate equal to 1/2 − ϵ. Let Pi be the associated probability measure
induced by the player’s strategy over the T rounds of the game when interacting with
losses generated by θi. Further, let P0 be the probability measure induced by the
player’s policy when interacting with a bandit game in which all losses are sampled
from N (1/2, 1). Suppose the adversary selects which environment the player is going
to face in the beginning of the game, uniformly at random from all θi’s. If Ni(T )
denotes the random variable which is the number of times the player selected the i-th











Let us now bound |EPi [Ni(T )] −EP0 [Ni(T )]| using the same techniques as we did when
trying to distinguish N (0, 1) from N (ϵ, 1). First we write
EPi [Ni(T )] =
T∑︂
t=1




where it denotes the random variable which denotes the arm selected by the player.
We can decompose EP0 [Ni(T )] in the same way. Thus using Pinsker’s inequality and
AM-QM inequality the regret can be lower bounded as













The above inequality reveals the trade-off in selecting ϵ by the adversary. On one
hand the smaller ϵ is the harder it is to distinguish Pi from P0. On the other hand the




shows that the expected regret is lower bounded as E[R(T )] ≥ Ω(
√
TK).
For a similar exposition and more details on min-max lower bounds we refer the
reader to Slivkins (2019).
B.2 Instance dependent lower bounds
While min-max bounds provide a clear picture of what is possible to achieve in terms
of regret minimization for the bandit problem they do not tell the full story. After
all the player might not be faced with an adversary which has selected the worst
possible problem instance. In fact, if ϵ, that is the gap between the best arm and
other arms is large, the approach we present above is going to fail. Further, there
exist algorithms for the stochastic MAB problem which achieve instance-dependent
bounds which evaluate to O(K log (T )) whenever ϵ is large. It is natural to ask if such
algorithms are optimal. Next we show how to attempt such a lower bound.
Similarly to the min-max lower bounds we begin with a lower bound on the KL-
divergence between the induced measures P and P′ by the policy of the player acting
on bandit instances θ and θ′. We well specify how to choose θ′ given an instance θ in
a bit. The key inequality states that
KL(P,P′) ≥ kl(EP[X],EP′ [X]), (B.1)
where X is any measurable random variable with respect to P and P′ and kl is the
KL-divergence between two Bernoulli random variables with the respective means.




Eθi [Nk(T )]KL(θ(k), θ′(k)).
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where we use θ(k) to denote the distribution of arm k under environment θ. Fix an
arm k which is sub-optimal under θ. Let X = Nk(T )/T and choose θ′ so that it only
differs from θ on arm k and arm k is optimal for θ′ We have the following
Eθ[Nk(T )]KL(θ(k), θ′(k)) ≥
(︄






T − Eθ′ [Nk(T )]
)︄
− log (2) .
We claim that this is sufficient for our desired lower bound, at least for player strategies
which enjoy instance-dependent guarantees. In particular, let π be such a strategy,
that is for any α > 0 the strategy has regret bounded by o(Tα) for large enough
T on any instance problem instance. Then because k is sub-optimal for θ we have
Eθ[Nk(T )]
T





→ log (T ). Let θk be the environment
which minimizes the KL-divergence over all θ′ which satisfy the above construction.




∆k log (T )
KL(θ, θk)
,
for large enough T . The work of Garivier et al. (2018) shows such instance dependent
bounds formally and further discusses lower bounds for small T as well.
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